Haiti experienced a military coup when it was their first time under a government freely elected by the people. However, unexpectedly, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the then-President of Haiti, who was considered pro-people, was accused of having committed human rights violations. This was the beginning of the 1991 Haitian military coup, which never brought peace to the country. Many in the international community paid attention to this phenomenon. Various interventions to bring peace were carried out by Western countries, even symbolically by the United Nations, to engage in peacebuilding through liberal means. However, these liberal peacebuilding efforts did not run smoothly and received a lot of criticism, especially from the perspective of critical peacebuilding. It was in this situation that grassroots movements began to emerge, marking the emergence of a local turn. The author will explain one by one the history of the 1991 Haitian military coup, the liberal peacebuilding intervention efforts by the West, the criticism of its failure through critical peacebuilding, and the rise of local communities.
Aristide’s election by the people symbolized opposition to the military and economic elite that had long been in power (Hallward, 2007). His administration at that time was considered pro-people because of his efforts to expand civilian control over the military. He pressured cruel generals under the previous military regime to retire and promoted officers who were considered committed to democracy. Although his actions seemed good for the people, President Aristide’s human rights record was tarnished by military killings of civilians and his supporters in rural areas. In addition, five young men were killed by military officers who were friendly to the Aristide government, but the case was never seriously investigated. Not to mention, the civilian population became increasingly brutal in their violence, such as hanging and intimidating people they considered evil, sometimes from among their political opponents.
Just eight months after Aristide was inaugurated, a military coup took place, justified by the perpetrators as a response to human rights violations committed by the Aristide regime. This coup was not only a military rebellion but also a response from powerful interest groups who felt threatened by Aristide’s populist agenda (Dupuy, 1997).During the three years of the coup, there were 3,000 deaths, and hundreds of thousands of Haitians fled to the United States and the Dominican Republic. The army also repressed grassroots movements, such as the Papaye Peasant Movement (MPP), the Kombit Komilfo, the Labadie Youth Movement, and others. Many media outlets, including radio stations, were also repressed; journalists were arrested, and equipment was destroyed. Systematic violence against supporters of democracy and civilians continued until 1994.
Various diplomatic efforts were made to restore Haiti’s legitimate government through diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the United States. These diplomatic efforts led to the Governors Island Agreement (1993), which demanded the resignation of General Cedras, the return of Aristide as the legitimate president, and military and police reforms. However, its implementation failed because the military did not comply with the agreement. Not stopping there, the UN sought to resolve the military coup by mandating the United States to send 20,000 troops to overthrow the military government and restore Aristide. In addition, the UN also sent various missions, such as the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), which focused on training the Haitian National Police, and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which acted as an occupying force. At the peak of its efforts, elections were held as a symbol of peace in 1995 and 2000. The efforts made by the UN to restore the legitimate government of Haiti indicate the existence of liberal peacebuilding efforts that focus on democratization and the institutionalization of the rule of law (Paris, 2004).
Through critical peacebuilding, peacebuilding efforts have been criticized for being too top-down. Liberal peace often fails to take into account the daily lives of local communities and ignores their ability to carry out bottom-up peacebuilding actions (Richmond, 2011). As a result of liberal peacebuilding efforts, many programs are irrelevant to the needs of the Haitian people. Peacebuilding efforts carried out by parties external to Haiti often marginalize local communities and, over time, erode the state’s sovereignty (Kolbe & Muggah, 2015). Local civil society, indigenous communities, and grassroots organizations are not actively involved in policy formulation. For example, in the 1955 elections, the elections were repressive, unfree, and designed in such a way that the dominant elite and power conflicts were repeated. The elections were futile because there were no substantial social reforms, rendering peacebuilding efforts ineffective (Paris, 2004). Foreign aid created dependence on foreign countries. Local communities were not encouraged to be self-sufficient in improving their own welfare. The security mission undertaken by the UN also did not go well. Instead of being a security force and ensuring welfare, MINUSTAH members were involved in cases of sexual abuse of children. They have also become symbols of repression rather than peace, as during the colonial era. The institutions that have been established and reformed, such as the police and the judiciary, have had no significant impact because they lack popular legitimacy and are still prone to corruption. These institutions were established to achieve external goals, not local needs, and are therefore ineffective (Mac Ginty, 2021).
In the context of the failure of liberal peacebuilding efforts by the UN and Western countries due to the dominance of external actors, a different approach is needed to improve the welfare of Haitian society. With a local turn approach, the needs of the community will be more relevant because they are aware of what they need. The local turn emphasizes that peace must have meaning for those who experience it every day, not just for those who plan it from outside (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). This approach recognizes local communities as actors of peace by valuing community solidarity and everyday peace strategies. This approach has given rise to grassroots movements within communities to oppose top-down policies. Examples include the Mouvement Paysan de Papaye (MPP), Tèt Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen, local women’s movements in Port-au-Prince and rural areas, and others. The impact they have is also more positive than Western-designed liberal peacebuilding. MPP and Tèt Kole, as movements working in the field of agriculture, reject destructive foreign aid, such as genetically modified seeds from Monsanto. This has an impact on correcting the logic of liberal peacebuilding, which often frames power in the form of aid.
Thus, critical peacebuilding criticizes the failure of liberal peacebuilding efforts in Haiti by the UN and Western countries. These efforts did not result in conditions that were any better than those during the coup. The law is difficult to enforce because structural problems are too forced to follow Western methods and standards, making them irrelevant to conditions in Haiti. For this reason, the revival of local communities in the context of the local turn has a more positive influence than liberal peacebuilding.
