Diplomacy in Asia is moving at a swift pace where the upcoming SCO summit will emerge as the latest focal point. As the two Asian powers reengage, Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit to New Delhi on 18-19 August laid the foundation of this reset. The engagement ahead of the SCO summit represented a crucial moment that would shape the trajectory of India-China relations. During his visit, he held meetings and talks with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval, and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar. In the aftermath of the Galwan clash, these meetings carried a lot of symbolism and substance. He invited Modi to attend the upcoming SCO summit, which Modi has accepted, signalling the openness to exploring arrangements beyond Western frameworks. The issues raised in these meetings ranged from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) disengagement to easing trade restrictions and sharing hydrological data regarding the new dam in Tibet. As US economic pressure mounts, India is looking to diversify its ties, and a regional multilateral framework like the SCO opens a viable avenue.
Wang’s itinerary also included Pakistan and Afghanistan after his India visit. This highlights that China would be playing a central role in South Asia’s security apparatus. Beijing is navigating a complex triangular dynamic existing between India, China, and Pakistan. With this context, important questions arise, like what agendas will dominate the SCO summit, how far this potential reset will go, and what are the implications for South Asia.
The stage setting for the summit has been completed, with the disengagement and reopening of border points, the lifting of the ban on rare earth magnets, the restoration of fertiliser supplies, and talks on resuming direct flights. With the mix of these pragmatic and sensitive agendas, SCO can be used to advance these issues. Border disengagement can be one of the talking points. Strengthening economic ties and trade facilitation will also be major themes. Discussions on resource flows, energy cooperation, and supply chains have become more and more prominent on the SCO’s agenda, providing Beijing and New Delhi with a formal forum to discuss issues like high-tech products, rare earths, and fertilisers. Under the SCO’s auspices, a potentially delicate bilateral negotiation receives credibility, enabling both nations to show collaboration without undermining their bargaining positions.
Hydrological cooperation will also emerge, most likely under the SCO’s focus on sustainable development and ecological security, especially with regard to China’s massive project in Tibet. While China can portray its projects as aligned with regional development objectives, India finds that bringing up the issue on a multilateral basis helps ensure transparency.
Both India and China share an outlook on domestic economic development; i.e., foreign policy is being used as a tool to achieve it. Leading them to downplay their ideological differences. This explains the emphasis on economics, trade, and connectivity. They recognise that creating a stable environment is essential to sustain their growth. Even this kind of pragmatism does not exist in a vacuum; it is rather shaped by U.S. economic pressure.
Trump’s sweeping tariffs on India form the broader backdrop and also catalyse India-China closeness. Washington’s accusations that India is profiteering from Russian oil have unsettled the U.S.-India ties. The U.S. courting Pakistan amidst the existing tension between India and Pakistan has rattled New Delhi.
Wang Yi’s travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan showed China’s position as a central stabiliser in South Asia. In Kabul, he chaired the Sixth Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue with Pakistan’s Ishaq Dar and Afghanistan’s Amir Khan Muttaqi. All sides pledged to advance counterterrorism efforts, enhance trade and transit, and extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan. This was aimed at tackling the threats to Chinese projects, reflecting the economic as well as security motivations. Later in Pakistan, he re-emphasised the iron brotherhood bond while pushing regional integration. Moreover, these visits focused on the dynamics that reassured Pakistan of China’s support and also drew Afghanistan into its connectivity vision.
Around 20 leaders, observers, and dialogue partners are coming together for the SCO summit, which is a major optic for China’s diplomacy. Several incremental outcomes can be expected. Confidence-building measures on border disengagement may be announced, intended to reduce friction along the Line of Actual Control. Since the announcements regarding easing restrictions on rare earths and fertilisers or resuming flights are already done, states will move one step further by institutionalising these measures, embedding them in working groups, joint statements, or formal agreements. Counterterrorism will be India’s priority concern; it would also try to gain consensus on cross-border terrorism. However, this issue could emerge as an irritant in the broader discussions, a test of the SCO’s accommodative capacity for divergent security calculus. As far as Beijing is concerned, the summit offers a platform for optics beyond Asia. While SCO is a baton for non-Western multilateralism, China itself can be viewed as an alternative centre of global governance. This would be much about narrative and image as it is about policy.
Although SCO is a stepping stone in India-China relations, it is not a magic wand that would eliminate the existing structural issues. By institutionalising earlier announcements and advancing modest confidence-building measures, it can provide a framework for steady engagement. For Beijing, it is an opportunity to demonstrate that China is central to Asia’s diplomacy. The real test lies beyond the summit: whether India and China can convert symbolic gestures into durable mechanisms of cooperation and whether Pakistan and Afghanistan can be drawn into stable patterns of regional integration.
