Authors: Suman Manchi and Dr. Rubina Pradhan*
The Pahalgam terror attack on 22 April 2025, followed by the Indian armed forces’ swift ‘Operation Sindoor,’ has reopened the debate on nuclear stability by dragging two overt nuclear powers into an operational flare-up. The episode has put the standard model of deterrence under stress. Deterrence, by definition, is the capacity to dissuade an adversary from a particular course of action by threatening unacceptable costs. The rationale for acquiring nuclear arsenals rests on this principle: to contain any real or imagined challenges. Yet the logic of this compulsion has faced erosion whenever Pakistan has deployed cross-border terrorism under a national flag. For all their power to inhibit the use of rival nuclear arms, such arsenals failed to inhibit conventional aggression or proxy attacks orchestrated by an adversary willing to tolerate escalation.
India carried out a surgical strike following the 2016 Uri incident and the Balakot airstrike in response to the 2019 Pulwama attack. Based on these precedents, it was widely believed that the current government would respond with military retaliation against Pakistan after the Pahalgam terror attack. The Indian Air Force carried out Operation Sindoor against multiple terror infrastructures across Pakistan. The Pahalgam terror attack and its aftermath clearly demonstrated that tensions between nuclear-armed states can escalate significantly. Escalation is often explained through an ‘escalation ladder,’ ranging from diplomatic actions at the lowest level to conventional military operations and ultimately the possibility of nuclear war. It is widely argued that the presence of nuclear weapons acts as a large-scale conflict escalation, primarily due to the risk of inadvertent exchange. Such escalation arises from miscommunication, misperception, or accidental launches, thereby compelling states to exercise greater caution in their strategic behavior.
Though India did not stop at putting in abeyance the Indus Water Treaty, her response signaled a shift in strategic posture as India crossed the Line of Control and the international border to carry out military operations in retaliation. The Indian armed forces made it clear that Operation Sindoor targeted only terrorist hideouts and launchpads, with precision strikes that were carefully calibrated to avoid escalation. This strategy was aimed at placing the onus of any further escalation on Pakistan. While Pakistan did escalate, India retaliated with a strike on Pakistan’s air base, radar installations, and air defense systems, continuing the engagement until a ceasefire was mutually agreed upon.
During Operation Sindoor, the geopolitical conversation surrounding the risks and challenges of tensions between nuclear-armed states gained significant momentum. Nuclear discourse is one of the major aspects of geopolitics. Nuclear deterrence has proven ineffective in preventing major incidents like the Mumbai terror attack of 26/11, the Uri incident, the Pulwama incident, the Pahalgam incident, and numerous instances of cross-border terrorism. These events highlight the limitations of nuclear weapons in deterring conventional and, more significantly, the acts of terror groups. However, they do play a crucial role in preventing conflict from escalating beyond a certain threshold.
There is increasing fear that this threshold is continuously rising and that any escalation, whether deliberate or accidental, could result in nuclear accidents. Nuclear weapons are frequently used as a form of blackmail. Concern over the increase of tension between two nuclear-armed states was voiced by the Western world. However, Dr. S. Jaishankar, India’s External Affairs Minister, criticized the West’s tendency to project nuclear fear whenever tensions occur elsewhere in the world, as if non-Western nations are innately less capable of handling nuclear hazards.
In his speech following Operation Sindoor, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made it very evident that India would not accept or give in to nuclear blackmail, even though Pakistan has long used it as a tactic. India accused the Pakistani state and military of being behind the Pahalgam assaults. He added that going forward, “acts of terror” will be regarded as “acts of war,” even if Operation Sindoor was reiterated as India’s new anti-terrorism policy. This new anti-state-sponsored terrorism policy treats all acts by terrorist organizations as being carried out by the Pakistani government.
The military’s dominance over civilian political leadership in Pakistan has long been apparent. India has also publicly denounced Pakistan’s backing for terrorist groups, from providing them with safe havens to sending its military chiefs to terrorists’ funerals. India has serious security concerns when the state is so close to terrorist organizations and when the military controls the state’s policies. Pakistan is now essentially unable to disassociate itself from the crimes committed on Indian soil by its terrorist organizations as a result of India’s new anti-terrorism policy.
Pakistan still maintains ambiguity over the use of nuclear weapons, whereas India has proclaimed a no-first-use policy. India’s supremacy in conventional weaponry is intended to be countered by this uncertainty. The scenario is made more dangerous by the uncertainty surrounding the circumstances and timing of Pakistan’s use of its nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it is impossible to overlook China’s ongoing assistance to Pakistan in developing its narrative and in all other international forums. Another significant worry is China’s ongoing attempts to modernize its armaments system and expand its stockpile. The recent military coup in Bangladesh, which resulted in a regime less aligned with India’s interests, has introduced new strategic and diplomatic challenges.
All the above complexities pose a great challenge to India’s security as well as the regional stability of South Asia. India’s nuclear doctrine having an official no first use policy is an effective strategy that guarantees its adversaries that India would not use nuclear weapons unless attacked first. This also brings in a sense of stability in the region. India also believes in having a minimum nuclear stockpile, but a credible one that is enough to defend its security and sovereignty. India’s nuclear strategy makes it very clear that India’s retaliation against any first strike would be massive, with an intention to inflict maximum damage to the adversary.
The challenge now is how long the deterrence that has been reinstated during operation sindoor continues to be effective. Pakistan’s geography is not broad and wide enough to absorb any nuclear strike, unlike India, which has a geographical advantage with its land spread over a large area. Given Pakistan’s narrow geographical layout, any nuclear strike by India could result in disproportionately severe consequences. But would that stop Pakistan from engaging in state-sponsored terrorism in the future? How long would this deterrence hold? Any future acts of terror would result in a more aggressive response from the Indian side. Any escalation, misunderstanding, or accident may lead to nuclear disaster. India’s security strategy should aim at possessing ‘enough’ nuclear stockpiles to enforce minimum credible deterrence. Operation Sindoor demonstrated the value of having modernized and enhanced conventional military capabilities, despite the debate surrounding nuclear weapons. The same cannot be substituted. War is more expensive than deterrence.
*Dr. Rubina Pradhan, Assistant Professor, Centre for Research in Social Sciences and Education JAIN (Deemed-to-be University), Bengaluru, India
