Russia has transformed its nuclear strategy following the 2022 Ukraine invasion, which integrates nuclear signaling into conventional conflict through calculated ambiguity and graduated escalation. This article reveals how Russia employs nuclear gestures not primarily to deter nuclear attacks but to discourage Western proactiveness. This strategic shift presents unique challenges for European security architecture, requiring fundamental reassessment of deterrence frameworks across five dimensions: capability, institutional, normative, perceptual, and alliance. As traditional boundaries between war and peace fade, European nations must develop new cooperative approaches to nuclear policy while maintaining credible deterrence in an era of strategic uncertainty.
In the post-Cold War era, the assumption that nuclear deterrence had reached a stable equilibrium guided much of international security thinking. However, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine marked a pivotal moment that fundamentally altered this paradigm. Analysis of Russia’s deliberate integration of nuclear signaling into conventional conflict illuminates the emerging contours of future warfare—characterized not by clear lines between nuclear and conventional domains, but by calculated ambiguity, psychological manipulation, and graduated escalation. As traditional boundaries between war and peace become increasingly blurred, Europe faces the task of developing new strategic approaches that can effectively respond to these evolving threats while maintaining regional stability.
Russia has significantly altered its nuclear strategy since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Prior to this, in 2020, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published the presidential executive order “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” which outlined a broadened deterrence strategy. This framework defined nuclear deterrence not solely as a military-technical measure but as a comprehensive approach incorporating economic, informational, and political instruments targeted at both nuclear and non-nuclear states.
The main goal of this strategy is not to deter a nuclear or ballistic missile attack but to discourage Western powers from intervening in the war—especially through military aid. This approach challenges long-standing nuclear deterrence concepts, which were originally developed during the Cold War to prevent direct nuclear confrontation between superpowers. Russia has now unilaterally incorporated nuclear saber-rattling and brinkmanship into the realm of conventional and regional conflicts, marking a significant shift in the character and scope of nuclear strategy.
Russia’s new nuclear strategy includes nuclear gestures, threatening public declarations, information operations, and military tests and drills involving dual-capable weapons. Scholars of the Russian nuclear strategy argue that Russia tries to expand its “rungs of the nuclear escalation ladder.” Deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, the use of nuclear-capable Oreshnik ICBMs in Ukraine, and Russian officials’ rhetoric about not-unthinkable possible nuclear escalation represent Russia’s accelerated and demanding nuclear posture towards not only Ukraine but NATO too. These “rungs” give Russia the capacityto coerce other states and have influence on decision-makers in the West. The Kremlin views nuclear saber-rattling as a multi-step strategy. While it may not lead to the actual use of non-tactical nuclear weapons, its strength lies in shaping the perceptions of adversaries.
The current period represents great turbulence for European security architecture, with Russia’s aggressive nuclear strategy introducing additional complications. One of the most significant and unusual challenges facing European states is the absence of a coherent framework for common security and defense policy—particularly regarding nuclear issues. Crucially, the current nuclear challenge diverges sharply from the structured, bipolar tensions of the 20th century. Today’s nuclear landscape is broader, more diffuse, and strategically complex. Russia’s evolving doctrine extends beyond traditional deterrence, targeting not only regional adversaries but also aiming to obstruct Western military support to Ukraine. The diverse nature of these threats suggests that future conflict in Europe will revolve less around direct military confrontation and more around the manipulation of psychological thresholds, often avoiding clear and decisive military escalation.
Regardless of how the war in Ukraine ultimately concludes, Europe and the West cannot evade addressing fundamental security and defense issues, which must necessarily include nuclear considerations related to Russia. In the EU, security and defense remain domains primarily under national jurisdiction, and concurrently, the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence has been undermined following the Trump administration’s inauguration and subsequent turbulence in transatlantic relations.
Russia’s sophisticated nuclear maneuvering presents significant countering difficulties because individual nuclear gestures often fall below thresholds that would incite direct response—they are neither sufficiently aggressive nor substantial enough to warrant comprehensive counter-strategy implementation, but they do exist as an elephant in the room. This approach resembles “salami slicing” tactics—employing various low- or medium-level hostile acts, such as threatening public statements or provocative military exercises. Such strategies create a dilemma when responding to every provocation becomes impractical, while ignoring all acts of hostility appears equally problematic. Furthermore, if this strategy demonstrates effectiveness, it will likely encourage further strategic thinking centered on micro-escalation and ambiguous thresholds.
The key strategic challenge for Europe lies not only in redesigning its defense and security posture but also in reassessing the evolving nature of warfare itself—one that is unlikely to be clear-cut, decisive, or sharply defined. Russia’s bold and increasingly coercive nuclear doctrine necessitates a fundamental redefinition of the established concept of hybrid warfare. This reimagined framework must incorporate elements such as nuclear ambiguity, graduated escalation, blurred boundaries between political and military domains, and sustained brinkmanship as core features of future conflict.
Europe possesses two nuclear powers—the United Kingdom and France—each with very distinct national nuclear strategies emerging from country-specific historical contexts and strategic visions. With the resurgence of security and defense discourse, the need for integration of nuclear issues alongside other conventional and unconventional warfare considerations is apparent. These dynamics may catalyze recalibration of strategic thinking regarding nuclear provocations and signaling. Beyond enhancing relevant military capabilities, the European community requires a coherent vision determining how to interpret Russia’s nuclear provocations, distinguishing which actions warrant a response and which should be disregarded.
Thus, the challenge that the European community faces can be divided into five parts:
Capability dimension for strengthening military tools to respond to an adversary;
Institutional dimension to define which organizational structure will coordinate the common policy;
Normative dimension to establish shared understanding of Russia’s nuclear behavior;
Perceptual dimension to manage psychological factors and risk assessment; and
Alliance dimension to coordinate policies with non-European, most expectedly transatlantic partners.
Russia’s use of nuclear signaling within conventional operations has created a strategic gray zone, where traditional deterrence is no longer sufficient. The future of Eurasian geopolitics will likely be characterized by broad nuclear gestures and blurry boundaries between a real threat and a bluff. But success will depend on multi-dimensional resilience—the ability to interpret ambiguous signals, maintain a strategic perspective, and respond proportionately. By addressing these five dimensions holistically, Europe can develop the strategic autonomy necessary to navigate this complex landscape while preserving regional stability in an era of nuclear renaissance.
