Israel has expanded its objectives in the conflict with Iran, now aiming not only to dismantle the Islamic Republic’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, but also to promote regime change in Tehran. This shift has raised alarm bells due to the parallels with previous interventions. The cases of Iraq, Libya, and Syria show that abrupt regime changes often trigger civil wars and mass migration. Iran’s system is particularly complex, and a violent collapse could fragment the country and trigger an even greater exodus. To this, we must add growing divisions within the United States and conflicting positions in Europe, further complicating the global scenario.
Regime Change in the Middle East: Recent Precedents
In recent days, during an interview with Fox News, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly broadened his government’s objectives in the conflict with Iran. Under his leadership, the current Israeli government would not only seek to dismantle Iran’s nuclear and missile programs through military action, but also to push for regime change in Tehran. This new objective has drawn strong criticism from analysts who see troubling similarities with the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
At the time, the Bush administration’s main justification for the preemptive attack was the alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein’s regime, a claim later proven false. The outcome of that intervention was disastrous: the collapse of the Iraqi state. The resulting power vacuum paved the way for the rise of ISIS, which conquered and devastated areas in northern and eastern Iraq. According to estimates from UNHCR and think tanks like Brookings, around 4.7 million people were displaced internally and externally as a result of the war.
Iraq was not an isolated case. A few years later, in North Africa, the Arab Spring protests that destabilized Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya received support from the international community. UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, leading to a NATO-led military intervention. Several countries provided training, weapons, and intelligence to the rebel forces. Just three years after Gaddafi’s fall and in the same year Libya’s second civil war would eruptthen-Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki stated in August 2014 that two million Libyans (roughly one-third of the country’s pre-2011 population) had taken refuge in Tunisia.
Similarly, in 2013 the Obama administration faced a critical moment in Syria following the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons. The so-called “red line” set by President Obama in 2012 had been crossed, prompting the U.S. to intensify its involvement in the conflict with the goal of pressuring for regime change. The Democratic administration chose to indirectly support a deeply fragmented opposition coalition, whose goals ranged from pro-Western democracy to the establishment of an Islamist theocracy.
On the opposite side of the chessboard, Russia provided decisive support to Assad’s government. The result was a prolonged civil war, large-scale regional destabilization, and one of the most severe migration crises Europe has faced in decades, one whose political and humanitarian consequences are still being debated today. The rise of far-right movements across Europe can be partially traced back to that moment: these sectors criticize the migration policies adopted during the crisis and call for the defense of “European identity” against the influx of migrants from the Middle East.
Why Iran Is a Much More Complex Case.
This historical overview should lead us to a clear conclusion: regime change is no minor affair. Even in countries far less complex than Persia in terms of ethnic, religious, and political dynamics, these efforts have triggered conflicts with global consequences. But why would Iran be even more sensitive if we fail to learn from past experiences?
First of all, Iran’s regime is not a simple dictatorship. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as its name suggests, is a hybrid structure: a democracy under the supervision of a theocratic system. That is, there is electoral and representative participation at certain levels of decision-making, but all under the strict supervision of religious authorities led by the Supreme Leader. Religious and civil powers coexist in constant tension and that very complexity, rather than being a weakness, has been key to the regime’s longevity.
Iranians elect a president, a parliament (Majlis), and an Assembly of Experts, whose theoretical role includes overseeing and even removing the Supreme Leader. However, this entire “democratic” framework is controlled by the Guardian Council, an unelected body that approves or vetoes candidates and ensures all laws passed by parliament comply with Shia Islamic principles.
The judiciary, in turn, falls under the authority of the Supreme Leader, who appoints its head and ensures that legal rulings remain aligned with religious precepts. In practice, this theocratic dimension acts as a permanent filter and limit to the actions of elected institutions, making Iran a particularly complex case.
This fragmented institutional structure has created constant tensions, especially in a country that has endured near-permanent crises since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In this context, the relationship between the president and the Supreme Leader has steadily deteriorated in favor of the latter, resulting in an increasingly lopsided power structure.
As Argentines, we understand the implications of dual power structures and can easily identify when the formal figure of the president is reduced to an administrative role, overshadowed by a more powerful actor behind the scenes. In Iran, the Supreme Leader not only has the final word on religious and constitutional matters, but is also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and intelligence services making him the true center of power. The president, meanwhile, is left to manage the equivalent of “street lighting and garbage collection” in the Islamic Republic.
This structure has led to a state within a state, governed by religious ends and maintained by complex intelligence networks operating deep within the public system. In the “basements” of the Islamic Republic lie power structures that answer not to the president or government but directly to the Supreme Leader. In the event of regime change or even the death of its commander-in-chief, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei it is highly likely that these organizations would fragment into autonomous cells determined to retain power through force. This could lead, as in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, to the balkanization of the country. Perhaps, for the security of Israel and the West, a weakened authoritarian theocracy under sanctions is preferable to an explosive patchwork of conflicts.
The Migration Risk and Europe’s Identity Crisis
The migration crisis triggered by the Syrian conflict, a country of around 23 million inhabitants in 2011had a profound impact on Europe. The prolonged war led to a massive exodus toward the continent, generating one of the most significant migratory crises of recent decades. With images as harrowing as that of Aylan Kurdi, the 3-year-old Syrian boy who drowned on a Turkish beach, the crisis’s political, social, and cultural repercussions remain under intense debate, particularly due to the perceived threat to European identity posed by the influx of Muslim migrants.
Iran, with a current population of approximately 90 million, presents all the ingredients for a potential political fragmentation crisis similar to those seen elsewhere in the region. If the order imposed by the ayatollahs is broken without an orderly transition and without a government capable of ensuring stability and economic recovery, the risk of a massive exodus is very real. In such a scenario, Europe and the United States could face a migratory wave even greater than those caused by the conflicts in Syria, Libya, or Iraq. The current migration crisis might pale in comparison to the geopolitical and humanitarian nightmare of bringing a 90-million-person country to its knees.
At the same time, this debate is gaining ground within the Republican establishment. In recent days, ultra-Trumpist journalist Tucker Carlson engaged in a tense interview with Senator Ted Cruz, questioning why the U.S. should get involved in yet another Middle Eastern conflict. The exchange exposed divisions within the Republican Party and the strategic dilemmas facing Donald Trump. In fact, the former president has postponed by two weeks any announcement on whether he will actively support intervention, an apparent effort to avoid falling into his own version of the Iraq War.
Meanwhile, Europe’s far-right and leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán blindly support the Israeli government’s objectives in the region. However, during the 2015 migration crisis, Orbán was one of the leading opponents of open borders, and ever since has advocated for the protection of “national identity” in the face of what he describes as Europe’s Islamization.
These same sectors may soon face a boomerang effect, rapidly transitioning from their idealized “Old Europe” to the dystopian nightmare portrayed in Michel Houellebecq’s novels.
