We live in Trump’s world right now, even if we may not like it, as the world is anxiously trying to figure out any phrase, any leak, or any body language cue to figure out the president’s intentions towards Iran. If the US does enter the conflict, all bets are off, but hopefully this might be another one of its usual tactics to try to pressure foreign governments into agreeing to its demands, in this case a new nuclear deal with the Islamic Republic. Once he realizes he cannot control his genocidal “ally” in Israel (Russia also comes to mind, with Trump’s famous Vladimir STOP tweet), and he cannot pressure his “enemy” Iran (Zelensky might still have PTSD the next time he visits Washington), he might decide to “walk away” from the whole ordeal. Donald’s trade war on the world also sputtered when the bond market and the globe’s counter-tariffs threatened to tank the US economy to a point of no return. Regarding China, the US administration fired up the tariff machine, but after months of escalating rhetoric and the inability to hurt the Chinese economy more than it was hurting itself, it quietly agreed to a deal that puts the trade war on hold (one or two tweets in Trump terms is a whisper). You can say that Trump is a bad negotiator and that he does not get (productive) things done, and you might be right, but American pressure is on the cusp of achieving its goal of furthering American military hegemony, thanks to its use of NATO.
A couple of weeks ago, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte formally unveiled an already controversial two-tiered plan to boost allied spending to 5 percent of GDP. Rutte’s plan aims to reach the 5% of GDP defense target through two main components. The first, accounting for 3.5% of GDP, is dedicated to direct investment in core military capabilities such as tanks, fighter jets, air defense systems, missiles, and personnel. The second component, comprising 1.5% of GDP, focuses on broader security-related investments, including critical infrastructure like roads, bridges, ports, and airfields, as well as industrial capacity, logistics, and societal resilience. This two-tiered approach is designed to ensure not only military readiness but also the ability to rapidly deploy and sustain forces across Europe in the face of potential threats. Rutte has emphasized that the 5% target is not arbitrary but grounded in NATO’s updated defense strategies and capability goals. He argues that the Alliance faces growing threats from actors such as Russia and China and that a “quantum leap” in investment is essential to make NATO’s defense posture both credible and effective. Key drivers of this increase include a 400% expansion in air and missile defense capabilities; the procurement of thousands of armored vehicles and tanks, along with millions of artillery shells; the doubling of enabling capabilities such as logistics and medical support; and major investments in warships, aircraft (including at least 700 F-35 fighter jets), drones, long-range missiles, and space and cyber capabilities.
You might ask yourself, why 5%? It seems like an arbitrary number, right? Well, you would be right because unexpectedly, on the 7th of January, then President-elect Donald Trump said that NATO members should spend 5% of their gross domestic product on defense, a significant increase from the current 2% target that he so pursued in his first term. “I think NATO should have 5%.” “They can all afford it, but they should be at 5%, not 2%,” he said at an hour-long press conference in which he also refused to rule out using military action to pursue acquisition of the Panama Canal and Greenland and floated the idea of turning Canada into a US state (more threats followed by backing down when he meets resistance—starting to see a trend here?). This was dismissed in most European capitals as typical Trump talk, but he and his administration stuck with it. Slowly but surely the American diplomatic and economic machine started swaying the opinion of countries, as well as offices in The Hague, until it got to the point where the 5% official increase was just waiting to be announced, and so it did, but not everybody is on board with it:
The Spanish government is among those that have voiced reluctance to commit to the proposed increase in defense spending. In a letter to Rutte, Spanish PM Pedro Sanchez argued that “for Spain, committing to a 5% target would not only be unreasonable but also counterproductive to strengthening European defense; and it would also be incompatible with our welfare state and our worldview.” Labeled by Washington as an “uncomfortable ally,” Spain is likely to face intense pressure from the United States to raise its military budget to around €80 billion—more than double its current €33 billion allocation. This pressure has already started, with White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt saying, “He (Trump) has made our priorities clear to our European allies, including Spain,” and that “He wants to see all European partners pay their share and reach the 5% target.” However, several arguments could support its resistance to this push, especially considering the parallel rearmament trajectory being pursued by the European Union.
One key point is that there is no definitive spending figure that guarantees national or collective security, neither in the context of Russian aggression nor amid concerns about diminished U.S. protection. The focus, instead, should be on defining shared defense capabilities, jointly decided and funded, while allowing each country the autonomy to chart its own fiscal route to achieve these goals. Moreover, in an era marked by diverse and evolving threats—many of which are non-military, such as climate change and terrorism—it is essential to recognize that true security extends beyond conventional defense measures. As such, the calculation of a country’s security effort should include spending in areas that NATO has historically overlooked, like cybersecurity, which has become increasingly critical. Another significant concern lies in the timeline proposed to meet the new spending targets. When the Wales summit in 2014 set a 10-year deadline for reaching 2% of GDP in defense expenditure, only four NATO members managed to achieve it. Setting a new target for 2032 seems questionable, especially when even the United States has yet to fully meet the current benchmark.
Another pivotal aspect is it doesn’t address the lack of interconnection between European armies, supply chains, and military industries, which, once fixed, would allow a strong European pillar of NATO to form, freeing up US assets for Asia, the US’s ultimate goal. For this, a strong political consensus needs to be reached, and while very unlikely, it trumps a divided rearmament program. Additionally, there is a genuine risk that prioritizing these military spending demands—such as those outlined recently in The Hague—will come at the expense of another pillar of both national and European security: social cohesion. No matter how much governments try to downplay the consequences, drastically increasing defense budgets will lead to trade-offs, potentially forcing cuts in other critical areas of public spending. Such sacrifices could undermine the already fragile social contract, rooted in the promise that no one will be excluded or left behind. Finally, this course will undoubtedly lead us to become even more dependent on Washington (both in the purchase of weapons and gas) instead of spending money on our own defense capabilities.
Between 2020 and 2024, U.S. arms exports to NATO countries in Europe tripled, and by 2024, American companies accounted for around 64% of all European NATO arms imports—up from 52% in the previous five-year period. Defense giants like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing have taken advantage of this surge, aggressively marketing fighter jets like the F-35, air defense systems, and drones across the continent. Simultaneously, in the energy sector, the U.S. has used the rhetoric of “energy security” to promote its liquefied natural gas (LNG). By early 2025, over 80% of U.S. LNG exports were being shipped to Europe. In 2023, the U.S. supplied roughly 46–54% of all LNG imported by the European Union, making it the continent’s top gas supplier.
By setting military spending benchmarks, like the 5% of GDP goal, and framing threats such as Russian aggression as shared existential challenges (which it is), the U.S. creates a sense of urgency that drives European countries to invest more heavily in military capabilities. Much of this increased spending translates into the purchase of American-made weapons systems, defense technologies, and military infrastructure, reinforcing the U.S.’s position as the primary arms supplier within the Alliance and worldwide. Similarly, under the banner of energy security and reducing dependency on Russian gas, the U.S. has promoted liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to Europe, especially after the Ukraine war. These policies not only serve geopolitical goals but also strengthen U.S. industries, making NATO a conduit for advancing both American security agendas and economic interests in Europe. Trump has had an erratic start to his foreign policy, but his use of NATO to further American businesses and economic interests will be his first big win, with or without its so-called allies.
