The 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, held in late May 2025 in Singapore, continued to clearly reflect the escalating strategic tensions between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region. Mutual criticism of freedom of navigation, militarization of the South China Sea, and the “rules-based” international order created an atmosphere of near-confrontation.
In that context, Vietnam—a country with a strategic position and close relations with both the United States and China—has once again attracted the attention of international analysts as a potential model of the “soft balancing” strategy. The question is, can Vietnam continue to maintain an independent and autonomous foreign policy while the great powers are increasingly exerting pressure?
US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s speech at Shangri-La Dialogue 2025 reaffirmed America’s “unwavering” commitment to the security of its allies and partners in Asia, with a particular emphasis on “freedom of navigation in the South China Sea” and opposition to “unilateral actions that change the status quo.” Hegseth also announced the expansion of defense cooperation with many Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam.
In turn, China has criticized the United States for using the Shangri-La Dialogue to “create disputes, sow discord, provoke confrontation, and pursue selfish interests,” after US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth called China a threat in the Indo-Pacific region.
The war of words between the United States and China at Shangri-La 22 not only reflects the stance of the two powers but also an effort to shape the understanding of regional security, leaving countries like Vietnam facing many difficult choices.
Since 2023, when upgrading relations with the US to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” Vietnam has entered a new phase in its policy of “multilateralization and diversification” of international relations. Bilateral trade turnover between Vietnam and the US has exceeded the 124 billion USD mark in 2024, while the US has also actively promoted cooperation in technology, cybersecurity, and maritime patrol support.
However, China remains Vietnam’s largest trading partner, with total two-way trade reaching a peak of over 230 billion USD in 2023. In addition, China is also an important source of input materials in many manufacturing and processing sectors.
Geostrategically, Vietnam is caught between two increasingly clear poles of influence. Leaning too heavily toward one side not only violates Hanoi’s principle of independent and autonomous diplomacy but also carries the risk of being drawn into conflicts that are not its own.
Vietnam’s “four no’s” defense policy—no participation in military alliances; no alliance with one country against another; no allowing foreign countries to set up military bases; No use of force or threat of use of force—continues to be affirmed after Shangri-La.
However, the challenge lies in practical implementation in the context of the US increasing its military presence in the East Sea, while China continues to consolidate artificial outposts and increase its maritime law enforcement forces.
Vietnam has been strengthening its defense capabilities, but it is not seeking a rigid alliance. Its defense procurement from multiple sources (Russia, Israel, South Korea, India, etc.) reflects its desire to maintain a flexible neutrality. In addition, Vietnam prioritizes bilateral and multilateral defense dialogues—including the ADMM+ and the ASEAN Maritime Security Capacity Building Initiative—to maintain regional stability.
For many experts, Vietnam is currently one of the few ASEAN countries with the capacity and courage to maintain a “dual pivot ”strategy”—maintaining warm relations with the US while maintaining stability with China. After the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, Vietnam will continue to play an active role in maintaining the stability of the regional power structure. By raising its voice, it will strengthen ASEAN’s central role, from the East Sea issue to building military-security dialogue mechanisms.
However, it cannot be denied that the increasing strategic pressure from both sides may hurt Vietnam’s independent policy space, especially when some countries in the region have begun to lean heavily towards one side; for example, the Philippines has increased military exercises and signed many extensive military agreements with the US.
Vietnam needs to continue moving in the direction of “not choosing sides, but choosing interests.” This means prioritizing substantive projects: energy transition, green technology, improving maritime security capacity, and responding to climate change.
Equally important is to promote bilateral and multilateral dialogue channels to resolve disagreements, especially the East Sea issue. In the context of the Code of Conduct (COC) still not reaching consensus after nearly two decades of negotiations, Vietnam’s proactive mediating role in ASEAN is extremely necessary.
Finally, Vietnam needs to invest more heavily in its domestic “strategic analytical capacity” and foreign policy advisory apparatus to provide flexible, realistic options and respond promptly to strategic movements in the region.
Thus, after the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, although no solution to regional security conflicts emerged, it was a clear reminder that US-China competition will continue, even more fiercely. In that environment, Vietnam has no other choice but to uphold the principles of independence, self-reliance, and cooperation while strengthening internal strength, expanding partnerships, and firmly maintaining a principled stance.
It is not an easy road. But as history has shown, Vietnam’s sobriety and steadfastness in the midst of major strategic currents is the foundation for long-term stability and development.
