On 1 June 2025 Mexico held a historic and unprecedented vote to elect judges, from local magistrates up to Supreme Court justices. Nearly 2,600 positions were at stake: nine seats on the Supreme Court, specialist tribunals and hundreds of lower judgeships. The governing MORENA party, led by Claudia Sheinbaum and rooted in the movement of former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, hailed this “radical” reform as a victory over corruption.
This election poses grave dangers to Mexico’s democracy. The complex, massive vote risks turning justice into a popularity contest – or worse, a prize for the ruling party. The reality is simple: justice should never be on the ballot – it should be applied and respected, not sold to the highest bidder.
In practice the election saw abysmal turnout (around 13 %) and widespread confusion. Observers documented illegal “cheat sheets” and partisan voting guides, which steered citizens toward pro-government candidates. Many Mexicans stayed home, viewing the poll as a farce. The result was a virtual guarantee that MORENA’s favoured judges will fill the courts, undermining the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary.
A Sweeping Overhaul Under MORENA
The judicial vote was the culmination of a constitutional reform passed in late 2024 by MORENA’s congressional supermajority. MORENA campaigned on a platform of sweeping change – the so-called “Fourth Transformation” of Mexico – portraying the existing judiciary as corrupt and elitist. President López Obrador and his successor Claudia Sheinbaum insisted that direct elections would “root out corruption” and make judges answer to “the people.”
The reform amended long-standing procedures: the Supreme Court was cut from 11 justices to 9 (with shorter 12-year terms), and an appointed Judiciary Council was replaced by a new Disciplinary Tribunal. Crucially, judges at all levels would no longer be selected behind closed doors, but would face open elections. By putting every federal judge to the popular vote, Mexico became the first country in history to elect its entire national judiciary. Only Bolivia (on a smaller scale) has tried anything similar, and Mexico’s makeover dwarfs anything in democratic tradition.
This top-to-bottom shift sparked alarm among legal experts and opposition parties. In the months before the vote, thousands of judges, lawyers and rights groups protested in the streets. Choosing judges by campaign – complete with slogans and party lists – would undermine the rule of law. Electing judges would incentivise them to issue decisions to win votes and satisfy political constituencies instead of impartially deciding cases. In short, electoral judges would have to campaign like politicians, jeopardising their neutrality.
International bodies echoed those concerns. The Organisation of American States (OAS) sent observers who bluntly concluded that this model should not be replicated elsewhere. Canada’s and the US governments also warned that the overhaul could strip courts of genuine independence. Even some civil-society approval was fractured: polls showed a majority of citizens liked the idea of change, but without a clear plan or understanding of the reforms many remained sceptical.
Complex Rules, Partisan Process
The mechanics of the vote were dizzyingly complex. For federal seats alone, Congress first short-listed candidates via evaluation committees stacked with MORENA appointees. Some state contests were even more opaque: in Durango, for example, one nominee was pre-selected for each local judgeship – a single-candidate ballot.
In most jurisdictions multiple candidates ran, but voters faced paper ballots hundreds of names long. It was an enormous logistical undertaking. The electoral authority (INE) scrambled to organise it in mere months, issuing special pamphlets and even mobile voting stations.
Partisanship soon coloured every step. The MORENA-led legislature forced through the reforms despite opposition boycott, ensuring that most candidates were hand-picked by the ruling coalition. Once the candidates were set, many displayed open loyalty: several tried to register ballot names like “AMLO’s Judge” or “Judge of the Fourth Transformation,” underscoring the blatant politicisation.
On election day, MORENA’s machine was in full force. Party activists distributed cheat-sheet leaflets telling voters exactly which boxes to tick for MORENA’s favoured candidates. These illicit voting guides, some disguised as food (“wafer versions” even meant to be eaten before inspectors arrived), proliferated in rallies and neighbourhoods. The aim was obvious: steer the choice of judges toward the executive’s allies.
Turning the Courts Into an Election
On Sunday 1 June voters finally went to the polls. But turnout was pitiful. Official tallies showed just around 12–13 % of the electorate voted – barely one in eight registered citizens. By contrast, presidential elections typically attract roughly 60 % turnout. In fact, this was the lowest federal participation level in Mexico’s democratic history. Many polling places sat nearly empty, with long stretches of unmarked ballots. Such weak turnout fatally weakened the exercise’s legitimacy.
Despite the vacuum, President Sheinbaum hailed the event as a triumph. She insisted it was a complete success and Mexico was now the most democratic country in the world. She emphasised that the vote was peaceful, inexpensive and offered “a free vote” to citizens.
Yet the irony is evident: with so few voting, the results would reflect only those mobilised by the parties. Empty ballot boxes, ballots marked prematurely and citizens did not even know who they were voting for. This is not democracy. It is an insult.
Indeed, in many areas MORENA networks turned out their sympathisers in full, tilting even the tiny electorate overwhelmingly towards government-aligned jurists. Since there was no legal minimum turnout, the election will stand; results are being certified and a new court is due to convene in September. But the optics of near-empty streets and groaning protests led some to dub 1 June “Black Sunday.”
Erosion of Independence and Checks
These elections undermine core democratic norms. By design, the reforms sweep away much of the traditional separation of powers. Instead of an independent judiciary insulated from politics, Mexico now has a legislature-dominated candidate list and a nationwide campaign.
This tilts justice toward the executive. It ends three decades of checks and balances, returning the nation to a competitive authoritarian regime. In a democratic system the courts are meant to check the government – but this election was styled to remake them in the government’s image. The plan will bulldoze the separation of powers by flooding the courts with underqualified, politically aligned candidates. Indeed, many of the distributed cheat sheets specifically highlighted contestants for the Supreme Court – the only branch that had frequently ruled against MORENA’s agenda – alongside nominees for the new disciplinary tribunal poised to punish errant judges.
The vote can also be seen as potentially the first step toward backsliding. No democracy should let judges campaign for favour; doing so violates international standards requiring that judge selection be free from politics and grounded on merit. Judicial elections would increase the influence of money in judicial decision-making, including through campaign contributions from organised crime. In Mexico’s case, those worries are not fanciful: among the thousands running were some colourful figures – including a convicted drug trafficker and one of El Chapo’s lawyers. The vote risks not only filling seats with MORENA loyalists but also giving cartels an opening to promote friendly judges through their own voter drives.
Within weeks of the election, media tallies confirmed the pre-ordained outcome: MORENA affiliates and allies secured the vast majority of seats, including commanding positions on the Supreme Court. Early returns indicated MORENA’s ranking candidates dominated the vote. Legal experts were already predicting trouble. With judges elected by parties, independent oversight has shrunk; new judges will be selected by popularity, not by qualifications.
A Blow to Judicial Integrity
At stake in all this is the very idea of impartial justice. In principle, a judge’s job is to decide cases according to law and evidence, not to appeal to voters. Democracy and the rule of law require that courts be protected from political interference. Yet in Mexico’s experiment the judiciary was effectively turned into the fourth branch of MORENA’s political machine.
Justice cannot survive as a popularity contest, voters, with no legal expertise and minimal incentive to vote, will hand power to those promising loyalty rather than competence.
The problems go deeper. The Senate’s reforms not only changed how judges are chosen but also how long they serve and how easily they can be disciplined. Under the new constitution, Mexican judges have much shorter, renewable terms (nine years in most cases) and serve at the pleasure of voters. Aligning judges’ terms with the president’s cycle effectively eliminates security of tenure, because all sitting judges must step down when a new cohort is elected. International norms hold the opposite: judges must have permanent tenure and protection from political pressure. Eroding these protections puts every judge on a short leash. Furthermore, the new Disciplinary Tribunal – itself selected by ballot – will handle complaints against judges.
This could be used as a weapon: a fully political body empowered to fire judges if they issue judgments adverse to the government. In short, Mexico has traded predictable, law-based appointments for a volatile system vulnerable to political and even criminal influence.
Democracy in Theory and Practice
Putting all national judges to a public vote raises fundamental questions of democratic theory. On one hand, popular sovereignty is a pillar of democracy – yet even democratic systems draw boundaries. Judicial elections are rare: with the exception of the US, most modern democracies avoid them, recognising that judges must often protect minority rights and the constitution against majority whims.
If courts are elected by majority, who then checks the majority? This Mexican case suggests the paradox: lawmakers used their supermajority to create an election aimed at undercutting future checks. In effect it risks leaving the judiciary, the only branch that was not directly chosen by the ruling party as a product of MORENA’s popularity. When justice is up for vote, the law becomes a campaign promise—and in Mexico, those promises are rarely kept.
