As the third-largest democracy in the world, Indonesia elected the president and his vice through large-scale elections earlier last year. Many experts and survey bodies expected the election to be two rounds, but their predictions were incorrect. The outcomes resulted in Prabowo and Gibran Rakabuming Raka’s victory by a significant margin of 58%. The elected candidates portrayed the massive shift from democratic fragmentation to a unitary position because many coalition parties favored both of them.
The coalitional dynamics gave a pathway for their victory, allowing them to beat the other two candidates in a single-round voting. As soon as he was elected, he embraced political rivals who were competing with him, including the candidate Vice President Muhaimin Iskandar, who became Coordinating Minister for Community Empowerment. He also split some ministries, ensuring those who contributed to the winning of Prabowo and Gibran were given national positions.
Prabowo’s victory was not without controversy and critiques, particularly because his campaign was filled with populist rhetoric. As an ex-military man himself, Prabowo often builds upon nationalistic rhetoric. He also frequently expresses the need to support the wong cilik (the lower class). In conducting foreign policy, Prabowo uses seminal nationalist rhetoric. On numerous occasions, he also talked about the need to spread awareness, as some demonstrations were conditioned by some ‘foreign powers’ to divide the society. During his campaign, Prabowo and his staunch supporters used effective narratives to attract votes.
What is populism?
When speaking about populism, one scholar explains the phenomenon that targets the emotions and feelings of the people by utilizing simplistic discourse that is directed at the ‘gut feelings’ of the people.’ Andrés Velasco, in Populism and Identity (2022), defines political populism asa manifestation that confronts the people who conflict against others—various ‘elites,’ local minorities, immigrants, and even foreign foes that are correlated with the denial of complexity. Oftentimes, Prabowo also highlighted the existence of ‘foreign foes’ that were operating and threatening to divide Indonesia. He also urged his ministers to be cautious not to be dictated to by foreign interests. Responding to the closure of USAID, Prabowo also reenacted the foreign powers that were monetizing civil society movements.
In The Populism Trap: Discontents and Challenges to Democracy (2024), Armin Schäfer and Michael Zürn argue that once in power, authoritarian populists become populist authoritarians. This is due to the tendency that was usurped by the leaders to gain power. On behalf of the will of the people, basic norms of democracy are trampled and often used as legitimacy, only for the sake of power.
In the realm of foreign policy, populist leaders tend to be hyper-fixated on the narratives around fulfilling the people’s needs or exercising sovereignty at a global level. The element of personalization becomes the trait of populist leadership (Rosanvallon, 2018). In carrying out foreign policy, populist leaders tend to direct it on their behalf. That said, the existence of figures becomes important in the decision-making process. This process included dismantling the existing bureaucracy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Özdamar & Yanik, 2024). Apart from that, populist leaders also tend to diversify partnerships across international organizations. Populist leaders also often claim to exercise full sovereignty and seek alternative multilateral organizations that differ from the liberal order (Plagemann & Destradi, 2020).
Foreign policy president
When it comes to Indonesian foreign policy, the story becomes more far-fetched. When announcing the cabinet, Prabowo chose Sugiono, a retired first lieutenant from Kopassus, an elite force that was led by Prabowo in the late 90s. The appointment of Sugiono is likely to have a profound impact because it showcases the issuance of personalization in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Sugiono is well known for his staunch support for Prabowo in the 2019 and 2024 general elections and as a dedicated cadre within Prabowo’s Gerindra Party. No wonder; he is the ideological son of Prabowo himself. While Sugiono becomes the minister, Prabowo appoints three vice ministers: Anis Matta, a political ally, and Arrmanatha Nasir and Arif Havas Oegroseno, who are career diplomats.
This implies that Prabowo regards Sugiono, not the experienced diplomats, to be the executor of his orders since the activities of the course of Indonesian foreign policy bureaucracy are tamed by Prabowo as the mastermind. It is immediately apparent that Indonesian foreign policy under Prabowo is directed by Prabowo himself. He often uses bebas-aktif rhetoric to justify his deeds in changing the orientation of Indonesian foreign policy. In principle, bebas dan aktif can be translated literally as free and active, which implies the freedom to side with any countries or organizations that align with Indonesia’s interests. However, this principle, it seems, has been misused by Prabowo for arbitrariness and personalization.
This tendency towards a personalized approach is further illustrated by his article published by The Economist. Prabowo’s remarks are an irritation toward Western hypocrisy, stating that ‘the West is doing a double standard. This leads to his ‘diversification projects,’ which are also manifested in Prabowo’s foreign policy. Upon being elected, Prabowo confirmed that Indonesia would join BRICS and NDB, a multilateral organization founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The reason, said Prabowo, was that Indonesia needs to have a presence in the group.
Prabowo also shifted Indonesia’s stance on his primary visit to Beijing after being elected. In his meeting with Xi Jinping, he discussed the issue of the nine-dash line that includes the North Natuna Sea on 9 November 2024 and agreed on the overlapping claim over the South China Sea. It seems Prabowo detests the previous foreign policy formulation under Retno Marsudi, which emphasized sovereignty diplomacy (Marsudi, 2019). This undermines the ASEAN Code of Conduct on the South China Sea and betrays ASEAN’s collective effort to balance China’s strategic enlargement in the Southeast Asian seas.
The direction of Indonesian foreign policy is being modified by Prabowo, and this shift shows a lack of consistency and strategic depth due to an unclear overarching vision. It is no surprise that suspicions have arisen that Indonesian foreign policy will be using the top-down format, directed by Prabowo himself. This could reduce MoFA to a mere clarifier, despite the ministry’s inherent bureaucratic capacity to direct foreign policy, with numerous considerations of experienced diplomats and experts that can help with suitable foreign policy-making. Indeed, the implementation of Prabowo’s foreign policy reveals a populist tendency: while aiming to fulfill immediate interests, it ignores necessary bureaucratic mechanisms that aim for sustained achievements. These personalized characteristics may result in deviating from institutional checks and balances as well as long-term stability.
