The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa are witnessing extensive tensions within the framework of international and regional powers’ strategic objectives, where hostilities and rivalries have created a complex situation in this vital waterway for global trade and energy transit. Since Ansarullah, commonly known as the Houthis, in support of the people of Gaza, began obstructing the passage of ships and attempting to impose an economic blockade on Israel, the United States and the United Kingdom have reinforced their presence in the Red Sea by deploying naval fleets. Recently, by escalating operations, attacking infrastructure, and increasing the killing of Yemeni people, they have made the Red Sea more unsafe than ever before.
The United States military has announced that it attacked more than 800 targets in Yemen from mid-March to late April, such that the Red Sea remains insecure. In 2024, the volume of trade passing through the Suez Canal dropped by about 50 percent. This is while Trump recently claimed that American commercial ships would henceforth pass through both the Suez and Panama Canal freely and without paying customs duties.
However, the American confrontation with Houthis in the Red Sea has so far not only failed to reduce their actions in this sea and against Israel but has also made them more experienced. Today, in addition to the fact that the Houthis’ missiles can reach the occupied territories, the southern part of the Red Sea shipping lane, which extends from the northwest of the Gulf of Aden to opposite the port of Al-Salif, is also within their range, despite the lack of complete missile power dominance everywhere. Furthermore, they have direct control over the islands off the southern coast of the port of Hodeidah and other islands along Yemen’s waters. It can be added that these capabilities have provided them with a range of power from the north to the south of the Red Sea.
Given the extent of American attacks against Houthis during Trump’s presidency, it seems that the issue of Yemen has gone beyond maintaining Israel’s security. This analysis examines the reasons for this increased tension against the Yemenis by the United States and its allies while also exploring the strategic importance of the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, and the Suez Canal.
Alongside the significant American military presence in the Red Sea, the European Union’s EUNAVFOR ASPIDES military operation on January 29, 2024, can be noted, the aim of which was announced as protecting commercial ships against attacks by the armed forces of Yemen affiliated with the Houthi movement. The show of force by the United States and Europe, with the increase of naval fleets and aircraft carriers in the region, is actually for the deterrence of China, Russia, Iran, and Yemen under the guise of supporting Israel. Of course, this has not only failed to reduce tensions but has also brought the Red Sea closer to a turbulent region, as China and Russia maintain a serious presence behind the scenes of the Red Sea developments and Middle Eastern issues.
Furthermore, for several decades, the international efforts and those of the Red Sea littoral states to achieve collective security and strengthen regional alliances and economic partnerships have been fruitless. The competition and hostility among various countries for dominance over ports and the increase in the number of military bases on the coasts of the Red Sea countries have prevented the formation of anything, even to the extent of a cooperation council.
The United States has a strategic military presence in Djibouti, near Bab-el-Mandeb. Camp Lemonnier‘s stated goal is to promote regional security, stability, and prosperity. Russia also has a logistical military base near Bab-el-Mandeb in Port Sudan and has announced that its interests in this region are increasing. China has also established its first overseas military base in Djibouti to leverage the Red Sea’s position for its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. This base holds logistical significance for China, and it should not be forgotten that Beijing has significantly expanded its influence in Africa over the past two decades, with a strong presence across the continent through targeted investment and the use of debt leverage. Among China’s ambitious plans for Bab-el-Mandeb is creating a communication bridge or an underwater tunnel through which it could connect the continents of Asia and Africa via Yemen to Djibouti. However, this plan remains on paper and is currently stalled due to Trump’s policies of containing China.
Interestingly, Turkey also has a military presence in Djibouti. In February 2024, this country signed a comprehensive agreement with Djibouti that included military training, economic issues, and human resource development.
In addition to the importance of Yemen and Djibouti in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait for controlling the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, the competition and hostility of various countries for dominance over other ports in this waterway also continue.
Russia seeks to establish a naval base in Port Sudan and is trying to increase its influence in this waterway through an agreement signed in February 2025. Furthermore, China and Russia have cooperated with Houthis in Yemen and, in collaboration with Iran, support Houthis against American attacks.
Turkey and Qatar also have a presence in Sudan and Somalia. Turkey, with a military base in Somalia, influences the ports and airports of this country, and Qatar’s presence in southern Somalia is significant.
The United Arab Emirates has also established its maritime influence in the Red Sea region, particularly through its mercenaries in southern Yemen, as well as in Eritrea, Somaliland, and possibly Djibouti. Saudi Arabia, as a powerful country in the Red Sea region, aims to strengthen its role as a global logistics hub in this area based on its Vision 2030. The port of Jeddah, the largest port in the Red Sea with a handling capacity of over 7 million TEUs per year, has the capacity to manage about five thousand ships annually. The seaport of Yanbu also has a discharge capacity of 800 tons of grain per hour and manages 210 million tons of goods annually. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is undertaking the ambitious Neom City project on the Red Sea coast.
It is evident that the conflict of international and regional interests in the Red Sea is so high that it has severely reduced the possibility of achieving any regional cooperation. In 2020, Saudi Arabia launched the “Red Sea Council” by hosting regional countries, but that initiative also yielded no results. Of course, in addition to the rivalries and hostilities that originate outside the region, the rivalries and hostilities within the region must also be mentioned.
While external powers fuel the Red Sea tensions, instability is further compounded by long-standing regional rivalries and hostilities. Ethiopia is landlocked but has a privileged position near the Red Sea. This country has access to the sea through Djibouti, so it has sought to reduce its dependence by approaching Eritrea, a coastal Red Sea country, thereby diversifying its sea routes. However, recent reports indicate increasing tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
With its crucial geographical location overlooking the coastline, Eritrea seeks to strengthen its role but has profound differences and strained relations with Sudan and Djibouti, which is part of the geopolitical competition in the Red Sea.
In conclusion, the challenges, tensions, historical rivalries, political instability, and the military presence of international and regional powers with conflicting interests have created significant obstacles to peace in this critical international waterway.
The outlook for global trade and the energy supply chain in the Red Sea region does not appear bright. It is worth noting that the US president recently issued strong warnings to African leaders about China’s presence in Africa. This matter complicates these countries’ relations with China. The US may show less sensitivity to Russia’s presence in Africa, but it does not hesitate to contain China in the Middle East and Africa.
