The 2015 negotiations, fraught with significant challenges, ultimately culminated in the fragile Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This agreement generated hopes for lifting sanctions and normalizing Iran’s relations with the Western world. Still, it proved ephemeral and never achieved its intended objectives. The JCPOA ultimately failed due to structural weaknesses, pressures from opponents of the agreement, and persistent mistrust between the parties. With the withdrawal of the Trump administration from the accord, tensions between Tehran and Washington escalated again, placing the Middle East region on the precipice of successive crises. This paper compares the JCPOA negotiations with the recent Trump administration’s engagement with Iran.
Contrary to the arduous and contentious atmosphere of the JCPOA discussions, six salient factors now facilitate a smoother path toward a new agreement, enhancing its prospects for success. These factors range from the bilateral nature of the latest negotiations and Trump’s ambition to establish a diplomatic legacy to the altered regional power balance following the events of October 7th and the developments in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as shifts in the positions of key actors such as Israel, the US Congress, and the Arab Gulf states. These elements collectively favor a new accord. Consequently, it is anticipated that these negotiations will proceed more readily and that any resulting agreement will be more effective and durable than the JCPOA.
1. Bilateral Negotiations: The current negotiations between Trump and Iran differ significantly from the 2015 JCPOA by being bilateral, with Oman acting solely as a neutral mediator. This streamlined approach inherently enhances the prospects for success. The multilateral nature of the JCPOA, involving six world powers alongside Iran, introduced complexities arising from conflicting interests and rivalries among actors like China, Russia, the United States, and Europe. Generally, a larger number of negotiation participants elevates the challenges of coordination, dialogue management, national interest alignment, and countering obstruction from opponents. Furthermore, broader participation diminishes confidentiality, increasing the likelihood of peripheral issues, misunderstandings, and disruptions. Such circumstances gave opponents like Israel greater leverage to exert influence and impede progress. Conversely, a focused and direct bilateral dialogue minimizes these inherent risks and potential interferences. Consequently, the ongoing bilateral negotiations between Trump and Iran are poised to advance more swiftly and directly toward their objectives.
2. Trump’s Legacy Drive: Trump’s approach to Iran is driven by strategic objectives rather than ideological clashes. His priorities lie in economic matters, trade disputes, and resolving conflicts like those in Ukraine and Gaza. Iran, while significant, is one element in his broader agenda. Learning from the costly Iraq War, Trump seeks to avoid another protracted Middle Eastern conflict. As he stated in 2018, the US “wasted seven trillion dollars in the Middle East for no gain.” Now, in his potential final term, Trump is focused on securing a lasting legacy, aspiring to presidential greatness and even the Nobel Peace Prize. He likely sees an agreement with Iran, alongside resolving other conflicts, as a path to achieving this. Contrary to common assumptions, Trump’s egocentricity allows him to act independently of traditional lobbies and extremist factions. He pursues what he deems beneficial for “Trump’s America,” unbound by conventional political constraints. This independence enhances the potential for a successful and pragmatic negotiation with Iran.
3. Iran’s Strategic Preference: Iran’s strategic calculus favors an agreement over a potentially devastating war with Trump. A conflict would not only incur substantial economic, political, and military costs but also severely compromise Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and future bargaining leverage. Additionally, Iran’s economic constraints necessitate avoiding war. The looming threat of the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism, which allows for the reinstatement of UN sanctions without a Security Council vote upon Iranian non-compliance, further incentivizes an agreement. With the JCPOA’s expiration in October 2025, this mechanism’s activation risk escalates. This scenario would grant unilateral US sanctions international legitimacy and encourage broader global sanctions against Iran, a prospect highly undesirable for Tehran. Consequently, Iran views Trump’s deadlines as an opportunity to preempt a consensus on international sanctions.
4. Congressional Alignment: A key shift from the JCPOA era is the Republican alignment with Trump, now controlling both the legislative and executive branches. Recognizing that the US withdrawal from the JCPOA has accelerated Iran’s nuclear progress, they face a choice between agreement and war. Crucially, Democrats are unlikely to strongly oppose a deal, holding a significant portion of congressional seats. Furthermore, the president’s power to lift Iran sanctions is limited to six-month suspensions, a practice underscored by the 2023 Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act, which mandates congressional approval for any permanent lifting. This act, initially intended to block a Biden return to the JCPOA, ironically facilitates Trump’s path. With Republicans in control and Iran nearing nuclear threshold status, bipartisan support for a new agreement is more probable, increasing the likelihood of congressional passage or cooperation in easing sanctions.
5. Israel’s Evolving Priority: Following the setbacks to the so-called “Axis of Resistance” after October 7th and Iran’s accelerated nuclear progress post-JCPOA withdrawal, Israel’s primary concern has shifted decisively to curbing Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities. During the JCPOA, Iran’s bolstered resources fueled its regional proxies, effectively encircling Israel and making proxy conflicts Jerusalem’s main preoccupation. However, the direct threat of a nuclear Iran now supersedes this. Consequently, and unlike its stance in 2015, Israel, according to Netanyahu, now supports a robust agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear program, recognizing its limitations in unilaterally striking Iran’s facilities without US backing. While still harboring hopes for US military action against Iran’s nuclear sites and fearing a US pivot to East Asia post-agreement, Israel’s immediate priority aligns with securing a deal that demonstrably rolls back Iran’s nuclear ambitions. However, Israel’s desire to include Iran’s missile industry in any agreement remains a potential sticking point, unlikely to be accepted by Tehran and thus a possible impediment to successful negotiations. Furthermore, Israel remains wary of an agreement that could economically empower Iran, potentially leading to increased military spending directed against Israeli interests and its regional allies.
6. Arab Gulf States’ Pragmatism: The Arab Gulf states prioritize regional stability and recognize the severe consequences of a US-Iran conflict, which would inevitably engulf their territories and economies. A lack of robust independent defense capabilities heightens their vulnerability. Unlike in 2015, when they largely viewed post-sanctions Iran as the primary threat, the post-October 7th landscape has shifted their perception, with Israel’s actions now viewed with greater concern. Witnessing the impact of regional conflicts, these states are keen to avoid further destabilization. Consequently, they are no longer inclined to obstruct US-Iran negotiations. They will likely use their diplomatic and media influence to facilitate an agreement. They perceive a stable Iran that has shown solidarity against Israeli actions as a more desirable regional partner for maintaining the balance of power than one weakened by conflict. This pragmatic shift underscores their preference for a diplomatic resolution that ensures regional security for all parties involved.
The 2015 JCPOA was formed within a multilateral framework based on necessity but ultimately failed under political pressure from its opponents. However, today’s conditions are different. The bilateral negotiation process presents a more favorable path, influenced by Trump’s ambitions and changing regional dynamics. Although obstacles remain, particularly Israel’s continued hope to persuade the United States to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities and its concern that the United States will focus on East Asia and reduce its military presence in the Middle East after an agreement with Iran, as well as the inclusion of Iran’s missile industry in the agreement, which could lead to a deadlock, the six factors outlined here indicate that diplomacy has once again found an opportunity to achieve a faster and more durable agreement.
