Ukraine’s future is in jeopardy, and NATO membership looks off the table if Washington has anything to say about it. While America falls short, the EU should step up. Brussels should offer Ukraine EU membership.
Fearful of the new Trump administration’s courtship of the Russian Federation, EU leaders are scrambling to find their place in peace talks to end the war in Ukraine. Aware of the impact this peace formula will have on the entire European security architecture, EU policymakers are, however, hesitating to propose bold solutions that will bring immediate results. European armament is a necessary step, but it does not solve the fundamental problem: how will Ukraine’s security guarantees be ensured so as to prevent a new war started by the Russian Federation on the continent? One solution is the accelerated accession of Ukraine to the European Union.
Giorgia Meloni advocates for extending NATO’s article 5 to Ukraine as “the simplest and most effective proposal” for assuring security guarantees for Ukraine and calling Russia’s bluff. Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, has also described NATO membership as “the strongest security guarantee” and the “cheapest way forward” for Ukraine. However, the proposal doesn’t stand a chance of materializing, given officials in Trump’s new cabinet have said so loud and clear: NATO membership is off the table. EU policymakers have so far avoided recognizing that the European Union has its own version of NATO’s “Article 5,” which can make EU membership a security guarantee in itself for Ukraine.
The EU’s mutual defense clause is defined by Article 42(7) of the Lisbon Treaty as follows: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power.” In terms of implementation, the wording “all means in their power” includes the option of military assistance. This obligation is binding for member states but does not affect a country’s neutrality and is consistent with their commitments deriving from NATO membership. For some legal scholars, as highlighted by a 2024 report from Finabel, the EU’s mutual defense clause is seen as an improved and stronger version of NATO’s article 5 because it “includes a stronger duty to assist if it is invoked” and because it improves the territorial scope of its application.
Just like NATO’s article 5, the EU’s mutual defense clause has only been tested once in practice. France was the first country to invoke it in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in November 2015. EU member states helped France with military aid and increased intelligence sharing. Some countries, such as Sweden, helped France by approving the sale of military equipment and offering logistical support for airstrikes in Iraq and Syria.
The existence of this clause could solve the problems regarding Ukraine’s security guarantees, offering an alternative solution that could be implemented immediately: accepting Ukraine through an immediate procedure to become a member of the European Union. This clause, coupled with the EU’s armament efforts, could prevent and discourage a resumption of war in Ukraine after the conflict would be over. It would eliminate the possibility of a frozen conflict, which Moscow has a vocation to manage with great skill. Importantly, EU membership would also help Ukraine rebuild its economy, increasing its chances of standing on its own two feet militarily in the future.
In 2024, the European Union launched formal accession talks with Ukraine, but because of the comprehensive and draining bureaucratic process, an optimistic accession horizon would be 2030 at the earliest. The government in Kiev is struggling to make progress in adopting European Union legislation and carrying out the reforms needed for accession, even though it is engaged in a war. These exceptional conditions should be recognized by European leaders, who need to stop seeing EU accession as merely a formal and static process and reframe it to be adapted to the times and new geopolitical realities.
A strategic Eastern enlargement would allow the EU the prospect of becoming a geopolitically relevant power, as its leaders have been claiming they want to become, not to be trapped between Washington and Moscow. It will also show the new Trump administration that they mean business and that the EU has both the policy tools and political determination not to accept bystander status in Ukraine’s security talks.
