Every year, nearly three thousand delegates convene in Beijing for the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s grand legislative gathering. Projected as a constitutional democratic institution, the NPC claims to embody governance by the people on an unparalleled scale. Throughout the proceedings, governance laws are discussed and debated, and economic policies are formed and implemented, all the while China’s state media portray it as a hallmark of its “Whole-Process People’s Democracy,” the latest addition to its repertoire of politically loaded phrases. However, beneath the surface of this grand assembly and the state-controlled projection of representative governance lies a carefully orchestrated procedure — one that presents itself as a uniquely Chinese-style democratic system but is in reality entirely controlled by the Communist Party of China (CPC).
Despite its lack of political and electoral competition, the NPC is projected as the world’s largest democratic assembly, surpassing any similar parliamentary body in both scale and participation. To external observers, China’s claim to democracy appears paradoxical—how can a single-party state that has monopolized political power credibly brand itself as a democratic system? Yet, within China, the CPC has meticulously constructed a narrative that has redefined democracy on its own terms. This alternative interpretation, amplified by state-controlled media, serves not only as a tool for domestic legitimacy but also as a global counter-narrative, aimed at challenging the West’s long-standing ‘discourse hegemony.’ By championing a model that prioritizes governance efficiency over electoral contestation, the CPC, particularly under Xi Jinping, has invariably entered a contest over the very definition of what constitutes legitimate political power and, as an extension, over democracy as a system of governance. In light of such narrative assertions, deconstructing these dual projections is crucial for several reasons, as it not only reshapes perception of governance within China but also poses a growing challenge to Western democratic norms, influencing the broader discourse on democracy in the 21st century.
Rewriting the Meaning of Democracy in Both Letter and Practice
Over the decades, the CPC has crafted a narrative that has not only solidified its governance model domestically but has also presented a redefined version of Chinese democracy internationally. At the heart of this narrative projection lies a dual strategy. On one hand, the Party has rigorously promoted democracy as a universal good, embedding the term in everyday language and aligning it with values like collective participation, social stability, and economic progress. On the other hand, it has ensured that this version of democracy remains free from reinterpretation by alternative actors or movements in China. By rejecting procedural frameworks like multiparty competition or free national elections, the party has framed democracy on its own terms, precluding challenges to its authority while asserting its role as the sole guardian of democratic values.
Furthermore, China’s ideological assertion over the political concept has not merely been rhetorical but has also been composed of deliberate conceptual innovations and institutional practices designed to counter Western liberal democracy. Xi Jinping’s advancement of the concept of ‘whole-process people’s democracy’ stands as a prime example of this strategic narrative. With this idea, the Party’s ideologues have attempted to shift the foundation of democratic legitimacy, moving it away from the traditional yardstick of electoral competition and toward the tangible outcomes of governance. However, even though marketed as a novel governance approach, this newly established concept is essentially a repackaging of longstanding Party ideals, now framed with a sharper critique of liberal democracy. Xi’s vision has intertwined Party leadership, the people’s participation, and the rule of law into a singular framework, reinforcing a long-standing Party rhetoric: that democracy in China can only flourish under the CPC’s control.
By positioning governance efficiency as the ultimate measure of democracy, this repackaged model not only challenges the conventional and the much-acclaimed link between democracy and electoral pluralism but has also strengthened the CPC’s claim that its rule is both legitimate and indispensable. Under Xi’s democratic framework, democracy is not measured by the ability to vote in contested elections but by the government’s capacity to deliver economic success, social stability, and national strength.
On similar lines, party ideologues have long argued that a well-governed society, where people’s needs are efficiently met, is inherently more democratic than a system that tolerates political dysfunction in the name of electoral freedom. This model has further emphasized consultative mechanisms, where state-sanctioned discussions and advisory processes precede the need for competitive elections and an environment that allows for multiple perspectives to flourish.
This alternative model has further been reinforced through a sharper critique of electoral democracy. The CPC’s propaganda machinery has regularly highlighted the perceived failings of liberal democracies, portraying them as inefficient, chaotic, and vulnerable to manipulation by wealthy elites. According to this narrative, elections are not a vehicle for genuine public representation but an arena for competition between vested interests, leading to instability rather than effective governance. Chinese state media have also consistently drawn upon examples such as the deep polarization in the U.S. and Indian electoral systems to argue that competitive elections have often exacerbated societal divisions rather than resolving them, thus also directly challenging the very premises of a liberal democratic framework that multiparty elections are the sole path to democratic legitimacy.
Institutionalizing Control: The Party’s Alternative ‘Democratic’ Model
Beyond conceptual reinterpretation, the CPC’s challenge to liberal democracy has also manifested in institutional design. Instead of competitive elections, the Party has relied on a highly structured meritocratic selection process, where officials rise through Party ranks based on performance metrics determined by the Party itself. In theory, this ensures that governance is entrusted to the most capable administrators rather than populist politicians. The CPC has often promoted this approach as an antidote to electoral unpredictability, arguing that China’s centralized model has allowed for long-term planning and policy stability that Western democracies have often lacked.
This projected model has also claimed to ensure accountability; however, not in the way liberal democracies understand or oversee it. In the absence of a free press and independent institutions, the Party has come to be known for policing its own ranks through an expansive disciplinary apparatus. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) holds millions of officials accountable each year, functioning as a mechanism of “bottom-up oversight” even though it operates entirely within Party structures. Similarly, grassroots mediation committees handle disputes without an independent judiciary, reinforcing the idea that democracy is embedded within local governance rather than being a function of national electoral processes.
That said, beneath the Party’s claims of stability and efficiency, its model raises fundamental questions about the nature of accountability in a system where the sole entity/institution (i.e., the Party) serves as both the enforcer and the adjudicator. By internalizing oversight within its own ranks and embedding control in local governance structures, the CPC has ensured that its very own political authority remains unchallenged, even as it presents an illusion of participatory governance. This self-regulated accountability, however, while effective in maintaining centralized stability, practically lacks the external checks and balance system that has defined democratic legitimacy in its broader sense for over two centuries. More critically, this reinterpretation, designed to suit its governance style, reflects not just an adaptation but a strategic attempt to influence the discourse over legitimate political norms. By embedding its model within a broader ideological struggle, the Party’s ideologues have positioned its unique governance framework as a direct counter to liberal democratic principles, challenging the long-standing assumption that democracy can be achieved only through a predetermined path as ascribed by the West.
Such efforts by the Party also do not end at its borders; the Party’s reinterpretation of democracy is increasingly moving outward, shaping global perceptions and challenging the West’s long-standing discursive hegemony over what it means to govern in the name of the people.
The Global South and China’s Democracy Narrative
Through strategic partnerships and economic influence, China has systematically advanced its governance model as an attractive alternative for developing nations. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), often framed as an economic project, has been the serving vehicle for promoting such governance philosophy. By integrating partner countries into large-scale infrastructure projects with extensive Chinese oversight, it has been argued that these ventures embody democratic participation, since local stakeholders are involved in the planning and implementation phases. In this framing, the roots of a Chinese-style democracy have become an exercise of collective decision-making, thereby gaining greater legitimacy under the Party’s banner of ‘consultative governance.’
Beyond infrastructure, the Party has also invested significantly in actively training officials from developing nations in ‘consultative governance.’ The Nyerere Leadership School run by the CPC in Africa, for instance, has been instrumental in shaping how African political elites perceive governance, reinforcing the idea that strong leadership and centralized decision-making are compatible with democratic legitimacy.
Such tactics go on to suggest that China is not merely presenting an alternative against liberal democratic norms, but rather moving a step ahead and quietly reshaping how governance is practiced in the developing world. For many developing and underdeveloped governments, the prospect of economic uncertainty and political volatility generally remains high, and therefore the appeal of a model that promises stability without the turbulence of electoral cycles will continue to gain more space due to its perceived promise of swifter prosperity.
Thus, the influence of such strategies goes beyond rhetoric and ideological persuasion and can potentially seep into the administrative practices and legal frameworks of countries in the Global South. Countering such strategic narratives and practices therefore becomes of grave importance in light of the ideological reinterpretation that Beijing is working towards.
The High-Stakes Contest for Political Ideas
The CPC’s contest over democracy is not a debate that is being waged in democratic capitals, nor is it a direct appeal for global acceptance; it is rather an attempt for a slow and deliberate erosion of the idea that democracy, as defined by electoral competition and constitutional safeguards, is the only legitimate form of governance. By shifting the emphasis from political representation to governance outcomes, the CPC is practically aiming to redefine democracy as a system measured not by elections but by economic growth, social stability, and the state’s capacity to deliver prosperity. This argument also resonates deeply in regions where democratic institutions have struggled to deliver tangible progress and where the promise of development holds greater immediate value than the principles of multiparty competition. The growing receptiveness to China’s economic and political model, particularly in the Global South, must be seen as an alarming signal of how governance legitimacy is slowly yet steadily transforming, and by extension, how the future of democracy as a political concept itself is being rewritten in these regions.
Far more importantly, by presenting its model as a viable and efficient alternative, the CPC is not only legitimizing centralized control but also offering ideological cover to regimes that seek to consolidate power under the banner of stability and development. As this alternative gains’ traction, the long-standing discourse over legitimate political power through democracy faces an uphill challenge, not through direct confrontation, but through the gradual normalization of a parallel vision of governance. Whether liberal democracies can push back against this shifting tide will depend not just on defending their institutions but also on proving, in both words and outcomes, that democracy remains the most resilient road to stability and prosperity in the 21st century.
