On April 1, China once again conducted a large-scale military exercise encircling Taiwan, marking the fifth such event since August 2022, when then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, and the third since Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te took office.
Lai has been in office for less than a year, and on May 20 this year, he will deliver his first anniversary speech. If Lai again says something Beijing dislikes, a sixth large-scale military exercise could occur next month. It cannot be ruled out whether the Chinese military might this time enter Taiwan’s territorial waters or airspace.
Each time Beijing launches a major exercise, U.S. aircraft carriers “tactfully” steer clear of the Taiwan Strait. This time is no exception: on April 2, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) carrier strike group departed the South China Sea for the Middle East. On the same day, China’s aircraft carrier Shandong conducted drills off Taiwan’s eastern coast.
The Carl Vinson is currently the only U.S. carrier on duty in the Pacific.
Yet another round of posturing. Having witnessed this U.S.-China sparring so many times, Taiwanese people understand it as a tacit “rivalry without rupture” between China and the U.S.—a display meant for propaganda and to bolster each side’s negotiating leverage. As a result, their mood remains unaffected, and the stock market continues to soar.
Yet another round of Shadowboxing. Having witnessed this U.S.-China sparring so many times, Taiwanese people understand it as a tacit “rivalry without rupture” between China and the U.S.—a display meant for propaganda and to bolster each side’s negotiating leverage. As a result, their mood remains unaffected, and the stock market continues to soar.
As I mentioned last time, Lai Ching-te’s provocative rhetoric is a product of U.S. acquiescence, aimed at pushing for a U.S.-China leaders’ summit. Thus, until Xi Jinping and Trump meet, tensions in the Taiwan Strait will escalate, but neither side will show their full hand.
Prior to this military exercise on the island, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth visited Hawaii, Guam, Japan, and the Philippines, and delivered strong language on China, another political move to facilitate the U.S.-China Leadership Summit, in line with Trump’s diplomatic and trade line of compromise through conflict. The US has been a leader in the US-China leadership summit.
Some argue that Lai’s provocations toward Beijing are directed by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, consistent with the Republican Party’s anti-China hawkish stance. Others believe Hegseth’s visits to Japan and the Philippines reflect factional considerations, aimed at appeasing the GOP’s anti-China hawks’ Asia policy. Both views hold merit. While Trump’s deal-making diplomacy differs significantly from the hawks’ approach, their obsession with confrontation aids Trump in pressuring Beijing into compromise and hastening leader-level talks.
However, this does not mean Trump seeks a fierce clash with Beijing over Taiwan.
Thus, the current U.S.-China “posturing” over Taiwan is ultimately about striking a deal—finding a mutually acceptable compromise. From a factional perspective, Rubio and Hegseth serve as bridges between Trump and the GOP hawks, but Trump is the decision-maker, and deal-making is the overarching strategy, as neither side wants a showdown. The only risk is whether Taiwan misreads U.S. signals and veers too far down an anti-China path.
On Beijing’s side, the two-week gap between Taipei’s provocative remarks and the military exercises around the island is a departure from China’s previous immediate response, as Xi is busy meeting with dozens of foreign business executives in an effort to lure foreign capital and doesn’t want the military exercises to spoil the mood. Solving the Taiwan issue is less of a priority than revitalizing the economy, but a strong signal is still necessary to calm people’s anger.
It’s worth emphasizing that Beijing’s exercises are not mere theater. Each drill yields dividends: it brings the Chinese military closer to Taiwan in every aspect while offsetting the scale and pace of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
For the U.S., arms sales to Taiwan aim to ensure a Taiwan Strait conflict would drain China’s resources as much as possible. For China, the weaponry and strategies displayed in these exercises, paired with diplomatic pressure, disrupt U.S. military plans in Taiwan, reducing the resource cost of any potential war.
Thus, each exercise strengthens Beijing’s control over Taiwan and its surrounding waters, creating faits accomplis to enable a swift victory in any conflict and deter foreign intervention. Following this pattern, Beijing might, this year or next, physically control ships entering and leaving Taiwan’s ports, depending on the level of provocation from Taipei and Washington.
Due to this exercise, two of Taiwan’s natural gas transport ships couldn’t dock, hinting at the possibility of a blockade. Taiwan relies heavily on energy imports, and if its energy supply lines were cut, its reserves would last just 14 days. This is why the Trump administration wants Taiwan to revive nuclear power, though the current ruling party opposes it.
In other words, all U.S. arms sales to Taiwan cannot overcome China’s blockade strategy. If Taiwan launched medium-range missiles at mainland China, Beijing would view it as a U.S. declaration of war, inevitably drawing American forces into the conflict.
In fact, beyond showcasing regional strike capabilities to the U.S. and Japan through exercises, Beijing has, since last year, begun demonstrating long-range attack capabilities. Should the U.S. and Japan intervene in a Taiwan Strait war, not only would Okinawa bases fall within China’s missile range, but Guam would also face attacks. This is the core meaning of the “Shadowboxing”
Given Trump’s self-proclaimed pacifism—despite his peace efforts faltering since taking office—the Taiwan issue is one that the U.S. and China can resolve at the negotiating table. Beijing’s show of strength aims to lower Taiwan’s “price tag.” Trump, savvy as he is, knows that securing TSMC’s investment in the U.S. has already reduced Taiwan’s value. Thus, he’ll use arms sales to raise Beijing’s unification costs, negotiating a favorable deal. The main hitch is whether Xi Jinping will accept a U.S. offer laced with provocation under peaceful terms.
Xi has repeatedly warned the U.S. to handle Taiwan with extreme caution, implying he hopes Washington won’t overbid and eliminate his willingness to pay—because even if Xi agrees, he must consider public sentiment. Washington often overlooks that convincing 1.4 billion people is no easy task, yet it’s a necessity under China’s system.
Taipei assumes Beijing will not go to war for various reasons—this is a dangerous assumption. War does not always hinge on the true intentions of political leaders. More often than not, it is circumstances, not individual will, that drive critical decisions.
According to an exclusive Washington Post report citing a classified Pentagon memo, the Defense Department’s intelligence arm detailed Hegseth’s pre-nomination discussions with conservative allies (Heritage Foundation members) on Taiwan’s defense and new weapons systems targeting China. Analysts warned that these proposed actions could be seen as provocative by China, raising the risk of miscalculation and open hostilities.
This means that when Trump needs to get Beijing to compromise through controlled conflict, it is also possible that Hegseth or Rubio, who passed the order to Taipei, could have added fuel to the fire, causing Taipei to make a miscalculation, accidentally triggering uncontrolled conflict and putting Trump in a difficult position.
Unless Beijing is certain a U.S.-China summit can definitively prevent unwanted accidents, Xi won’t easily meet Trump. Simply put, Xi isn’t sure Trump has full control of the situation. If that’s uncertain, a meeting adds risk rather than reduces it—better to skip it.
In other words, by letting Taipei provoke Beijing this time, the Trump administration may have delayed a meeting with Xi Jinping.
