Washington, Tehran, and Iran’s “Second Class Citizens”

The Iranian government is well-known for its repressive policies against its population, best exemplified by the state’s violent response to the nationwide protests after the death of Mahsa Amini.

The Iranian government is well-known for its repressive policies against its population, best exemplified by the state’s violent response to the nationwide protests after the death of Mahsa Amini. While the 2024 election of President Masoud Pezeshkian generated hope for tolerance, Tehran passed last December a new draconian law against women and girls. The situation is worse for the country’s non-Fars ethnic populations like Azerbaijani Turks, Kurds, and Baloch.

During the second Trump administration, Washington will continue to treat Iran as a national security threat. More sanctions are expected, a continuation of the Biden administration’s sanctions. However, the Iranian government’s atrocious record of human rights and repression against minority groups must be a pillar of Washington’s future strategy.

In a 2023 letter about Iran to the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, members of the European Parliament described Azerbaijani Turks in Iran as “second-class citizens.” The term is, sadly, applicable to other groups as well.

Azerbaijani Turks are the largest non-Fars group in Iran, totaling around 30% of a nationwide population of around 91 million. The size of this ethnic group makes authorities view Azerbaijani Turks as a threat, and the response is repression. Iranian women are generally discriminated against, given the government’s well-known religious misogyny, but a different ethnicity makes the situation worse. Azerbaijani Turk women, for example, cannot learn Azerbaijani in Iranian schools, they have unequal access to employment, and they usually obtain low-paying jobs. The possibilities for socio-economic advancement and personal growth are, thus, negligible.

Tehran is permissive of child labor, and the situation is particularly problematic in the northern provinces where Azerbaijani Turks live (East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, and Ardabil provinces). Low-paying jobs for children include working on farms, carpet weaving, and street vending. Again, Azerbaijani Turk girls suffer the brunt of the state’s policies, as lack of education and female illiteracy are high in West Azerbaijan province.

Iran’s economic woes will particularly affect minorities and, within them, women and children. Hence, we can expect the child labor exploitation of Azerbaijani Turks to grow while simultaneously experiencing educational limitations – one human rights agency mentioned that over 1,600 children are working in East Azerbaijan province. The suffering of Azerbaijani Turk women and children is a component of Tehran’s strategy to eradicate their identity by limiting chances for the younger populations to learn the Azerbaijani language, history, and culture.

Suffice it to say that Iran is not interested in the UN’ Sustainable Development Goal 5 (SDG5), which aims to achieve equality and empower all women and girls. In 2022, the UN Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution to remove Iran from the Commission on the Status of Women for the remainder of its four-year term ending in 2026. Tehran’s treatment of Azerbaijani Turk women and girls was likely a reason for this decision.

The situation is not better for other ethnic groups, as the Kurds have been similarly persecuted in Iran. Moreover, Tehran views the existence of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan Region as a threat. In 2022, Tehran launched missiles against Kurdish opposition groups in Iraq, blaming them for protests in Iran. The most recent example of Tehran’s oppressive and violent policies against Kurds is the well-known case of Mahsa Amini, a Kurd from Saqez.

The Kurdish provinces in Iran (Kurdistan, Kermanshah) continue to be economically underdeveloped, with high levels of unemployment and political marginalization, a common problem among areas predominantly populated by minorities. The Norway-based human rights agency Hengaw reported in 2024 that over 100 Kurds in the country committed suicide over six months, “with some 40 percent of suicide cases related to unemployment and extreme poverty.”

Like Kurds and Azerbaijani Turks, the Baloch people who live in Sistan & Baluchistan province experience significant hardship; it is estimated that two-thirds of the population there live in extreme poverty. Even the Iranian government does not deny the situation. A 2024 Iranian Parliament’s Research Center report explained that the local population has “limited access to basic necessities like healthcare, education, roads, energy, clean water, and sanitation.”

Both the Azerbaijani Turks and Baloch people share another existential threat: the loss of critical bodies of water. Hamun Lake, a vital water source in Southern Iran, is drying up, while Lake Urmia in Northern Iran, where the Azerbaijani Turks live, is similarly disappearing. Water shortages occur across dozens of villages in Eastern Azerbaijan and Zanjan, while “unfair” water management strategies also affect the Baloch. Environmental challenges abound in Iran (air pollution is a problem in major cities), and the regime appears to be particularly uninterested in remedying environmental problems in areas where minorities live.

Given this situation and history, it is unsurprising that Azerbaijani Turks, Kurds, and Baloch were active participants in the protests after Amini’s death. Many of them were arrested and subsequently sent to the infamous Evin prison in Tehran. The inhumane behavior there and across other prisons has prompted the political prisoners, like the artist Murtaza Parvin, to resort to hunger strikes. The Iranian regime executed at least 901 people in 2024, according to the UN, including “dissidents and people connected to the 2022 protests.” It is unclear how many were Azerbaijani Turks, Kurds, or Baloch, but given Tehran’s record, we can assume many of them were executed.

In the early weeks of the second Trump administration, the government’s priorities so far include overhauling federal agencies, negotiating the war in Ukraine with Moscow, and tariff wars with China. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first trip abroad was a tour of Latin America. In other words, Iran has not yet become a pillar of Washington’s new foreign policy, though that will likely change given that Rubio visited Germany, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in February.

Washington continues to view the Iranian government as a national and regional security threat, and Rubio’s recent tour focused on discussing the “destabilizing activities of the Iranian regime and its proxies.” New US sanctions against Iran’s UAV and ballistic missile programs have been implemented. However, as far as is publicly known, the Secretary of State did not discuss Tehran’s internal repressive activities with US allies. This is a mistake.

Statements by the White House, State Department, and/or members of Congress on Iran’s minorities would be helpful to remind Iranian authorities that the US is very much aware of the history of repressive activities Tehran carries out against its own population in general, and non-Fars groups in particular. To be fair, this has already happened, as members of Congress have introduced bills to condemn “Iran’s human rights abuses, unjust crackdowns, and arrests and executions without due process.” Moreover, one legislation (HR 3035) accused Iran of “severe restrictions on the freedom of religion, and the severe repression of women and religious minorities.” However, the text does not mention minorities by name.

Mentioning state repression towards Azerbaijani Turks, Kurds, and Baloch in future official statements & legislation regarding Iran or future Washington-Tehran negotiations will give an international voice to the voiceless.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He covers geopolitical, defense, and trade issues in the Western Hemisphere, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.