U.S. SOF Must Act Now: Preventing Taiwan from Becoming the Next Ukraine

As the world is still reeling from the nearly three-year-long bloody war in Ukraine, the US is ramping up to prepare for another area of impending global conflict: Taiwan.

As the world is still reeling from the nearly three-year-long bloody war in Ukraine, the US is ramping up to prepare for another area of impending global conflict: Taiwan. In 2022, President Xi Jinping announced China’s vision to re-establish firm control of the island by 2030 using any means necessary. Since then, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has increased military preparations and intensified maritime efforts to assert dominance in the South China Sea, highlighting their staunch resolve. The PRC needs a swift takeover of the island, fearing that any delays may lead to a prolonged conflict and extensive US involvement.

Sound familiar? Russia’s initial operation to seize Ukraine and overthrow the government in 10 days quickly collapsed into World War I-style trench warfare without any major gains in the last two years. Undoubtedly, President Xi has been closely monitoring the situation and America’s response throughout the conflict, looking to avoid Russia’s mistakes. While the US is pursuing provocative naval Freedom of Navigation Operations to deter Chinese aggression, it may be missing the opportunity to exploit one of its greatest options for deterrence: Special Operations Forces (SOF).

Beyond just kicking in doors and taking out high-profile targets, SOF provides a unique capability to partner with military forces in other countries and train them for territorial defense. For the US, SOF has a solid track record of training countries to defend themselves successfully. In Colombia, US special operators worked with Colombian defense forces and police units to eradicate a guerrilla revolutionary group of narcotics traders. As a result, internal violence within the country decreased dramatically, and the Colombian military has stepped up to help train military and police forces in nearly every other Central American country. Similarly, US SOF partnered with military forces in The Philippines to root out al Qaeda aligned terrorists in the country. US SOF played an essential role in these operations to maintain peace from internal conflict, help these countries defend themselves from the possibility of external threats, and strengthen diplomatic ties with the US.

US SOF IN UKRAINE: MIXED RESULTS

In Ukraine, SOF also played an essential role in helping Ukraine before the invasion started. Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the US sent Green Berets to train the Ukrainian military to stop future Russian encroachment. Between 2015 and 2022, these 150 Green Berets reportedly trained more than 27,000 Ukrainian special forces. When Russia launched its full-fledged invasion in February 2022, these specially trained Ukrainian operators helped sabotage Russian invasion efforts and thwart the 10-day campaign. US SOF yet again helped Ukrainian defense forces protect its territory.

However, the Ukrainian story did not simply end there. Just as China has shown intense resolve to reclaim Taiwan, Russia refused to give up its aspirations for Ukraine so easily and instead opted to continue a prolonged war. While US SOF continued its training mission with the Ukrainian military, they failed to support Ukraine’s biggest defense asset: the civilian population. US Army Colonel Kevin Stringer, lead developer of the US military’s Resistance Operating Concept, recognizes that the general population is the primary source of a country’s resistance to invasion and must be partnered with the military operation to achieve maximal results. Ironically, while SOF didn’t work with civilian leaders, this role was filled by a large group of zealous retired US military veterans. They facilitated public groups to help provide intelligence, supplies, medical attention, and food to support the war effort, which some have credited to generating a “tangible [effect] on the battlefield.” Had US SOF been more involved with building civilian resistance capabilities, the Ukrainian military may have been more successful in stopping the invasion and keeping the Russians outside of their borders altogether.

A PLACE FOR SOF TO SHINE

Looking to the Pacific, the US has a crucial opportunity to learn from its mistakes in Ukraine and use its SOF to help Taiwan defend itself. The US already has a small contingent of Green Berets stationed on the island to help train Taiwanese defense forces. However, as the Ukrainian experience has shown, this may not be enough to deter China’s deep-rooted ambitions. A protracted war against China would be incredibly costly, unpopular, and strategically crucial and should be avoided to the greatest extent possible. Therefore, SOF should not be limited to merely training Taiwanese SOF and broader military forces but should also include deliberate resistance-building operations within the general population. These operations could take many different forms, but their goal must be to prepare the people of Taiwan to resist the impending PRC invasion and thwart their plans of forceful reunification.

As the US is preparing for a future conflict with China, it must not overlook the strategic significance of SOF in the deterrence efforts. US SOF has a successful track record of helping our allies defend themselves from internal and external conflict. Although SOF involvement in Ukraine helped foil Russia’s initial invasion plans, it failed to integrate with the civilian population to further the resistance efforts, leading to a longer drawn-out conflict. If the US does not use its SOF to build civilian resistance capabilities in Taiwan, China’s inevitable invasion may result in a costly protracted war like Russia-Ukraine.

Bradley Gorham
Bradley Gorham
Bradley Gorham is an undergraduate in the Department of Military Strategic Studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy. His research focuses on the role of Special Operations Forces in conflict. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force Academy, the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.