SQUAD: A Silver Lining For Quad?

Smaller alliances of nations or ‘minilaterals’ have become indispensable in the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. This article examines how SQUAD’s emergence as a defence alliance addressing ‘traditional’ military security provides an opportunity for QUAD to spearhead ‘non-traditional’ non-military security issues. The creation of SQUAD will benefit the Asia Pacific security architecture through two ways: (1) SQUAD will specifically address China’s alarming military build-up in South China Sea, which QUAD was unable to owing to its geographical expanse and strategic divergences (2) QUAD can address Chinese threats across critical emerging areas like cybersecurity, space research and maritime infrastructure. Both SQUAD and QUAD complementarily address traditional and non-traditional security in creating a ‘free and open’ Indo Pacific order.

QUAD’s Emergence: A Broad- Based Approach

The genesis of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) can be traced to 2004 ‘Tsunami Core Group’ formed by USA, Japan, Australia and India. In 2007, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appealed for a four-way partnership between these nations based on shared democratic values. QUAD’s foundations were thus marked by non-military or ‘non-traditional’ security issues, evolving from a disaster response task force to an alliance of democracies. Till present, QUAD meetings have reflected a vision to address several non-traditional security issues of climate change, vaccine diplomacy, critical emerging technologies, and supply chain resiliency.

Going beyond non-traditional security, QUAD’s military pivot became prominent with rising Chinese maritime belligerence. Through its ‘String of Pearls’ strategy, the dragon has progressively expanded its naval footprint across the seas of South Asia, Southeast Asia and Pacific Island States. The military posturing of QUAD is most evidently seen in the Malabar defence exercise, transforming from a bilateral US-India exercise  to a four-way partnership including Japan and Australia. QUAD meetings also made increasingly veiled references to counter China’s actions at sea, highlighting the need for “free, open rules-based order, rooted in international law” flagging “intimidating manoeuvres in South China Sea”.

However, QUAD is fraught with internal dissonance hindering a cohesive strategic vision for the grouping. Analysts have observed how countries like India have consistently deflected anti-China containment perceptions. This is neither surprising nor unreasonable considering looming border incursions India faces at the Indo-China border. India’s historical stance of ‘strategic autonomy’ also cautions it to continue balancing the tight-rope walk between US-China rivalry, attempting to sway towards neither. Uneasiness also prevails as India is at odds with other QUAD nations over the Russia-Ukraine crisis, including a refusal by India to comply with Western sanctions on Moscow’s industries.

Another overlooked issue is the diffused structure of QUAD itself. Geographically, QUAD remains expansive in its coverage across the Pacific seas. While this has helped QUAD nations coalesce around issues such as those of piracy in the Indian Ocean region or monitor illegal fishing, QUAD has failed to effectively counter Chinese military build-up in South China Sea. Not a single Malabar exercise has been conducted in what is arguably the most violence-susceptible maritime zone of the Indo-Pacific. Despite the Hague Tribunal’s 2016 order invalidating China’s 9-dash line, littoral states continue to witness violations of their territorial integrity.

SQUAD’s Emergence: A Defence-Driven Approach

The SQUAD becomes relevant in the context of prevailing security vacuum in South China Sea. In March 2024, a defence alliance among USA, Japan, Australia and Philippines came together to form the ‘SQUAD’ directly addressing the dragon in the room. Unlike the QUAD’s broader objectives, the SQUAD specifically addresses military ‘traditional’ security, with a pointed geographical focus safeguarding the waters of South China Sea from China’s military transgressions.

Another major difference between SQUAD and QUAD is not only seen in purpose but also in participation: while QUAD had India as one of the core countries, SQUAD instead has the Philippines. Geospatially, Philippines’ direct presence  in South China Sea provides an extended arm to the United States in maintaining vigil against Chinese transgressions. Geostrategically, the Philippines under recently elected Marcos Jr. is adopting an increasingly confrontational approach towards China, calling out the dragon’s gray-zone warfare tactics. While India’s ‘strategic autonomy’ in the Indo-Pacific may be argued as a vision in creating a new multipolar world order, USA and its military allies (including Japan and Australia) may instead hedge their bets on Philippines’ ‘assertive transparency’ holding the dragon accountable for its aggression. In response, China is increasingly perturbed by Philippines emerging as a new lynchpin of America’s ‘integrated deterrence’ in the Indo-Pacific.

While analysing SQUAD vis-a-vis QUAD, it is also important to note the dynamics between India and Philippines. Unlike India, Philippines is a mutual defence treaty ally of the US, while further deepening its military engagements with other regional partners including Japan and Australia. Philippines also seems to be more ideologically aligned with Western powers, given its consistent condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations. With the formation of SQUAD, analysts have debated whether India is at a strategic backfoot and is being replaced by the Philippines as a more consistent ally. 

Interestingly, India seems to have taken Philippines’ emerging military prominence in its stride. In fact, India has further aided Philippines’ strategic posturing through its offering of Brahmos missiles, concessional loans for defence purposes, and sending warships to South China Sea for naval exercises with “friendly” countries. What we see here is India’s “combat-support role” in comparison to Philippines’ “direct combat role”: while not taking on a military posture against China itself, India is keen on supporting nation states that do so.

SQUAD and QUAD: Harmonizing Traditional and Non-Traditional Security

If we circle back to SQUAD and QUAD with a bold Philippines and a benign India respectively, their future paths may be divergent yet complementary. SQUAD will take on a more traditional military security role in South China Sea, with Philippines as one of the major defence regional powers. This allows QUAD to spearhead non-traditional security issues, with India as one of the major Asian economic powers. Ironically, China’s initial scepticism of a broad-based QUAD emerging as an ‘Asian NATO’ may become more relevant in the context of a defence-driven SQUAD instead. This is seen in the recent participation of New Zealand for the first time in joint naval exercises by SQUAD nations. On the other hand, the QUAD may emerge as an essential group advocating STEM and cybersecurity research, equally relevant in shaping modern warfare. The recently introduced Project 33 under US Navy for instance acknowledges robotic warfare in a potential direct conflict with China. It is clear how QUAD’s relevance in promoting non-traditional security issues (such as Artificial Intelligence research)  directly affects traditional security concerns (including defence capabilities).

Instead of focusing on its strategic divergences, QUAD must play on its strengths and not shy away from leading non-traditional security issues in the Indo-Pacific. With contemporary global politics facing threats across dimensions including cyber crime, space wars, and maritime infrastructure, security in the Indo-Pacific has become layered and multi-dimensional. Traditional military security, albeit important, should no longer be the sole focus of nation states in the 21st century. Given the initiative, QUAD must utilise the SQUAD’s emergence as a silver lining in leading non-traditional security issues in the Indo-Pacific security architecture.

Table of Comparison: SQUAD vis-a-vis QUAD (Infographic, excluded from word count)