Systemic Failures: Marginalization of Sunni Arabs in Iraq
Iraq’s political, social, and economic failures of the last 21 years are deeply rooted in one stark reality: the systematic marginalization and deprivation of Sunni Arabs at the hands of the Shiite-led central government. When the George W. Bush administration explained its rationale for overthrowing former president Saddam Hussein and replacing the one-party state with a disjointed parliamentary system, stakeholders like Paul Bremer, the first civilian leader of Iraq post-Saddam Hussein, contended that putting Shiites in charge of Baghdad corrected a historical injustice, primarily the Sunni “minority” ruling over the Shiite “majority” since the fall of the Abbasids more than 750 years ago. Bremer’s revisionist history defies both demographics—given that Iraq’s Kurds and Arabs are both Sunnis—and Iraq’s constitution, considering Article 14 guarantees equal rights for all Iraqi citizens.
From the controversial de-Baathification policy that uprooted more than 500,000 Sunnis from government jobs to the war against ISIS that displaced millions Sunnis from their homes in northern and western Iraq, historical precedent and modern trajectories prove that the time has come for the Iraqi government and their patrons in Washington and Tehran to redress wrongdoing by greenlighting the creation of a semi-autonomous Sunni region in line with both the Iraqi constitution and the framework that led to the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq. Failure to acknowledge the rights and aspirations of Sunnis after years of institutional and structural discrimination will pave the way for greater instability and conflict in Iraq.
The Iraqi Constitution: A Framework for Federalism
In 2005, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani did not stand in the way of calls for federalism, laying the groundwork for a constitution that emphasizes federalism and soft partition. Article 116 of the Iraqi constitution establishes a federal system characterized by a decentralized capital, self-governing regions, governorates, and local administrations. Article 117 of the constitution recognizes the KRG as a federal entity entitled to a share of Iraq’s oil wealth and the management of local administrative, economic, and security affairs. Article 119 stipulates that one or more governorates can form a region based on a request to be voted on in a referendum, submitted by either one-third of the council members of each governorate wishing to form a region or one-tenth of the voters in each governorate intending to form a region.
Following the 2003 American invasion, Sunni leaders initially balked at the notion of soft partition, fearing that Shiites and Kurds could exploit a decentralized model to dilute the influence of Sunnis. However, shifting circumstances have led Sunni leaders to reassess their stance, realizing that federalism may offer the only viable path to addressing long-standing grievances.
Evolving Sunni Perspectives on Federalism
Arab Sunni leaders who previously opposed soft partition predicated their logic on the belief that Iraq’s new rulers would play by the rules of democracy. With successive U.S.- and Iranian-backed administrations showing no signs of faithfully implementing the Iraqi constitution, Sunni leaders of all stripes and backgrounds hypothesize that only soft partition can revive war-stricken Sunni Arab areas, address the plight of IDPs displaced during the war against ISIS, and insulate the country from another civil war.
Among the most prominent individuals to endorse soft partition, Sunni Grand Mufti Abdul Malik Al-Saadi issued a fatwa supporting the implementation of a federal regional model. Outside Iraq, Arab Sunni activists led by Aiham Alsammarae, Iraq’s electricity minister from 2003 to 2005, have openly called on the U.S. Senate to revisit then-Senator Joe Biden’s 2006 bill proposing a soft partition of Iraq into three semi-autonomous regions for Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds under a unified central federal government.
In 2014 and 2015, Vice President Biden renewed calls for the U.S. to endorse and implement the soft partition of Iraq in response to the Sunni uprisings of western Iraq that culminated in Iraq’s third civil war in under 15 years. With both the Iraqi constitution and segments of American lawmakers favoring soft partition, Iraqi elites have a rare opportunity to end the perpetual state of conflict, inequality, and discord.
The U.S., Iran, and a Shift Toward Sunni Pragmatism
The United States’ marriage of convenience with Shiites has rapidly unraveled due to strategic divergences. Most recently, Iran has aided Russia, Hezbollah, and Hamas, undermining American interests in the Middle East and Europe. Washington’s pivot away from Iran and its Shiite allies, coupled with tacit support for the bloodless coup that brought Al-Qaeda to power in Syria, could foreshadow additional power plays and greater support for anti-Iranian elements in the region.
On one hand, Al Qaeda’s presence in Syria could buoy the interests of long-forgotten Arab Sunnis regionally. On the other hand, the inexperience of the new administration in Damascus and its overdependence on Israel, Turkey, and the U.S. for legitimacy could ignite new sectarian conflicts in the region. While Syria’s new leader Mohammed al-Jolani, now known as Ahmad al-Sharaa, has crystallized his intent to exact revenge against Iran, Hezbollah, and Alawites, Iraqi Sunnis remain solely focused on reviving their regions through socioeconomic development and political reform.
Unlike the Kurds, who have continued to receive upwards of 18% of Iraq’s oil revenue to fund their local administration, Arab Sunnis believe they possess ample resources, capacities, and manpower to rebuild their region from the bottom up. Whether through untapped gas reserves in six Sunni-majority governorates, investments from Iraqis at home and abroad, or trade with regional and international powers, Sunnis will harness their own resources if they are granted the legal and administrative space to do so.
Drawing Inspiration from Success: Building a Sunni Arab Region
Iraqi stakeholders envisioning the Sunni Arab region are keen to draw from their own successes and the ongoing Kurdish experiment to create a prototype for stability and prosperity in Iraq. From 2007 to 2009, Sunni tribes (Sahwa) triumphed over the Al-Qaeda insurgency that had destabilized and terrorized Sunni-majority regions. Tribal unity, the focal point of this stability, forms the foundation for future governance aligned with the expectations and needs of Sunni Arabs.
Despite political schisms that have occasionally threatened unity in Kurdistan, the KRG exemplifies the effectiveness of federalism. By devolving power from an indifferent and overburdened central government to hands-on and engaged local administrations, Kurdistan has demonstrated that localized governance can deliver results. The KRG’s modern stability reflects both bureaucratic effectiveness and Kurdish leaders’ commitment to transforming the region into a bastion of humanitarianism, education, and innovation. From Kurdish universities offering platforms for local and international talent to thrive, to humanitarian agencies welcoming displaced people with open arms, Kurdish leaders have risen to the occasion in highly consequential policy areas and initiatives.
A Vision for the Sunni Arab Region
Arab Sunni leaders recognize that stability is a prerequisite for harmonious relations with Baghdad, Kurdistan, and regional stakeholders. Just as Sahwa tribal fighters worked in lockstep with the U.S. and Baghdad to defeat Al-Qaeda, future Sunni leaders will play an integral role in a unified and interdependent security architecture that guarantees both local and national stability.
As local leadership and security partners tackle complex challenges—including resettling internally displaced persons (IDPs) and eliminating ISIS insurgents—the region will harness its full range of resources to rebuild infrastructure, attract direct investment, and increase bilateral trade domestically and internationally.
Soft Partition: Acknowledging the Rights of All Iraqis
The 2019 Tishreen uprising was another reminder of Iraq’s broken system. In previous rounds of civil unrest, Baghdad and its Iran-backed paramilitary allies blamed Sunni “takfiris” and foreign-backed elements for stoking unrest. However, when throngs of young Shiite men flooded the streets of Baghdad and Basra during the Tishreen rebellion, it became evident to Iraqis and the outside world that the country must return to the constitutional framework to safeguard the rights of the diverse population.
The status quo, which primarily favors elites in Baghdad and Kurdistan, is a liability for Iraq’s three main groups, regional states, and international powers. Warnings of an imminent ISIS insurgency in northern and western Iraq further underline the urgency of honoring the constitution and respecting Sunnis’ right to self-determination. By embracing soft partition, Iraq has the chance to avoid further conflict and foster a stable, inclusive future.
