Ballots, Bullets, and Betrayal: How South Africa Sold Out Mozambique’s Revolution

Mozambique, once a symbol of post-colonial resilience and revolutionary potential, now finds itself at a perilous crossroads.

Mozambique, once a symbol of post-colonial resilience and revolutionary potential, now finds itself at a perilous crossroads. Political instability, amplified by the aftermath of the October 2024 elections, has cast doubt on the country’s democratic trajectory. Allegations of electoral fraud and voter suppression have eroded public trust in the ruling FRELIMO party, as opposition groups decry what they call a rigged process. This political turmoil unfolds against the backdrop of an insurgency in Cabo Delgado, where armed conflict has displaced nearly a million people, and a humanitarian crisis fueled by corporate-led natural resource extraction devastates local communities.

These interlocking crises expose a fragile state, where governance is failing to address the needs of ordinary Mozambicans. Instead, power remains concentrated in the hands of elites who exploit the country’s wealth for personal and political gain. The regional response has been equally fraught. South Africa, Mozambique’s largest trading partner and a key actor in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), has shown a vested interest in stabilizing the region—but its motivations are far from altruistic.

This article seeks to demonstrate how South Africa’s approach to Mozambique—driven by corporate interests, energy security needs, and militarization—has enabled violence, exacerbated humanitarian crises, and stifled the prospects for genuine peace and regional solidarity.

Historical Context: South Africa and Mozambique’s Entwined Histories

The Anti-Apartheid Struggle and Post-Liberation Realities:
During the apartheid era, Mozambique was a key ally for the African National Congress (ANC), providing logistical and military support to the ANC’s struggle against apartheid. Mozambique’s Frelimo government, under Samora Machel, provided sanctuary to exiled South African freedom fighters and allowed guerrilla attacks against the apartheid regime. However, after the end of apartheid in 1994, both Frelimo and the ANC transitioned to neoliberal economic models, abandoning many of their original revolutionary goals in favour of market-driven policies.

Samora Machel (Frelimo) and Nelson Mandela (ANC) had a close political relationship in the 1980s. After the end of apartheid, South Africa’s foreign policy under President Nelson Mandela and later Thabo Mbeki shifted towards fostering regional stability through economic integration, often disregarding the socio-political inequalities exacerbated by corporate influence in Mozambique.

The Economic Imperatives Driving South Africa’s Policy

Corporate Exploitation and Energy Needs:
South African companies, such as SasolExxaro Resources, and Kumba Iron Ore, have significant investments in Mozambique’s natural gas and coal sectors. These companies have benefitted from preferential treatment under the South African government’s policies. For example, Sasol has been involved in Mozambique’s gas sector for decades, with operations like the Pande and Temane gas fields in Inhambane Province. These energy extraction projects have faced local opposition due to their environmental impact and the displacement of communities, yet South Africa’s government has remained largely silent on these issues.  In 2010, Sasol signed a deal with the Mozambican government to extract natural gas from the country’s northern region, despite local protests over the environmental impact and land rights issues. South Africa’s government, under Jacob Zuma, ensured the project moved forward, aligning with South Africa’s own energy needs.

Energy Security and Regional Power Dynamics:
South Africa’s energy crisis, especially the lack of reliable power sources, has driven it to secure resources from neighboring countries, particularly Mozambique. South Africa’s energy needs have made the development of Mozambique’s gas reserves a priority, often at the expense of local communities and stability in Mozambique. South Africa’s Eskom, the state-owned electricity supplier, imports significant amounts of electricity from Mozambique’s Hidroeléctrica de Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam. The relationship between Eskom and Mozambique has often been viewed as exploitative, with South Africa benefiting from cheap energy while Mozambique’s infrastructure suffers from underinvestment.

Militarized Solutions and Their Failures

South Africa’s Role in SAMIM (Southern African Development Community Military Intervention in Mozambique):
South Africa has played a critical role in military interventions in Mozambique. The SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), launched in 2021, saw South African forces deployed to combat Islamist insurgents in Cabo Delgado. However, the militarized approach has not addressed the root causes of the insurgency, such as social and economic marginalization, corruption, and the failure of state institutions. In 2021, South African troops, alongside forces from Rwanda, were sent to Mozambique to fight insurgents linked to the Islamic State (ISIS) in Cabo Delgado. Despite the presence of foreign troops, violence escalated, with more displacement and humanitarian crises emerging.

The South African Military-Industrial Complex:
South Africa’s defense industry has benefited from the conflict in Mozambique. South African defense contractors, including companies like Denel (South Africa’s state-owned arms manufacturer), have secured lucrative military contracts from both the Mozambican government and private security firms operating in the region. Denel and other South African arms companies have sold military equipment and training services to Mozambique. These weapons have been used by both the Mozambican military and private contractors involved in securing resource-rich regions, exacerbating violence and instability.

South Africa’s Silence on Humanitarian Crises

Refugees and Xenophobia:
South Africa’s failure to act on the displacement caused by Mozambique’s violence, and the rise of xenophobic rhetoric towards refugees, especially those from Mozambique, paints a picture of a government more concerned with domestic stability than regional solidarity. Many Mozambicans fleeing the conflict have been subjected to xenophobic attacks in South Africa, where they are seen as a drain on resources. In 2019, tensions in South Africa around the treatment of refugees and migrants boiled over into violent xenophobic attacks. Mozambican refugees, like many others from other African countries, were targeted in these attacks, despite the country’s historical commitment to pan-African solidarity.

Humanitarian Aid:
South Africa has also been slow to provide support for the millions of displaced Mozambicans. While international NGOs and other countries have stepped in to provide relief, South Africa’s government has largely ignored the humanitarian needs of refugees fleeing the conflict. South Africa’s foreign policy under Cyril Ramaphosa has been criticized for not engaging more actively in Mozambique’s refugee crisis. Despite regional challenges, South Africa has not significantly opened its borders or expanded its refugee protection policies.

Frelimo and ANC: Allies in Neoliberal Oppression

Political Alliances and Neoliberalism:
Both the ANC and Frelimo have shifted from socialist ideals to embrace neoliberal policies in the post-liberation era. Under Thabo Mbeki’s presidency (1999–2008), South Africa’s foreign policy moved towards economic integration, focusing on resource extraction and promoting corporate interests. This has often meant prioritizing the interests of multinational corporations over the needs of local populations, both in South Africa and Mozambique. Under Thabo Mbeki and José Eduardo dos Santos (Angola’s president), South Africa and Frelimo aligned in promoting free-market policies that favoured multinational companies, leading to the marginalization of rural populations in both countries. This alignment persisted during the presidency of Jacob Zuma in South Africa.

A Radical Vision for Mozambique-South Africa Relations: The Shadow of Ramaphosa’s Leadership

South Africa’s involvement in Mozambique’s crisis is not merely a question of state policy—it is also shaped by the personal history, ideological inclinations, and leadership style of President Cyril Ramaphosa. A closer examination of Ramaphosa’s trajectory reveals a leader caught between the legacies of struggle politics, neoliberal capitalism, and an increasingly fragile regional leadership role. This psychoanalytical analysis of Ramaphosa’s leadership sheds light on why South Africa’s response to Mozambique’s crisis has been limited, self-serving, and often complicit in perpetuating cycles of exploitation and violence.

Ramaphosa: A Man of Dualities

Cyril Ramaphosa’s life story reflects a set of contradictions that have profoundly shaped his leadership. A former trade unionist and anti-apartheid activist, Ramaphosa rose to prominence as a key figure in the struggle for democracy. Yet, after apartheid, he pivoted to become a wealthy businessman, benefiting from the very structures of neoliberal capitalism that many in the ANC once sought to dismantle.

This dual identity—freedom fighter turned billionaire—defines much of his approach to governance. On one hand, Ramaphosa remains rhetorically committed to ideals of justice and Pan-African solidarity. On the other, his business interests and connections to corporate elites position him as a defender of neoliberal policies that prioritize profits over people. These dualities are evident in how South Africa engages with Mozambique.

The Corporate Lens: Ramaphosa’s Business Interests and Mozambique

Ramaphosa’s corporate history is central to understanding his policies. As a former chairperson of companies like MTNShanduka Group, and Lonmin (infamously linked to the Marikana massacre), he epitomizes the entanglement of political power and corporate profit. This history shapes South Africa’s response to Mozambique in several ways:

  1. Gas Exploitation: Mozambique’s vast natural gas reserves are of significant interest to South African companies and international investors. Ramaphosa’s leadership has continued to promote South Africa as a hub for resource extraction, prioritizing corporate investments over local community development. His government has done little to challenge the dominance of South African corporations like Sasol, which are deeply entrenched in Mozambique’s extractive economy.
  2. The Neoliberal Playbook: Ramaphosa’s embrace of neoliberal economics means that his administration views Mozambique primarily as a site for capital expansion, rather than as a partner in a shared struggle for development. The focus on protecting corporate interests in Cabo Delgado, often under the guise of regional stability, reflects a policy shaped more by investor confidence than by human needs.
  3. Marikana’s Ghost: The Marikana massacre, in which 34 striking miners were killed by police during Ramaphosa’s tenure on Lonmin’s board, casts a long shadow over his leadership. It illustrates his willingness to side with capital against labor and communities in moments of conflict. This legacy resonates in Mozambique, where South Africa’s intervention prioritizes corporate and state security over addressing the grievances of marginalized communities affected by resource extraction.

Ramaphosa’s Political Pragmatism and Pan-Africanism

Ramaphosa’s leadership style is often described as cautious and pragmatic, shaped by his experience as a negotiator during South Africa’s transition to democracy. However, this pragmatism often translates into inaction or half-measures when bold leadership is required. In the context of Mozambique, this manifests as:

  1. Weak Regional Leadership: As chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Ramaphosa has often failed to assert moral or political authority. His approach to Mozambique’s insurgency has been characterized by a reliance on militarized solutions, without addressing the structural causes of the conflict.
  2. The Failure of Solidarity: While Ramaphosa frequently invokes the rhetoric of Pan-African solidarity, his actions often betray these ideals. South Africa’s policies toward Mozambique resemble a form of neocolonialism, with South African corporations and the military playing a dominant role in shaping the country’s trajectory. This undermines the revolutionary ethos that once united the ANC and FRELIMO during their struggles against colonial and apartheid rule.
  3. A Leadership Void: Ramaphosa’s indecisiveness on Mozambique reflects a broader pattern in his presidency. Just as he has struggled to tackle corruption and economic inequality within South Africa, he has failed to articulate a transformative vision for the region. His preference for behind-the-scenes negotiations and avoidance of confrontation leaves critical issues unresolved.

Psychological Underpinnings: Ramaphosa’s Approach to Power

To understand Ramaphosa’s interaction with Mozambique, it is crucial to consider the psychological dimensions of his leadership:

  1. Conflict Avoidance: Ramaphosa’s history as a negotiator and consensus-builder makes him reluctant to take strong, controversial stances. This conflict-avoidant approach leads to a reliance on compromise and half-measures, which are ill-suited to addressing the complex crises in Mozambique.
  2. The Shadow of Business: Ramaphosa’s personal wealth and corporate connections shape his worldview. His instinct is to see economic growth as a panacea, even when it exacerbates inequality and fuels conflict. This corporate mindset blinds him to the need for redistributive policies and grassroots empowerment in Mozambique.
  3. The Weight of Legacy: As a leader of the ANC, Ramaphosa is deeply aware of the party’s historical role as a liberation movement. However, this awareness often translates into an overreliance on nostalgia and symbolism, rather than concrete action. His invocation of solidarity with Mozambique’s FRELIMO often rings hollow, as South Africa’s actions on the ground prioritize exploitation over partnership.

Implications for Mozambique-South Africa Relations

Ramaphosa’s leadership style and personal history have profound implications for the future of Mozambique-South Africa relations. If left unchallenged, his approach will perpetuate a cycle of exploitation, militarization, and inequality. A radical reimagining of this relationship must confront the contradictions at the heart of his presidency:

  • Rejecting Neoliberalism: South Africa must move beyond the neoliberal policies championed by Ramaphosa and prioritize economic justice for Mozambique’s marginalized communities.
  • Centering Human Dignity: South Africa’s intervention in Mozambique must shift from protecting corporate interests to empowering local communities through redistributive policies and grassroots peacebuilding.
  • Reviving Revolutionary Solidarity: The ANC must return to its roots as a liberation movement and support Mozambique in building a just and equitable society, free from the domination of multinational corporations.

Conclusion: A Call for Radical Leadership

Cyril Ramaphosa’s leadership represents both the promise and the peril of post-apartheid South Africa. His cautious pragmatism and corporate entanglements have shaped a foreign policy that prioritizes stability for elites over justice for the people. In Mozambique, this approach has exacerbated conflict and inequality, undermining the revolutionary ideals that once united the two nations.

A radical vision for Mozambique-South Africa relations requires breaking free from Ramaphosa’s corporate mindset and embracing a new paradigm of solidarity, justice, and sustainability. This transformation will not come from the halls of power but from the grassroots movements and communities demanding a future free from exploitation and violence. South Africa must choose whether to stand with the people of Mozambique or remain complicit in their suffering. The time for bold, transformative leadership is now.

N. Sithole kaMiya
N. Sithole kaMiya
WITS Society, Work, and Politics Institute (SWOP) Research Fellow Mellon Pipeline Development Program Research Fellow (MPDP) GLUS Sue Ledwith awardee Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellow (MMUF)