The recent fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime has sent shockwaves across the global political landscape, reigniting discussions about authoritarian resilience and the power of grassroots resistance. For over a decade, Assad clung to power through brutal crackdowns, foreign support, and exploiting divisions within Syria’s fractured society. However, a convergence of economic collapse, internal dissent, and waning international support proved too great for his regime to withstand. This pivotal moment has inspired hope for those living under oppressive regimes worldwide, including in Myanmar, where the military junta—known as the State Administration Council (SAC)—continues to grip the nation with an iron fist.
Both Syria and Myanmar are characterized by a complex web of factions, religious and ethnic minorities, and militias, each with differing goals. In Syria, major players include the Assad regime, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Islamist groups like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Kurdish forces such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). While united in their desire to overthrow Assad, these groups diverge sharply in their visions for Syria, ranging from secular democracy to Islamist governance, with Kurds primarily seeking autonomy. This fragmentation has often led to infighting, weakening the opposition’s ability to present a united front.
Myanmar’s resistance, though similarly diverse, is more cohesive. Key players include the National Unity Government (NUG), representing the ousted civilian leadership; People’s Defense Forces (PDFs); and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) such as the Karen National Union (KNU), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and Chin National Front (CNF). Unlike Syria, most ethnic groups in Myanmar are not vying for central power but advocate for autonomy or federalism, which has fostered a shared vision for a federal democratic state. This unity has minimized infighting and strengthened opposition to the State Administration Council (SAC).
The role of external actors sharply distinguishes the conflicts in Syria and Myanmar. Syria’s war became a proxy battleground for competing international powers, with Russia and Iran backing Assad to secure their regional interests, while the United States, Turkey, and Gulf states supported various opposition groups with conflicting agendas. This foreign interference fragmented the opposition and prolonged the conflict. By contrast, Myanmar’s conflict is dominated by a single external actor: China. Beijing supports the State Administration Council (SAC) to protect strategic investments like the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, critical to mitigating its Malacca Dilemma. While China maintains ties with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the opposition National Unity Government (NUG), its backing of the junta reflects strategic pragmatism.
Recently, Beijing has intensified its involvement, endorsing military airstrikes, imposing resource blockades on resistance groups, and pressuring EAOs like the United Wa State Army (UWSA) to limit revolutionary support. Unlike Syria, Myanmar’s conflict lacks the entanglement of competing foreign powers, reducing the risk of conflicting agendas and offering a glimmer of hope for a negotiated resolution among EAOs. However, China’s unwavering support for the SAC has also prolonged the conflict, contributing to widespread destruction of lives, property, and the economy.
Myanmar’s simpler external dynamics provide its resistance with a strategic advantage compared to Syria’s fragmented opposition. Syria’s rebels, while benefiting from significant international backing, struggled with deep divisions and competing goals. Assad’s downfall came after years of corruption, military fatigue, and overreliance on foreign allies like Russia and Iran, which ultimately strained his regime. By contrast, Myanmar’s military remains relatively cohesive despite fighting on multiple fronts, and its resistance forces adhere to human rights principles, unlike Syria’s jihadist factions.
Myanmar’s resistance, anchored by a shared vision for federalism and minimal infighting, has demonstrated resilience. Resistance forces have captured strategic resources like rare earth deposits and defied China’s attempts to curb their advances. Internally, Min Aung Hlaing’s military is grappling with declining morale and control, exemplified by losses in Rakhine State to the Arakan Army (AA) and offensives by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and NUG-aligned People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). Growing dissatisfaction among junta supporters and increasing territorial losses raise doubts about how long the SAC can maintain its grip on power.
While the fall of Assad demonstrates that sustained pressure and resilience can dismantle entrenched regimes, Myanmar’s resistance faces unique challenges as it contends with both the junta’s internal cohesion and Beijing’s backing. Nevertheless, Myanmar’s relatively unified opposition and limited foreign interference provide a clearer path for meaningful change compared to Syria’s externally entangled conflict.
The global response to Myanmar’s resistance has been weaker than the international support for Syria’s opposition. Sanctions and condemnations have targeted the junta, but financial or military aid for the National Unity Government (NUG) and EAOs remains limited. ASEAN’s inconsistent stance—ranging from Malaysia and Indonesia’s criticism of the junta to Thailand’s closer ties—further undermines regional efforts. This contrasts sharply with Syria, where regional powers and global actors decisively took sides.
While Myanmar’s resistance has shown adaptability, using both peaceful and armed strategies, parallels with Assad’s downfall remain tenuous. Entrenched but under pressure from economic sanctions, sustained resistance, and widespread unpopularity, the junta endures with support from allies like China and Russia. Although some Myanmar soldiers have defected, there is little evidence that Min Aung Hlaing’s regime is nearing collapse. Key shifts, such as widespread military defections or significant external support for opposition groups, have yet to materialize.
For Myanmar’s citizens, Assad’s defeat is more than a distant geopolitical event—it is a symbol of hope. Despite the ongoing suffering and instability, the resilience of Myanmar’s opposition continues to inspire belief that even the most entrenched regimes can be challenged and ultimately overthrown.
