Authors: Abhivardhan and Genevieve Donnellon-May
As Donald Trump prepares for a potential return to the White House, the Indo-Pacific region faces the prospect of significant shifts in tech policy, particularly within the context of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) —comprising the US, India, Australia, and Japan—and its strategic approach to China. Under Trump’s leadership, the United States (U.S.). is likely to take a more transactional, bilateral approach to technology and security, which could challenge the Quad’s multilateral efforts to counter China’s growing influence in the region.
With China increasingly positioning itself as a leader in advanced technologies like 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), and semiconductors, the Quad’s collective goal of reducing reliance on Chinese tech becomes even more urgent. For instance, China has demonstrated its technological prowess through Huawei’s successful development of 7nm chips that power advanced 5G networks, even while facing U.S. sanctions. The Digital Silk Road initiative has seen China invest over US$79 billion in digital infrastructure projects across multiple countries, showcasing its growing influence in global tech development.
The region will need to adapt to this changing landscape, navigating both Trump’s preference for less regulatory oversight and China’s aggressive push to shape global technological standards through various initiatives. The Quad’s response will be crucial in safeguarding cybersecurity and maintaining a tech landscape with the free, open & inclusive Indo-Pacific.
The Quad has set key priorities around the ethical development of emerging technologies, grounded in shared democratic values. These include promoting a human-centric approach to AI with a focus on transparency, fairness, and accountability, through initiatives like the Critical and Emerging Technology (CET) Working Group, launched in 2021, to address risks and misuse.
Cybersecurity remains a top priority, with the Quad working to align policies, prevent cybercrime, and build regional capacity to enhance infrastructure resilience. The group is also focused on establishing global cyber norms to protect against state and non-state threats.
The Quad champions an open, secure internet, advocating for net neutrality, cross-border data flows, and privacy protections. Combating disinformation and ensuring platform accountability are also key goals, as highlighted in the 2021 Leaders’ Joint Statement.
Additionally, the Quad is prioritizing secure 5G networks, promoting Open Radio Access Networks (Open RAN) to reduce reliance on China, and strengthening semiconductor supply chains for resilience in global markets. These priorities reflect the Quad’s commitment to ethical, secure technology practices, driving stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.
Under a Trump 2.0 presidency, the Quad may place greater emphasis on four main aspects.
The first is artificial intelligence (AI) and emerging technologies.
The Biden administration’s Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence (EO 13960) marked a significant step towards establishing ethical and transparent AI governance in the U.S. Signed in 2021, the order aims to promote responsible AI development by setting standards for transparency, accountability, and public trust, and fostering innovation in critical sectors. For instance, The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued comprehensive guidance in March 2024 defining “rights-impacting” and “safety-impacting” AI systems for federal agencies, establishing clear parameters for AI risk assessments.
Although a second Trump presidency might lead to the repeal of EO 13960, its initial commitments – like promoting AI ethics, transparency, and trust – have already influenced U.S. governance practices, creating a foundation for AI ethics and regulation across US Government divisions and departments.
However, this evolving landscape presents an opportunity for China to further assert its influence in AI development. If U.S. regulatory gaps widen under a change in leadership, China may leverage platforms like the Global AI Governance Forum and the BRICS+ AI Alliance to promote its vision of AI as a tool for state control. For China, AI is not just about technological advancement but also about reinforcing political and social control, aligning with its broader geopolitical strategy.
In such scenarios, the Quad nations may need to coordinate their efforts to present democratic alternatives in AI ethics and development, ensuring that AI technology remains a force for global progress rather than authoritarian governance.
The second aspect is cybersecurity and 5G. The Quad’s emphasis on cybersecurity and secure telecommunications infrastructure directly aligns with Trump’s historical opposition to Chinese tech giants like Huawei. However, if the U.S. reduces the authority of agencies such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) under a second Trump presidency, the Quad’s Senior Cyber Group may face challenges in maintaining a unified stance.
In this context, India, as a rising geopolitical power, is well-positioned to lead the charge in setting standards for secure digital infrastructure and promoting interoperability among Quad nations. New Delhi’s emphasis on developing indigenous 5G solutions and its adoption of Open Radio Access Networks (RAN) technology further solidify its role as a key player in shaping the future of secure telecom networks in the Indo-Pacific. For instance, India has established a robust Indigenous 5G Test Bed across five premier institutions – IIT Madras, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kanpur, and IISc Bangalore. The CEWiT/IIT Madras facility now provides comprehensive end-to-end testing capabilities for RAN Level, PHY Level, and various other telecommunications equipment.
Meanwhile, China remains focused on expanding its digital infrastructure footprint through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), presenting a significant challenge to the Quad’s efforts to ensure resilient, secure networks. Beijing’s strategy positions digital infrastructure as a tool of economic and geopolitical influence, offering developing countries access to advanced technologies in exchange for greater political and economic alignment.
In this light, the Quad must therefore not only enhance cooperation among its members but also actively counter China’s growing digital influence by promoting alternative, secure, and open technologies that safeguard democratic values.
The third aspect is the Quad’s semiconductor strategy. The Quad’s push to strengthen semiconductor supply chains is essential for reducing dependence on China and ensuring the stability of advanced technology production.
Under a second Trump administration, the U.S. is likely to intensify efforts to reshore semiconductor manufacturing, aligning with initiatives like the CHIPS and Science Act. While this could bolster the Quad’s broader objectives, Trump’s preference for bilateral deals over multilateral frameworks may complicate cooperation.
For example, the U.S. might prioritise individual agreements with Quad members, such as India’s emerging semiconductor initiatives and Japan’s advanced materials expertise. India’s Semicon India program has positioned the country as a key player in global semiconductor manufacturing, offering attractive opportunities for collaboration.
To this end, partnerships with the U.S. and Japan could help India expand its capabilities in chip fabrication and design, strengthening the Quad’s semiconductor ecosystem. Meanwhile, Australia’s role as a supplier of critical rare earth minerals for chip production will remain essential to the success of these efforts.
The fourth aspect is standards and interoperability. Unified technical standards are critical to ensuring interoperability in emerging technologies like 5G, AI, and Internet of Things. However, Trump’s deregulatory stance and scepticism of multilateral rule-making could complicate efforts to establish coordinated global standards, particularly in areas such as AI ethics, privacy, and telecommunications security. In this context, the Quad may face challenges in advancing unified technical frameworks.
A key area where the Quad could make a significant impact is in the promotion of Open RAN as an alternative to reliance on Chinese telecom giants. While this focus is likely to continue under Trump, the emphasis may shift from government-led initiatives to more market-driven solutions. India, with its rapid 5G rollout and leadership in telecommunications software, is well-positioned to pilot Open RAN deployments. This could serve as a model for other Quad nations, strengthening their collective technological resilience.
To this end, India’s active participation in global standards bodies—particularly in AI governance—could help shape international norms that reflect democratic values. Without a strong U.S. presence in multilateral forums like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and ISO, China could assert its influence in defining global technical standards, especially for AI and communications. As such, it will be critical for the Quad, and particularly India, to ensure that democratic countries remain central to setting these standards in the face of China’s growing influence.
The Quad’s ability to shape the future of global tech governance is crucial in countering China’s growing influence in the digital realm. As the U.S. pivots under a potential second Trump administration, the Quad must prioritize securing digital infrastructure, promoting transparent AI governance, and ensuring alignment on emerging tech standards. By fostering interoperability and upholding democratic values in tech policies, the Quad can effectively challenge China’s attempts to dominate global digital norms.
A unified, strategic approach is essential to safeguard regional stability, protect democratic ideals, and maintain a competitive edge in the global technological landscape.
