“We have two lives, and the second begins when we realize we only have one.” – Confucius
Introductory
“Confucius once said, ‘Before you embark on a journey of revenge, dig two graves.’ Israel may have no choice but to contemplate this ancient wisdom after the brutal attack it endured on October 7, 2023. We are living through a period of unparalleled and unprecedented geopolitical tension, where the rules of engagement are increasingly tested by acts of counterterrorism. The killing of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the terrorist group Hezbollah, by the precision bombing carried out by Israel in Beirut has set off a roller coaster of reactions around the world. This article unravels whether Nasrallah’s killing was justified under the frameworks of international law, or whether it constitutes a treacherous or perfidious act prohibited in international law. For Israel, it was a necessary act of self-defence against an enduring threat. For its critics, the killing raises profound legal and moral questions, especially about the limits of state-sanctioned violence in the murky realm of international law.
Legal Context: The International Framework
Targeted killings, particularly of terrorist(s) leaders, occupy a controversial position in international law. There is no single treaty governing such acts, but legal interpretations based on the UN Charter, customary international law, and International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) provide a framework for evaluating their legality. The foundational legal standard in this case is Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life. Although this prohibition is fundamental, it is not absolute during armed conflicts, where self-defence or military necessity can justify the use of lethal force.
The case of Nasrallah’s killing raises vital questions about whether the attack constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life, and whether it conforms to the standards of necessity and proportionality required under international law. The key legal principles that must be considered include state self-defence, proportionality, and distinction between combatants and civilians, as well as the extraterritorial application of force.
Self-Defense and Anticipatory Self-Defense
Article 51 of the UN Charter enshrines the right of self-defence for states in the event of an armed attack. Hezbollah, a proscribed terrorist organization by multiple states, has a long history of hostile actions against Israel, including rocket attacks targeting both military and civilian sites. Nasrallah’s killing by Israel was part of its defensive strategy against Hezbollah, aimed at neutralizing a key operational terrorist leader and preventing future attacks.
However, a critical issue in assessing the legality of this killing is whether Nasrallah posed an imminent threat at the time of the attack. The doctrine of anticipatory self-defense allows states to strike pre-emptively if an attack is imminent. Israel’s justification is that Hezbollah’s continued rocket fire and its leadership’s role in coordinating attacks present a continuous and imminent threat. While Israel may not have clear evidence of an immediate attack being planned by Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s historical aggression provides a credible basis for Israel’s reliance on anticipatory self-defense.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has previously addressed self-defense claims in cases like Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States) 2003 ICJ 161, emphasizing that such claims must meet the tests of necessity and proportionality. In this instance, Israel’s actions arguably satisfy these criteria, as the targeted killing was aimed at weakening Hezbollah’s capacity to launch further attacks.
Proportionality and Distinction in IHL
IHL, particularly the principles of proportionality and distinction, plays a crucial role in evaluating whether Israel’s actions were lawful. The principle of proportionality requires that the anticipated military advantage from an attack must outweigh any potential harm to civilians. The principle of distinction mandates that combatants and civilians be clearly differentiated, with civilian populations and infrastructure spared from deliberate attack.
Israel’s operation to kill Nasrallah, carried out through precision strikes, appears to have adhered to these principles. The Israel Defense Forces (“IDF”) issued warnings to civilians in the surrounding area before the attack, advising them to evacuate. This aligns with Israel’s obligations under IHL to mitigate civilian casualties, especially in light of Hezbollah’s tactic of embedding military infrastructure within civilian areas.
Nasrallah, as the leader of Hezbollah, can be classified as a legitimate military target under IHL. However, the fact that the killing occurred in Iran, outside an active conflict zone, complicates the legal assessment. While Nasrallah’s status as a combatant remains unchanged, the extraterritorial nature of the strike raises concerns about whether Israel’s actions violated Iran’s sovereignty and the prohibition against extrajudicial killings.
Treacherous or Perfidious Killing: A Legal Challenge
One of the most serious legal objections to Israel’s targeted killing of Nasrallah is the accusation that it constitutes a treacherous or perfidious act, prohibited by the Hague Convention IV of 1907. Perfidious acts are those that betray a party’s intention to observe the laws of war, for example, by feigning civilian status to lure combatants into a vulnerable position. Such acts violate the core principles of IHL.
While the assassination of Nasrallah took place outside a recognized conflict zone, it is difficult to classify it as perfidy under the Geneva Conventions. Israel did not engage in the manner that would constitute a treacherous killing. However, some scholars may argue that conducting such an operation on the territory of a third state (Iran) could be seen as an infringement of international norms and the protections afforded to non-combatants.
Nasrallah’s continued leadership of Hezbollah, a belligerent organization engaged in hostilities against Israel, reinforces Israel’s claim that he remained a legitimate military target. Yet, the extraterritorial nature of the strike in Iran complicates the legal analysis, as it raises the question of whether the operation violated Iran’s sovereignty or amounted to an extrajudicial killing.
International Precedents and Extraterritorial Self-Defense
The ICJ has dealt with issues of extraterritorial self-defense in cases like Oil Platforms and the 2004 Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion. In both instances, the Court recognized that states face legitimate security concerns but emphasized that their responses must be proportionate and comply with international legal standards.
In the case of Nasrallah, Israel’s reliance on self-defense is supported by the continued threat posed by Hezbollah, which fits the definition of an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The extraterritorial nature of the strike, however, invites comparison with other cases where the use of force across borders has been contested. While the ICJ has affirmed that states can engage in self-defense against non-state actors, the necessity and proportionality of such actions remain under scrutiny.
Conclusion: A Justified Act or a Violation of International Law?
Israel’s targeted killing of Nasrallah can be legally justified under the doctrine of self-defense, as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Given Hezbollah’s ongoing attacks against Israel, Nasrallah represented a legitimate military target, and Israel acted within its right to defend itself from future aggression. The principles of proportionality and distinction were observed in the operation, as Israel took steps to mitigate civilian casualties.
However, the extraterritorial nature of the strike and the fact that it occurred outside a recognized conflict zone complicate the legal evaluation. Some may argue that the operation constitutes a treacherous or perfidious act, violating international human rights law and state sovereignty. While Israel’s actions were militarily and politically justified, they remain contentious from a legal standpoint, with critics likely to view the assassination as a violation of international norms.
In conclusion, while Israel’s killing of Nasrallah aligns with the legal framework of self-defense, the method and location of the operation open the door for debates on the legality of extraterritorial targeted killings and the boundaries of state sovereignty in modern conflict. The operation was justified under current international law but remains subject to critical legal analysis. In crux, what has been done by Israel is legally justifiable under the international law framework of the day.
