This February, External Affairs Minister of India, Dr S. Jaishankar, visited Australia for the 7th Indian Ocean Conference, organised by the India Foundation with the Ministry of External Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Australia. The theme for the Conference was ‘Towards a Stable and Sustainable Indian Ocean’, and is meant to bring together key stakeholders of the Indian Ocean region to formulate a plan for collective action and stronger regional cooperation (Siddiqui, 2024).
This conference is one of many recent attempts to strengthen diplomatic ties in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The world has seen a renewed interest in the Indian Ocean and its surrounding countries lately as it is a region of great political, economic, cultural and diplomatic significance. It is also home to some of the fastest-growing economies in the world, such as India and China.
The Indian Ocean is the third-largest ocean in the world by area, with Asia to its west, Africa to its north, Indo-China to its east and Antarctica to its south. It covers an extensive distance of 9600 km from north to south, 7800 km from east to west, and contains 20% of the world’s water (Fatima & Jamshed, 2015). It also contains historical trade routes and choke points, such as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, the Mozambique Channel, etc.
These dynamics in mind, it is no wonder that the Indian Ocean is more than just a large body of water. It has been historically imminent, and in all likelihood, will be in the future too. With changing equations owing to the rapid rise of China and growing interest in the IOR, particularly for the United States of America (USA), India must utilise and leverage its strategic location at the mouth of the Indian Ocean in order to navigate the changing waters.
The History of the Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean had a reputation as a busy trade route for a long time: navigation across its northern rim actually dates back to around 5000 BCE. Early ports in the Indian Ocean region extended from the coasts of Africa to Gujarat. Early travellers, consisting mainly of traders from Ancient Rome, described it as “teeming […] with commercial activity” (Alpers, 2014, 19). Along with commodities being traded, ideas and culture also spread by way of these routes, leading to an intermingling of traditions in the IOR.
The IOR has also been a highly volatile region. In 2009, in fact, the IOR witnessed nearly 50% of the world’s severe crises, and 170 of the political ones. As per many, these conflicts were caused by local factors such as state-sponsored terrorism, poverty, hunger, etc. but they can be linked at least partially to foreign militaristic intervention (the War on Terror being a shining example) (Bouchard & Crumplin, 2010) During the Cold War, the IOR was increasingly the focus of interest for the two superpowers – US and USSR – owing to access to Gulf oil reserves. This led to American military interventionism in the region, but this was a largely neglected development, because geostrategy and global politics was still dominated by the North Atlantic and Pacific Northwest (Bouchard & Crumplin, 2010).
India Within the Indian Ocean Region – A Background
The Indian Ocean is the only ocean to be named after a country, which conveys the importance of India’s position within the IOR. India and China are emerging powers in this region, considering their massive populations and economies growing at lightning speed. In fact, analyses even suggest that “the likely emergence of China and India . . . as new global players […] will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those in the two previous centuries” (Berlin, 2006, 58).
For India, maintaining influence in the IOR has always been a priority. Because of India’s location in the Indian Ocean – a large portion of the country’s landmass juts into the ocean – it closely monitors developments in the region, as these greatly affect it (Jaishankar, 2022). This desire for influence in the IOR has only increased since the implementation of the Liberalisation, Privatisation, Globalisation (LPG) policy in the 1990s, as foreign trade passing through India has since shot up. For India, the Indian Ocean is important from the points of view of foreign trade, maritime security, accessibility to the rest of Asia and the world, etc. (Berlin, 2006) Some even suggest that New Delhi sees the Indian Ocean as its “backyard, and deems it natural that India function as, eventually, the leader and predominant influence in the region” (Berlin, 2006, 60). Another factor for India’s push into the Indian Ocean is its anxiety about external powers gaining influence in the region. In recent times, the main cause for this is China, whose recent foray into the IOR includes projects like Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and Gwadar Port in Pakistan. The threat of another rising power in India’s supposed backyard has led to concern within India. Therefore, New Delhi has been attempting to strengthen its influence in the IOR, by itself and through cooperation with other stakeholders in the region (Jaishankar, 2022).
Geopolitics and the Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean is clearly instrumental in shaping geopolitical dynamics, in South Asia as well as the rest of the world. For most of the 20th century, the role of the IOR in world geopolitics was largely neglected, but from the 1970s, it has risen to “ an area of crucial geostrategic importance” (Bouchard & Crumplin, 2010, 27). This is evident in the foreign policies of several states, such as China and the United States, both of whom have shown great interest in the IOR since the 70s. China, as mentioned above, is working to build an ambitious network across the Indian Ocean in order to bolster its foreign trade, gather influence in the IOR and counter the influence of other rising powers, such as India. The US, following its long-standing tradition of military intervention in other countries, has steadily attempted to increase its presence in the IOR, looking for permanent military bases and securing economic ties (Bouchard & Crumplin, 2010).
Conflicts such as the South China Sea issue have further complicated matters. The Straits of Malacca are an important chokepoint in the IOR, from where almost 15 million oil barrels are transported daily (Fatima & Jamshed, 2015). China seeks to lay claim to these through a border dispute over the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal, drawing ire from states like the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Taiwan, etc., under whose jurisdictions these islands currently fall. Naturally, this has drawn attention from the US, which sent troops, ships and planes to the area in a ‘freedom of navigation’ operation. There are fears that this area could become a serious flashpoint in the future (“What Is the South China Sea Dispute?” 2023).
Such occurrences have made states of the IOR realise the strategic potential of their region in shaping geopolitical dynamics. Therefore, attempts like the Indian Ocean Conference mentioned previously are made to create a collective front for IOR states, as well as to ensure cooperation and a smooth flow of information.
Another notable endeavour for this purpose is the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Established in 1997, the vision of the IORA is to create a united Indian Ocean region for socio-economic cooperation. As of now IORA consists of 23 states (IORA, 1997). It is generally understood as an organisation of great potential, but not much tangible action. While it does provide a remarkable platform for states of the IOR to cooperate in a multitude of areas (maritime security, trade, etc.), it is held back by the sheer diversity and size of the region as well as the presence of various regional groupings and lack of clear leadership (Islam, 2017).
The creation of the IORA has heralded an era of regionalism not seen before: revolving around a maritime identity as opposed to a territorial one. It bases its cooperation around an ocean, as opposed to land. This has been termed maritime regionalism: “the institutionalisation of cooperation in sea territories” (Islam, 2017, VI).
The Role of India
The Indian landmass is highly important for the Indian Ocean. The converse of this is just as true: India depends as much on the IOR as the IOR depends on India. This makes it very important for India to prioritise its engagement with the states of the IOR, as well as external powers taking a keen interest in the region since the 70s. New Delhi was aware of this early on, as echoed in Jawaharlal Nehru’s comments in 1958: “whichever power controls the Indian Ocean has India’s sea borne trade at its mercy apart from its independence” (Mann, 2018, 11).
However, we can only see beginnings of a changing mindset towards IOR policy fairly recently. The 1990s saw a major shift, as the blue economy (maritime activities) was deemed essential to India’s progress under Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh. Accordingly, New Delhi’s maritime strategy began to place more emphasis on the Indian Ocean, a larger share of the budget was allocated to the Navy, and naval diplomacy gained importance (Mann, 2018). The 1990s are significant here because that is when the LPG policy was implemented and India moved from a strategy of self-reliance to globalisation, making ocean security and trade all the more crucial.
Apart from this, India has been engaging with other powers interested in the IOR, especially the US, through activities such as joint naval exercises – the Malabar exercises (jointly with the US and Indian Navies) are a good example. These are primarily done with the aim of countering China’s influence, which is also a major driving force behind India’s push into the IOR. India is also a member of several International Organisations (IOs) active in the IOR, such as the IORA, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), etc., in order to further cement its position as a formidable force in the region.
Looking Forward: Opportunities and Challenges
India acknowledged the growing importance of ocean domains, particularly the Indian Ocean, in a joint statement with Australia: “many of the future challenges are likely to occur in, and emanate from, the maritime domain” – underlining the reemergence of the maritime space as the theatre for geopolitical competition (Baruah, 2020, 8). India has a particular advantage with respect to its geographical location in this regard, making it an indispensable part of any state’s Indian Ocean policy. This is an important consideration for India while visualising its own future in the IOR. Since the end of the Cold War, until recently, India enjoyed the privilege of being the dominant power in the IOR, but this is now threatened by both the rise of China and the reawakening of the US to the strategic possibilities of the Indian Ocean (Baruah, 2020). This presents India with both a challenge and an opportunity: New Delhi must seek to reestablish its presence in the Indian Ocean – a task made marginally easier by its geographical location – while at the same time countering China’s overwhelming presence in the region without aspiring to become the sole hegemon of the IOR. It is a delicate balancing act, one that cannot be resolved through brute naval force.
India’s location in the Indian Ocean also places it at an optimal position to gain access to the Pacific and the Atlantic, and influential powers there. Since former US president Donald Trump’s reference to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ at the 2017 summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the term has re-emerged into the spotlight (Jaishankar, 2022). Consequently, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke of India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific during the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue (Baruah, 2020). This has served to reopen a window for India to leverage its location in the IOR to gain influence with Western powers. However, here again a balancing act needs to occur: India needs to gain a favourable and respectable position within the current West-led world order, without becoming a pawn in the West’s containment strategy for the rest of the world (Baruah, 2020). This is easier said than done, as India does need to address the issue of a rapidly-rising China in its immediate neighbourhood – the ‘Indo-Pacific’ clearly has no set strategy for this, but the effects of China as an IOR hegemon will first be felt by India. Nonetheless, India, while wishing to manage the effects of a rising China, does not wish to be perceived as jumping the bandwagon with Western powers (Baruah, 2020).
India and the Indian Ocean are inseparably linked. So it follows that the challenges faced by the Indian Ocean are sure to affect India. This could be in several forms: China’s Belt and Road Initiative as part of its String of Pearls strategy to create an effective choker around India’s geographical location in the IOR, cutting off its sphere of influence, stands out in this regard. This could have very powerful effects on the IOR as a whole, but specifically on India, as its influence in the region is crucial for its trade and security policies. Additionally, India’s status in international organisations in the IOR, such as QUAD and the IORA is a challenge as well as an opportunity. On one hand, this offers a good opportunity for India to reestablish its influential presence in the IOR, leveraging its geographic location there, and also to collaborate with other IOR states in order to create a unified and formidable front for the IOR as a whole. On the other hand, it must tread carefully so as not to overestimate its influence in the IOR and become a mere pawn for Western powers to push their own influence into the region.
Conclusion
In his work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (1890), former US Navy officer Alfred Mahan calls oceans ‘great commons’, through which commerce and military force could flow freely. He stressed that nations with strong navies could essentially gain unlimited power and influence in the world due to their control over the seas (Manship, 1964). While the treatise, written in the late 19th century, is now criticised for overestimating states’ navies, its description of the importance of oceans holds true even to this day. Particularly with reference to the Indian Ocean, Mahan’s theory on the vast flow of commerce and military force are accurate: as discussed above, nearly a third of the world’s cargo passes through the Indian Ocean. Recently, his assessment of the potentiality of countries with strong navies is also starting to come to fruition: states such as the US, who have a vested interest in the IOR, have begun to station military bases on islands throughout the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia being a striking example).
India’s location in the Indian Ocean is extremely strategic, as has been established, which places it at a crucial juncture in consideration with Mahan’s theory. India finds itself in a precarious position in this regard, with the magnanimous task of countering the effects of a rapidly-rising China while actively engaging with the Western powers without compromising its own sovereignty and interests in the Indian ocean region. It is a delicate balancing act, and one which Indian geostrategy and diplomacy will have to employ in order to navigate the changing waters of the world order in the future.
