Geopolitics and Democracy: The Western Liberal Order from Foundation to Fracture presents a well-debated academic standpoint on a very pertinent topic of international relations: in what manner the interplay between international and domestic politics has shaped or undermined the United States-led Western liberal order, from its post-World War II (WWII) origins through the Cold War to the present era?
The book is authored by two distinguished Western scholars of international relations: (i) Brian Burgoon, a Professor of Political Economy in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam; and (ii) Peter Trubowitz, a Professor of International Relations, Director of the Phelan United States Centre at London School of Economics, and an Associate Fellow at Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs. It comprises five chapters: (i) The Solvency Gap; (ii) A Widening Gyre; (iii) Roots of Insolvency; (iv) Reaping the Whirlwind; and (v) Bridging the Gap.
The authors argue that international security and domestic stability had gained great traction after World War II. Therefore, in order to repel communism, socialism, and fascism domestically, and to sustain popular support for international openness and cooperation among the Western liberal democracies, the political leaders had to guarantee their citizens ‘freedom from want’ as well as ‘freedom from fear.’ (p.1) Subsequently, during the Cold War period, international and domestic politics were intertwined to maintain widespread backing for global openness and collaboration among Western countries. (p.31)
However, the situation changed dramatically after the end of the Cold War. The foreign and domestic policy have become disconnected, each operating in isolation and increasingly, at cross-purposes with the other. (p.41)
The embrace of globalism by Western political elites was accompanied by domestic reforms that undermined public support and led to the gradual erosion of support for ‘liberal internationalism’ in Western societies, thereby creating a democratic solvency gap—the disconnect between democratic values and the practical outcomes of democratic policies. (p.84)
The 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, and the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis have been singled out as ‘inflection points’ by the authors. Arguably, each of these foreign policy decisions contributed to the widening democratic solvency gap between Western governments and their publics over international openness and cooperation. (p.85)
The authors point out that, in the United States’ two-party system, liberal internationalism was supported by both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, as well as by major segments of the business, labor, and agricultural communities. (p.87) Whereas in Western Europe’s multiparty democracies, liberal internationalism garnered support from both sides of the left-right ideological divide. Under the leadership of Christian Democrats and Conservatives, who largely dominated party politics in the 1950s, Western European countries joined NATO, rearmed militarily, and took the first steps toward political confederation and an integrated common market. (p.88) The early steps toward political confederation in Western Europe involved creating institutions and agreements that fostered cooperation among nations. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which established the European Economic Community (EEC), were foundational to this process. (p.89) Notably, in Western democracies, the level of mainstream party support for liberal internationalism was impressively strong. It also proved resilient, despite repeated challenges. (p.91)
The West’s efforts to globalize the liberal order in the wake of the Soviet Union’s disintegration and communism’s collapse and the resulting problems of strategic nature that plague Western democracies today have been described by the authors as an ‘overextension.’ They argue, the West has made international commitments which are way beyond their ‘economic and military’ means. (p.128)
Importantly, for much of the past seventy-five years, mainstream political parties in the West have been the bedrock of the liberal international order. They were not only a bulwark against political extremism from the political left and political right during the Cold War, but also the building blocks upon which the West’s shared commitment to the liberal international order rested. (p.130) According to the authors, this is no longer the case. Although, most mainstream parties continue to back the liberal order, their political capacity to support and promote it has weakened considerably. Arguably, the public at large in the West will embrace liberal internationalism only once the social democratic system is rebuilt at home. (p.132)
If the United States and other Western democracies cannot bridge the ‘ends-means divide’ by pulling back internationally, perhaps they can do so through ‘Great Power competition.’ This is the view of a growing number of policymakers, political analysts, and pundits who see geopolitical rivalry with China and Russia as a way to increase domestic support for global governance. (p.133)
In conclusion, the book provides an interesting perspective which is adequately supported by empirical findings about a compelling new interpretation of why the Western liberal international order emerged and why it is under threat from anti-globalist forces today. The book presents well-argued propositions, supported by relevant facts, about the apparent unravelling of the Western ‘liberal’ world order, a consequence of the variance between the domestic political imperatives and international geopolitical objectives of Western democracies.
However, the book’s narrative is too simplistic, as the reasons discussed for the decline in the support for mainstream political parties and the domestic support for ‘liberalism’ in the Western liberal democracies may be more complex than just the increasing ‘political discontent of the publics.’ They may also include: the resurgence of reactionary nationalism, diminishing social securities, increasing economic challenges etcetera. Having said that, the book is a stimulating read and is a good addition to the existing literature.
