The eleventh edition of the Xiangshan Forum was held in Beijing from 12th -14th September 2024 and was themed ‘Promoting Peace for a Shared Future.’ This year witnessed an increased number of participants compared to the previous editions of the Xiangshan Forums. With about 90 countries participating in this year’s edition, the 11th Xiangshan Forum has held discussions in four plenary and eight simultaneous special sessions on topicals on “Global South, international security, improving international security mechanisms, maintaining peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region, and achieving a balanced and orderly multipolar world.” The four plenary sessions comprised various speakers, but this article focuses on analyzing the speeches of Southeast Asia politico-military leaders. In the first plenary session titled ‘Security Cooperation and Asia-Pacific Prosperity and Stability,’ three Southeast Asia politico-military leaders consisting of Gen. Phan Van Giang – Minister of National Defense of Vietnam, H.E. Ng Eng Hen – Minister for Defense of Singapore, and H.E. Adly Bin Zahari -Deputy Minister of Defense of Malaysia. In the second plenary, Gen. Tea Seiha – Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, Cambodia spoke about ‘Multipolarity and the Evolving International Order.’ In the third plenary, Gen. Chansamone Chanyalath – Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, Laos spoke about ‘Global South and World Peaceful Development.’ In the fourth plenary, Amb. I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja – Executive Director, ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation and was Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations, spoke on ‘International Mechanisms and Global Security Governance.’ The plenary has other speakers representing from Politico-Bureaucratic and also from academia. Here, the focus is to understand the stance of Southeast Asian States articulating their interest in the recently concluded 11th Xiangshan Forum, especially since these nations share disputes with China over the South China Sea.

South China Sea – dividing views?

The interviews and plenary speeches delivered by the politico-military officials of Southeast Asian countries voiced a resolution to the South China Sea conflict. Amb. I. Puja of Indonesia said, “It takes time to build trust and confidence”, though dialogue is the key to resolving a conflict. He also emphasized the South China Sea conflict settlement, owing to a lot of positivity in the ASEAN-China mechanism. Deputy Minister of National Defense of Malaysia – Adly Zahari, on completion of his speech in the plenary during the question session when asked about Malaysia’s stand on the South China Sea, was vocal in highlighting the priority on freedom of navigation in the contested seas being a “peaceful zone for economic and trade purposes.”

In his plenary address, Singapore’s Defense Minister, Dr Ng Eng Hen, pointed at China’s focus on resolving conflicts in his backyard – the South China Sea. China’s proactive role was “to restore diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran.” He called for China to reciprocate the same interest shown in another regional conflict towards solving the South China Sea conflict. During his plenary address, Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Gen. Tea Seiha mentioned every aspect of traditional and non-traditional security issues. Still, his speech did not include the long-standing South China Sea conflict. South China Sea is considered the prime issue involving ASEAN’s mediation with China. Cambodia’s careful omission of the South China Sea conflict in its plenary address at the 11th Xiangshan Forum moots the dilemma within ASEAN.

China and ASEAN Value – Paradox

11th Xiangshan Forum attendant has few claimant states in the South China Sea conflict, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei; except Malaysia. The forum saw a discussion on the most topical security issues faced by Global South. The South China Sea is a security issue in the Global South, so careful omission of the conflict in the 11th Xiangshan Forum propounds a query: Does China post an assertive posture to its conflict? Even the Indonesia delegate Amb. China’s media houses questioned I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja about the Philippines’ recent activity at Xianbin Jiao.

The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea, signed by ASEAN and China, is a non-binding force and has some features detrimental to the ASEAN method of conflict mediation. DOC is supposed to bring China as a follower of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 1976. DOC explicitly states that China shall not use force in the conflict. China violated this ‘no-force’ provision by deploying the PRC in the disputed South China Sea to block the right to free passage as given for ships in the High Sea by UNCLOS. DOC conceded to China by entirely diluting the sacrosanct Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 1976 that disputes should be resolved through friendly consultations and negotiations by the states directly concerned. DOC’s concession could be a success for China’s assertive diplomacy in dealing with disputes bilaterally. The repeated China provocation at South China Sea proximity to the Philippines has led to a point where the Philippines stepped out of ASEAN’s mediation with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2013. Other ASEAN countries, though, have not supported this move, which has yet been seen as a success in China’s diplomacy against the Philippines. Even Singapore’s calling for China to resolve this conflict in the 11th Xiangshan Forum did not take sides between the Philippines and China in 2012.

Code of Conduct – Delayed or Derailed?

Twenty years since the DOC was signed to arrive at the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Code of Conduct (COC) should have two components – “peaceful resolution of territorial disputes and self-restraint” and “confidence building through mutual exchange of military personnel and cooperation in environmental research.” China has shown keen interest in the latter in COC discussions since the inception of talks in 2018. China’s priority is confidence-building measures, but the lack of emphasis on conflict resolution is the deadlock hindering COC discussions. DOC has already placed disputes on the South China Sea that China would deal with bilaterally, which seems to be a card that derails the efforts toward COC.

ASEAN has previously resolved conflicts in Southeast Asia. This conflict is time-testing the ASEAN as an organization. Even in this course, ASEAN-led mediation has peacefully resolved maritime claims between Indonesia and the Philippines. ASEAN has hesitated to deal with China in the South China Sea because most ASEAN nations have good trade relations and economic cooperation with China. Good trade and economic cooperation were believed to increase political cooperation.

Southeast Asian Nation-States must understand from their historical perspectives that their geographical location is in hot trade channels. Due to their crucial location, trade is a phenomenon that has also made the region rich and vulnerable. Historical invasions occurred in the region to create a trade monopoly. So, reciprocal political cooperation and economic cooperation are not the endgame that could be foreseen. Even the recently reached consensus between China and ASEAN led to China-ASEAN South China Sea Pact. This pact gave a timeline to arrive at the best by the next three years, 2026. This pact seems to emphasize DOC’s desire to bring COC to promote peace and stability in the region. Delayed COC seems to be ASEAN’s initial effort to establish a ‘security regime’ through DOC through self-restraint. However, the increased PRC presence in the South China Sea troubling the trade and vitals of these countries, promoting urgency to COC for creating a ‘security community’ leading to regional stability, which, in a sense, leads to the prospects of war avoidance. No war would be ideal for ASEAN’s economic development. ASEAN’s approach neglects the historical influence on China’s statecraft – the ‘Tributary System’. Through this system, China has held dominance over their neighbourhood in history. Tributary hegemony cannot be practised in the current rule-based international order. China to exert the Tributary System again has possibilities with the South China Sea conflict. Being a crucial sea to connect these trade-dependent nations with their partners, Southeast Asian countries have to yield to the dictates of China for smooth and amicable trading in the region, which includes giving tributes to China. In the quest delayed or derailed, the Code of Conduct would not be derailed by China but delayed until a binding agreement arrives to exert the Tributary System on these nations.