It is hard to deny that the world is veering towards a Second Cold War between China and the US if it is not upon us already. As nations around the world scramble to reckon with this reality to safeguard their interests, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is a nation on the frontline of dealing with this new world. Over the past two to three decades, the ROK has been balancing between China, the key economic partner, and the US, the guarantor of the ROK’s security. But the advent of increased chaos and hostility to international relations may force the ROK to once again choose a committed course of action in the near future. How swiftly and decisively the ROK chooses a course of action is contingent on the regional situation.
Said regional situation is best described as peaceful but increasingly bubbling with tension. The ROK is faced with an increasingly bellicose northern neighbour, with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) under Kim Jong Un continuing to posture aggressively and improve the North’s military readiness. The renewed friendship between Russia and the DPRK earlier this year signals the potential for further bellicose actions. China also looms as a potential threat, as the CCP attempts to manoeuvre China into becoming the primary power in the broader Indo-Pacific region. The diplomatic incident and subsequent sanctions over the THAAD deployment in 2017 highlights China’s seeming willingness to employ a heavy-handed approach against its weaker neighbour.
This article will examine the broad strategic trajectory of South Korea in global politics. It will examine the stated strategic trajectory of the ROK and its recent relations with the two most potentially troublesome neighbours, China and the DPRK. By looking at this, this article hopes to illuminate the extent to which Korea is still balancing between China and the US (in short yes, but drawing closer to the US), and speculate a little about future prospects.
The current strategic trajectory of South Korea
The ROK’s geopolitical “guns vs butter” dilemma between the US and China places severe limitations on the nation’s freedom of action in theory, as both of these titans have to be placated. However, the past year or so seems to indicate a shift towards a more committed approach to the ROK’s policy and strategy, which leans heavily in favour of the Western democratic bloc.
Internally, the ROK’s latest strategy document for the Indo-Pacific, titled “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region” and published in December of 2022 in English, focuses on transforming South Korea into a “Global Pivotal State”. To disentangle the slogan, the strategic focus for the ROK is to strengthen ties with its current allies and seek out new parties to expand its network of allegiances and partnerships to increase its global footprint. The ROK has to pursue this course due to being a middle state, or middle power in international relations jargon, in terms of its overall power and influence. Working in multilateral frameworks underpinned by the current world order is an effective policy tool for middle powers. Since they cannot hope to match a great power directly in terms of economic and military influence, the alternative strategy is to pursue influence within multilateral institutions to alter the decision-making and affect changes in global governance to the benefit of the nation. Thus, the ROK hopes to expand and integrate further into the current global system to buttress its position against future shocks.
One also has to mention that the Moon Jae-In administration instituted the “New Southern Policy” as the key foreign policy of his tenure in 2017. The policy aimed to enhance diplomatic and economic cooperation between the ROK and the nations of Southeast Asia. As previously noted, the ROK has to reckon with a highly constrained degree of freedom of action in international politics due to its position and location. Looking to the South made sense to allow for greater manoeuvrability and establishing new partnerships. The approach was fairly successful, upgrading bilateral ties with several nations in the region and increasing investments in the region to $119 billion a year by 2021, an increase of 73%.
The new regime is continuing this policy, at least in spirit, with the new strategy emphasising the search for stronger partnerships in Southeast Asia and ASEAN in particular. The new strategy also mentions expanding co-operation in other places, such as Mongolia and Africa. There has been movement in that direction recently. The South Korea-Africa summit took place between the 4th and 5th of June this year with 48 African nations joining in the proceedings. The ROK wanted deals on critical minerals, such as cobalt, nickel and lithium, to help develop advanced technologies, such as chips, semiconductors and electric vehicles, as well as obtaining more political and diplomatic support from Africa on pressuring the DPRK. In exchange, the ROK pledged $14 billion in export financing and $10 billion in aid funding over 6 years. This demonstrates that one of the key strategic objectives for the ROK is to expand its global footprint to avoid being hemmed in by overreliance on China.
The document also makes frequent use of the notion of universal values, which, in this case, means liberal values. This rhetoric strongly indicates a preference for aligning with the Western bloc on most global issues, especially in regional disputes. The document voices opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo by force, which refers to both the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. Balancing and working with China remains a prevalent concern, but strengthening connections between like minded-nations and expanding connections is of at least equal importance. This will also be seen in the commentary provided below.
The ROK and the DPRK: The irreconcilable feuding siblings
Increasingly South Korea is showing signs of increased anxiety about the DPRK and is moving towards bolstering the nation’s deterrence. On July the 11th 2024, the ROK signed new guidelines for extended nuclear deterrence with the US. For those unfamiliar with the term, extended nuclear deterrence means that a country does not possess its own nuclear weapons but rather relies on a third party to provide a nuclear umbrella with its own arsenal and support that nation in case of a crisis. Japan has the same type of arrangement with the US, for example. The agreement is mostly centred around responding to the DPRK, but the fact remains that this upgrades the alliance between the two democracies into a nuclear alliance. Including this, there are also provisions for the deployment of US nuclear assets to the Korean peninsula, specifically to counter threats stemming from the DPRK.
Concurrently, President Yoon Suk Yeol has been attending NATO summits since 2022, to strengthen ties between the ROK and Europe on matters of defence. But the most significant development is the inauguration of trilateral cooperation between Japan, South Korea and the US which started in the Camp David summit last year. Many substantive issues are brought up as areas of further collaboration. The security components of the agreements reached are focused on improving information sharing about DPRK missiles and cyber activities conducted by the DPRK. Additionally, there are also provisions present to improve maritime security coordination in the Indo-Pacific. Such provisions are just as likely to be there to counter China as well as the DPRK, though it is notable that China is never mentioned in the original fact sheet. While still in the early stages, rhetoric from the three parties indicates the partnership is in a good place at the moment.
Japan and the ROK have unresolved issues regarding the colonisation of Korea by Showa Japan from 1910 to 1945. This has made collaboration difficult at times due to national resentments, particularly around the issue of ‘comfort women’ taken by Japanese soldiers during that time. Uniting together to counter the DPRK is a step forward for the two, and could help improve relations between the US partners in the long run.
These moves against the DPRK are a major shift from the “Sunshine Policy” pursued by liberal governments since 1998. Its key aims were peaceful engagement with the North, greater economic co-operation and a decoupling of political and military affairs to facilitate friendly relations and mollify the DPRK’s rather delicate threat perception about South Korea and its alliance with the US. The policy has been maintained by liberal governments as the approach for dealing with the DPRK. Despite being the modus operandi for several administrations, it is hard to see what results such a policy has accomplished. Nuclear tests, including continental missile tests, have occurred, and have, in fact, increased, under the auspices of both liberal and conservative administrations in the 21st century, even after the Sunshine Policy was implemented. Below is a graph that illustrates the increase in missile tests by the North.
Strengthening ties with the US and Japan will not help with the DPRK’s threat perception at all. Thus the new moves serve as a sort of repudiation of the Sunshine Policy. Admittedly the current administration is conservative, so this is not wholly unexpected. However, actions by the DPRK indicate that the reinforcement of alliances by the ROK is not unprovoked.
Just a month before the NATO summit and the new agreements with the US, Putin visited North Korea and, amidst the bonhomie shared between the two autocrats, signed a new treaty with the DPRK. The new treaty elevates the relationship between the two nations to the level of comprehensive strategic partnership, which in diplomatic terms is one of the higher-level agreements two countries can sign between each other, covering multiple areas of cooperation, including security. Granted, deeds are superior to words. Ironically, South Korea and China are also in a comprehensive strategic partnership, which one has a hard time telling given the coolness between the two. Given this, it remains to be seen how strong the renewed Russia-DPRK friendship will be in the fullness of time. Regardless, the DPRK gaining more powerful revisionist partners only bodes ill for the ROK’s security.
The shifts by both of the Koreas indicate that they are more willing to cement their positions within the global blocs they were already leaning towards. Thus, one can conclude that the attempts at pursuing the “Sunshine Policy” have been largely a failure, as the disunified nations on the peninsula will always see the other as the biggest threat. Recent issues at the border serve to highlight this further.
Including the new treaty, the DPRK has been sending balloons full of trash, manure and firecrackers over the border with the South since June of this year. These acts are in response to South Korean activists sending balloons with anti-DPRK materials over the border, alongside cultural items like K-dramas and K-pop, to incentivize dissidents. These balloons have caused some problems, including a fire on a rooftop and have caused disruptions to air traffic at certain ROK airports.
The rise in tension is accompanied by the DPRK once again labelling the South as the principal enemy of the regime. What is clear from all of these swirling moves and spats is that the direction of the relationship between the two Koreas is rapidly nosediving back to mistrust, tension and antipathy. Reunification will likely remain a distant dream for a long time to come. While Yoon has recently stated that he wishes for renewed dialogue and peaceful reunification, this can be seen as rhetoric designed to reinforce the image of South Korea as the peaceful Korea vis-a-vis the bellicosity of the DPRK. Since the issue of Korean unification is likely to remain intractable, the Yoon administration has done the best it can with the hand that it has been dealt. The fact is, the issue can never be resolved without an effort from the DPRK’s steadiest benefactor.
China and Korea: An uneven relationship
This brings us nicely to the questions of the ROK’s relationship with China. First, a very brief overview of the relations between the two from 1992 to 2017 is in order. The two nations went through a normalisation of relations in 1992, officially recognizing each other and starting formal diplomatic relations. Under the liberal administrations of the ROK from 1998 to 2008 the two nations were in alignment on the subject of Korean unification, as both preferred inter-Korean dialogue to reduce tension. The two nations also continued to deepen their economic ties within this period of goodwill and continued reinforcing their official ties, upgrading their partnership status to that of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Additionally, China became the main export market for Korea in 2014. Despite some incidents over the next 20 years, such as the Garlic War of 2000, relations were on a rapid upswing. One could have reasonably argued back then that Korea was drawing closer to China’s orbit.
However, the good times were not to last. In 2017 China lodged a diplomatic protest and imposed serious economic sanctions on the ROK for the deployment of a US THAAD system, an anti-ballistic missile defence system, to the peninsula. Those included bans on some South Korean products, restrictions and cancellations of K-pop concerts and Chinese travel agencies bans on package holidays and restrictions on charter flights to the country. In addition to these bans, Korean conglomerate Lotte, which gave land to the ROK government for the deployment of the THAAD system, was hit with the regulatory hammer by Chinese authorities to investigate its operations in China. This resulted in Lotte seeking to fully exit China, winding down its operations by 2019.
The dispute was ultimately resolved thanks to Korea promising the three No’s to China. These were: No additional THAAD deployments, No participation in the US-lead missile defence system and No joining a US-Japan-South Korea trilateral alliance. Since then, it appears that these promises have been violated, especially the last one.
Since the THADD incident, the relationship has become notably icier. Nothing better illustrates this than a poll conducted by Sinophon on South Korean public opinion. It found that 81% of South Koreans expressed either negative or extremely negative feelings towards China, which was more than the other 55 countries surveyed in the poll. The ROK has signalled greater support for Taiwan recently, which has drawn the ire of China. Additionally, the ROK’s trade with China has also seen a dropoff due to several factors, namely China becoming more self-sufficient in semiconductors. Exports to China have dropped substantially from 25.3% in 2020 to 19.7%. The graph below illustrates this reduction even more starkly.
Nonetheless, both parties still need each other, albeit for different reasons. On the side of China, the idea of South Korea as a potential wedge in the US alliance system in Northeast Asia was seemingly working up until 2017. The THAAD debacle showed that if China wants partners in the region, she cannot antagonise South Korea too strongly. If one views the relationship between China, South Korea and the US as a triangle, China cannot afford to deliver Korea into the arms of the US and its alliance structure.
As seen above, Korea has been moving in that direction, and China is at least part of the reason for that trajectory. In a paper published by RAND in 2020, Ji-Young Lee argues that the two conditions for good relations between China and South Korea are a desire on the ROK’s side to pursue unification and stable US-China relations. At this particular moment, both of these are negative. He goes on to say that:
“…for the foreseeable future, China is not emerging as a strategic alternative to the United States for South Korea; South Korea’s alliance with the United States is not replaceable with a strategic partnership with China.”
What specific moves China will make to continue the strategy of driving a wedge into the US-South Korea alliance and keep the ROK close remains to be seen. In late 2023 China did make something of a small concession to the ROK by agreeing that its fishing fleets should have identification systems installed while in Korea’s EEZ. China making concessions is quite rare, but one cannot overrate the significance of such a small development. At best, it could indicate China may be willing to make some concessions to the ROK in the future, given the negative results of the THAAD experience.
To return to the RAND paper, however, it misses the critical element of how badly the ROK needs China on board to restrain the DPRK. Despite drawing closer to the West, Korea cannot take a truly adversarial position towards China. In the aforementioned strategy document, China is described as a “key partner” and it is easy to see why. The ROK needs China to help restrain the DPRK‘s excesses, as China would also not profit from the DPRK going rogue in any way.
China also remains a key export market for Korean goods. Despite the search for new markets and prospective partners across the globe, China will almost certainly remain a key market. The resumption of the trilateral summit between Korea, Japan and China this year, the first time this body has met since 2019, is an example of how the ROK has to facilitate greater dialogue with China on certain substantive issues. Despite the conditions outlined above not being met, geopolitical realities should preclude a total freezing of relations between China and the ROK.
Even given these difficulties, it can be argued, and indeed has been argued, that South Korea’s policy towards China under Yoon has been very successful. Though relations are still icy, antagonism is lower than one would expect and the revival of the trilateral summit in Korea shows some positive momentum. Korea has still been able to play the balancing act fairly well despite the circumstances.
Parting thoughts and conclusion
This overview has hopefully helped illuminate how South Korea is navigating some increasingly choppy waters. The overall strategic direction seems clear. Edge closer to the democratic bloc very gradually, find new partners to reduce dependence on China (and perhaps even the US should some unforeseeable catastrophe occur) and attempt to maintain China within its good auspices to help combat an aggressive DPRK. For now, this approach seems largely successful.
This is not to say all is roses and sunshine. Internally, there are problems. Yoon is not a popular president, as effective foreign policy is rarely a vote winner. He faces a low approval rating, dipping to 29% earlier this year, and a potential lame-duck presidency internally. The world’s lowest birthrate also presents a long-term challenge for Korea to navigate, as a sick, ageing, and feeble population is anathema to a nation’s health and survival. Nonetheless, South Korea is in a position to have more control and room to manoeuvre on matters that affect her destiny as a nation.
