The recent elections in Europe have raised concerns about the weakening of pro-European democratic forces and the rise of radical right-wing populists, which could further shift policies to the right. Although pro-European parties will still hold a majority in the new parliament, right-wing populists have made significant gains, which could impact not only the European Parliament but also increase the presence of far-right ministers in the European Council as more member countries see these parties participating in their governments.
Currently, right-wing forces hold nearly 180 seats, representing 25% of the new European Parliament. Of these, five parties constitute more than half of the elected radical right-wing representatives: France’s National Rally, Italy’s Brothers of Italy, Poland’s Law and Justice, Germany’s Alternative for Germany, and Hungary’s Fidesz. The recent election results indicate the widespread normalization of radical right-wing discourse across Europe, rooted in economic, political, identity, and migration crises.
Right-wing populist forces are organized under two main groups in the European Parliament: The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID). ECR, initially founded by British Conservatives and the Czech ODS as a relatively moderate Eurosceptic conservative group, has moved increasingly to the right over the past decade following the departure of British Conservatives due to Brexit and the inclusion of more extreme parties. It is now dominated by Italy’s Brothers of Italy and Poland’s Law and Justice.
The other group, ID, represents parties like Marine Le Pen’s National Rally from France, Italy’s Lega, and Alternative for Germany. A third group is expected to emerge with the new coalition, Patriots for Europe, initially comprised of Hungary’s Fidesz, Austria’s Freedom Party, and the Czech ANO. Despite their alignment on issues such as immigration policies, gender policies, climate change skepticism, Euroscepticism, national sovereignty, and welfare chauvinism, members of these two factions are divided on their stance toward Russia. While the ECR supports Ukraine in line with the EU stance, ID members, traditionally friends with Putin, show more sympathy towards Russia and are reluctant to continue military aid for Ukraine.
In terms of national governance, these two groups have different records. Unlike many ECR parties that have experience governing alone or in coalitions, ID has long been dominated by parties with little executive experience, often playing the role of systemic opposition. This has led the ID to adopt more populist and extremist rhetoric compared to the ECR.
The behavior of other political groups in the European Parliament towards ECR and ID also differs. Other parliamentary groups have generally maintained a policy of political isolation against the ID, refusing to cooperate with them. In contrast, relations with the ECR have been less contentious, at least until the British Conservatives left the EU, and center-right groups like the European People’s Party (EPP) and the liberal Renew group have occasionally collaborated with the ECR on issues like trade policy. However, ECR’s further shift to the right since 2019 has made consensus more challenging. The existing divisions within the radical right camp, alongside the strengthened position of the center-right EPP as the pivotal player in the European Parliament and Council, suggest that despite recent gains, radical right populists lack the capacity to influence EU decisions as a cohesive ideological bloc. However, the radical right’s success in the 2024 European Parliament elections has the potential to quickly shift European politics to the right.
In the European Parliament, unlike national parliaments, decision-making is based on flexible and issue-oriented majorities rather than stable coalitions. In most cases, these majorities have been formed through a “grand coalition” between the EPP and Social Democrats, often supported by the liberal Renew group or the Greens. With the increase in ECR and ID seats, this pattern has undergone changes. The loss of the center-left coalition majority has elevated the EPP to the strongest party in the European Parliament, making it indispensable for forming any majority. This situation enhances the influence and normalization of far-right positions within the mainstream political process.
While the threat of absolute far-right populist dominance over the European Parliament and France has been averted, the success of ECR and ID in the June elections provides them with the time, space, and financial resources to promote radical right ideas and normalize their discourse further.
The most prominent example of policy convergence can be seen in refugee policies, where radical right-wing populist parties have played a key role in shifting the debate from refugee redistribution within the EU to stricter border controls and outsourcing asylum requests to third countries. Their proposals have been accepted by more moderate parties.
Areas likely to experience similar changes in the coming years include climate and environmental policies, employment, and social policies, where the center-left majority in the European Parliament from 2019 to 2024 played a significant role. In foreign and security policy, the ID faction and the new Patriots for Europe faction will pose a serious challenge to continued support for Ukraine against Russia.
Despite the EU’s political system, with its multiple checks, balances, and consensus-building mechanisms, preventing any single political force from unilaterally imposing its policies, even after significant electoral victories, this same consensus tool prevents other actors from blocking the influence of a particular player even after achieving relative success within the Union. Thus, despite the center-right’s dominance, the EU still faces the threat of increasing radical right power, which has the potential to challenge liberalism and democracy.
