Religious conservatives and nationalists in the Muslim world and beyond have the wind in their sails. So do Arab autocrats, even if they increasingly cloak themselves in nationalism rather than religious conservatism.

Last week’s first election round in Turkey saw conservatives and ultra-nationalists win control of parliament. At the same time, Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears set to win a third presidential term in this Sunday’s run-off against opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu.

Irrespective of whether he is reelected, Mr. Erdogan’s conservative religious and nationalist coalition will enjoy a 322-seat majority in the 600-member Turkish parliament.

To even stand a chance of defeating Mr. Erdogan in the May 28 presidential run-off, Mr. Kilicdaroglu has hardened his anti-migrant and anti-Kurdish rhetoric since the May 14 first round in which he trailed the president by five percent.

Turkey is home to the world’s largest Syrian refugee community, estimated at 3.7 million, followed by Lebanon and Jordan.

As a result, Syrian refugees, like other minorities and disadvantaged groups, will be among the losers no matter who emerges as Turkey’s next president.

The Syrian plight is compounded by the welcoming of President Bashar al-Assad’s return earlier this month to the Arab fold when he attended an Arab League summit in Jeddah.

Instead of establishing criteria for handling the millions of people displaced by Mr. Al-Assad’s brutal conduct during a decade-long civil war, Arab leaders catered to the Syrian leader’s insistence that refugees return to his war-ravaged country.

The lack of criteria has opened the door to forced deportations, even if authorities in host countries deny the involuntary removal of refugees and Arab officials insist that their return must be voluntary.

Religious support for Mr. Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) fits a global mould in which conservative Muslims, Jews, Orthodox Christians, Anglicans, Hindus, and others find common ground in popularly supported traditional family values that constitute the norm in conservative societies.

Embrace of those values allows civilisationalist leaders such as Mr. Erdogan, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the prime ministers of India and Hungary, Narendra Modi and Victor Orban, to position themselves as bulwarks against Western promotion of gender fluidity and LGBTQ rights.

Even so, Turkey is one of two Middle Eastern countries most immediately prone to a culture war given Mr. Erdogan’s use of identity politics, culture warring, and anti-migrant rhetoric in his election campaign.

If Turkey is one step removed from a full-fledged culture war, Israel, governed by the most ultra-conservative and ultra-nationalist coalition in its history, is already at war with itself.

Government policies have sparked sustained mass protests and strained relations with the United States and significant segments of the Jewish Diaspora. They have also escalated tensions with Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and the besieged Gaza Strip.

At the other end of the Muslim world, reformers in Indonesia are concerned that Anies Baswedan, a former Jakarta governor with close ties to religious conservatives, including the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as Islamic militants, is one of three top candidates for the presidency in February 2024.

“These links raise concerns among Indonesia’s religious minorities, which make up 13 percent of the population, as well as many moderate Muslims,” said journalist Joseph Rahman.

To be sure, Iran is the Middle East’s true outlier. Forty-four years after the creation of an Islamic republic, culture was at the core of months of anti-government protests that sought to reduce, not increase, religion’s role in politics.

The protests were sparked by the death in custody last September of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish woman detained by morality police in Tehran in September for allegedly wearing her hijab “improperly.”

Interestingly, renewed popularity of religious conservatism has not sparked culture wars in the Arab Middle East like the battles fought in polarised societies such as Israel, the United States, and India or Christian faith communities like the Anglican church.

In various Arab countries, rulers pushing social and economic rather than political change subjugate religious elites potentially opposed to their liberalizing reforms. In addition, the repression of freedom of expression makes non-violent culture wars virtually impossible. So does the criminalisation of apostasy and blasphemy and, in Saudi Arabia, defining atheism calls as an act of terrorism.

Finally, Arab autocrats and authoritarians were early adapters as they waged a brutal campaign against Islamists in the wake of the 2011 popular Arab revolts in what analysts such as Shadi Hamid said amounted to a culture war.

The campaign rolled back the achievements of the revolts that toppled Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen’s leaders. A 2013 United Arab Emirates and Saudi-backed military coup overthrew Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brother and Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president. In addition, wars were waged to counter Islamists and jihadists in Syria, Libya, and Yemen.

In a twist of irony, that may have been round one in a Middle Eastern culture war. If recent polling is any indication, political Islam is making a comeback alongside religious conservatism, at least in terms of public sentiment.

“In most countries surveyed, young and old citizens demonstrate a clear preference for giving religion a greater role in politics,” said Michael Robbins, director and co-principal investigator of Arab Barometer. The group regularly surveys public opinion in the Middle East.

“In 2021-2022, roughly half or more in five of ten countries surveyed agreed that religious clerics should influence decisions of government,” Mr. Robbins added.

To be sure the comeback, may remain restricted to support in anonymous polling. There is little, if any, space for political Islam to express itself in countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. In exile, Islamist’s space is narrowing. For now, that gives autocrats and authoritarians the upper hand.

This article discusses the growing concern regarding nuclear technology proliferation and the significance of promoting transparency and accountability in the use of nuclear technology. The article emphasizes Saudi Arabia’s role in advocating nuclear transparency and non-proliferation in the Middle East and beyond. While much attention has been paid to nuclear proliferation in Iran and Iraq, the article argues that Saudi Arabia has been neglected in this regard. The article also discusses Saudi Arabia’s position on nuclear non-proliferation and its commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In addition, the article stresses the significance of international oversight to guarantee that Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program remains benign and transparent. The article argues that the international community must collaborate to enhance safeguards for nuclear technology and to promote transparency and accountability in order to prevent proliferation and maintain global security. Overall, the article offers significant insights into Saudi Arabia’s role in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and the significance of transparency and accountability in the use of nuclear technology.

Key Words: Nuclear technology, International safeguards, Saudi Arabia, Middle East, Non-proliferation treaty, Regional security

The question of nuclear technology and its potential for proliferation has been a longstanding concern for the international community. In light of recent events such as the Russia-Ukraine crisis, North Korean missile tests and US-Russia tussle, concerns of nuclear escalation are at an all-time high. As a result, there has been a growing emphasis on the importance of strengthening international safeguards for nuclear technology, with a focus on promoting transparency and accountability. Nuclear technology is a double-edged sword. While it has the potential to benefit humanity in many ways, including producing clean energy and providing medical treatments, it also poses significant risks if it falls into the wrong hands. Therefore, it is crucial to have strong international safeguards in place to ensure that nuclear technology is solely used for peaceful purposes.

One region that could possess potential nuclear threat in the future is the Middle East. The Middle East is an important region due to its abundant oil reserves and strategic location between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Several countries in the region have expressed an interest in developing nuclear energy programs as a means of diversifying their energy sources and meeting growing demand. However, the prospect of a nuclear-reliant Middle East raises concerns about regional security and the potential for nuclear proliferation. While much attention has been paid to nuclear proliferation in Iran and Iraq, Saudi Arabia has received startlingly little attention regarding nuclear proliferation and the role of Saudi Arabia in promoting transparency and accountability in nuclear technology has been overlooked.

As one of the important regional power in the Persian Gulf along with Iran and Turkey, the question of whether Saudi Arabia desires the capability to produce nuclear weapons has not been adequately addressed. While the majority of policymakers and experts believe that Saudi Arabia does not have a nuclear weapons program, other experts argue that the country possesses both the strategic motivation and financial means to pursue nuclear weapons. In this context, Saudi Arabia has an essential role to play in promoting transparency and accountability in the Middle East and Beyond in the use of nuclear technology.

Saudi Arabia’s Stance on Nuclear Non Proliferation

It is a widely held belief among policymakers and experts that Saudi Arabia does not possess a nuclear weapons program. This consensus is based on Saudi Arabia’s strong condemnation of nuclear weapons and the country’s claim that it has no intention of acquiring them. Additionally, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states have long advocated for a Middle East devoid of nuclear weapons. However, some experts have pointed out that Saudi Arabia possesses both the strategic motivation and financial means to pursue nuclear weapons.

In reality, Saudi Arabia is both vulnerable and affluent, and it has long felt threatened by the revolutionary victory of its Shi’ite foe across the Gulf. This vulnerability, coupled with its significant financial resources, has led some experts to believe that Saudi Arabia may attempt to acquire nuclear weapons if its national security is compromised.

Despite these concerns, Saudi Arabia is a party to both the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the IAEA safeguards framework. The nation signed the NPT reluctantly, but this had nothing to do with a desire to develop nuclear weapons. Since joining the International Atomic Energy Agency, Saudi Arabia has worked hard to fulfill its obligations under the IAEA’s “Milestones Approach,” a three-step plan leading to the launch of a nuclear power facility. Saudi Arabia has also acknowledged that NPT signatories have the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

A significant portion of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear arsenal is motivated by its desire for renewable energy. The country has been constructing a clean and secure nuclear energy program for quite some time. In 2010, the nuclear research project was initiated to establish “a sustainable future for Saudi Arabia by constructing a substantial alternative energy capability supported by world-class local businesses.” To advance its nuclear reactor initiative, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has established King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST). KACST collaborated with the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE) and other foreign experts to design the Saudi project’s reactors, which will be used to realize the country’s 2030 vision for sustainable energy.

Saudi Arabia is committed to its national policy of openness, dependability, and security. In this context, the country is striving to develop peaceful nuclear applications in a variety of fields, including its national nuclear energy program. While there are rational considerations in favor of nuclear energy security for Saudi Arabia, it is highly unlikely that the country will opt for nuclear weapons. The negative international reaction to Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is likely to weaken rather than empower the country.

Saudi Arabia has articulated its position on nuclear security and is committed to its long-held goal of rendering the entire Middle East a nuclear-free zone and emphasizing the importance of adherence to the NPT. To achieve this objective, Saudi Arabia seeks international community support for its resolutions. Saudi Arabia emphasizes the significance of adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards its rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to invest in its natural resources in a nuclear-threat-free environment. Saudi Arabia urges the international community to work towards a nuclear-weapon-free world so that the conditions of the Treaty can be thoroughly implemented. The country urges all nations that have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

However, it is also important to note that the Saudi nuclear program should be subject to international scrutiny to ensure that it remains peaceful and transparent. The international community must work together to strengthen safeguards for nuclear technology and promote transparency and accountability in order to prevent proliferation and maintain global security.

Implications for Regional Security

The prospect of a nuclear-reliant Middle East raises concerns about regional security and the potential for nuclear proliferation. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by any country in the region would likely trigger a nuclear arms race, with other countries feeling compelled to develop their own nuclear programs in response. This would increase the risk of nuclear accidents, miscalculation, and even nuclear war.

The fact that Saudi Arabia is located in such close proximity to other countries with nuclear capabilities, such as Pakistan and Israel, also raises concerns about the potential for conflict. Any incident involving nuclear weapons in the region would have far-reaching consequences for global security, given the importance of the Middle East in global energy markets and the potential for terrorism and other forms of instability in the region.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Saudi Arabia’s aspirations for a nuclear program raise concerns about regional security and the potential for nuclear proliferation. While the Kingdom has stated that its program is for peaceful purposes only, doubts remain due to its lack of transparency and its proximity to other countries with nuclear capabilities. The United States’ recent withdrawal from the JCPOA and its uncertain commitment to non-proliferation in the region only add to the uncertainty surrounding Saudi Arabia’s nuclear aspirations. Given the risks involved, it is imperative that the international community engage in cooperative efforts to monitor and regulate nuclear activities in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program.

The Arab summit, though not inherently significant, holds importance due to the prevailing perception of the Arab League as an outdated organization requiring reform or an alternative. However, this summit stands out for two notable reasons: the reinstatement of Syria into the Arab League and the implications surrounding it, as well as the messages conveyed by Saudi Arabia to both the world at large and the Arab nations specifically.

The return of Syria to the Arab League owes credit to the active role played by Saudi Arabia, which effectively imposed its will upon the other Arab countries that opposed or harbored reservations about Syria’s reinstatement.

This success underscores the reluctance of Arab nations to challenge Saudi directions, given the Kingdom’s size and the entwined interests shared with those countries. It reflects Saudi Arabia’s aspiration to attain diplomatic recognition for yet another political achievement, solidifying its position as the Arab decision-making hub. For Saudi Arabia to assume the role of Arab capital, Syria inevitably becomes the compass guiding this resolution and determining its course. The past years have served as a valuable lesson for all, demonstrating that Syria cannot be subjugated. Sufficient time has evidenced the validity of Syria’s stance and the sincerity of its orientations.

Moreover, the Arab League loses its weight and significance without Syria’s participation. After all, Syria was one of the league’s founding members in 1945, unlike the countries that sought Syria’s expulsion and remain hesitant about its return, as they did not exist during the league’s establishment. The reinstatement of Syria into the league is not an end in itself but rather a means to restore Arab relations with Syria. Each country is free to make its own decision in this regard. Despite its fragility, the Arab League remains the most prestigious international organization, serving as the umbrella that unites all Arab nations. It reminds the world of our collective identity as one Arab people, carrying substantial weight and importance on the international stage. This importance prompted leaders of major countries such as Russia and China to address the gathering of Arab presidents in Jeddah, recognizing the significance of these nations and seeking unity among the Arab side, given the prevailing regional inclination towards an alternative hostile to American hegemony. Furthermore, Ukrainian President Zelensky, driven by a sense of despair and failure with diminishing European support, sought to speak at the summit.

Zelensky’s presence at the summit on a French plane was made possible by French support and the European desire to influence Arab political decisions, which holds greater significance now than ever before. The invitation extended to the Ukrainian president to address Arab leaders was notable, with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia being the sole issuer, disregarding the opinions of other Arab nations.

This invitation did not come as a pleasant surprise to some countries, particularly Syria, which has stood by Russia in defending its national security and opposing NATO expansion into Ukraine since the war’s outset. The invitation adversely affects the Arab stance on the Ukrainian conflict, which is divided between pro-Russian or neutral positions.

The invitation reflects Saudi Arabia’s efforts to alleviate American discontent regarding its role in inviting Syria to the summit, its rapprochement with Iran, and its orientation toward China and Russia in foreign policy. The Kingdom also seeks to mediate in the Ukrainian crisis, thus bolstering its international political power.

However, this invitation is likely to be unwelcome to the Russian side, especially since Moscow previously accepted the Kingdom’s mediation in prisoner exchange agreements with Ukraine. It also complied with Saudi demands for the release of foreign mercenaries from the Azov Nazi Regiment, despite contradicting the sentiments of the Russian people.

Zelensky’s invitation raises concerns that Saudi Arabia may not have genuinely altered its political orientation, running counter to its efforts to draw closer to the United States and fulfill its desires.

Moreover, this invitation accentuates the stark differences in orientations between Saudi Arabia and Syria, leading to the Syrian delegation’s refusal to listen to Zelensky’s speech. It also refutes the notion of “positive neutrality” among Arab countries regarding the Ukrainian conflict, as described by the Saudi Foreign Minister.

Despite the appearance of consensus and harmony among Arab countries at the summit, the broader scene does not conceal the significant differences between them. Many countries are now unable to express their positions or discontent.

Underestimating the importance of the Arab League is as detrimental as overestimating its role and effectiveness. The organization has failed to reconcile the viewpoints of Arab countries and has consistently aligned with the stronger party. Moreover, routine and bureaucracy have overwhelmed the league’s operations.

Reforming the league is possible in the upcoming phase, provided there is the will to do so, particularly if Saudi Arabia assumes this task as the chair of the Arab summit. Such reform could alter certain conventions typically associated with the league’s functioning, such as the nationality of the secretary-general. It would not be surprising if the next secretary-general is a Gulf national, possibly from Saudi Arabia.

The Kingdom seeks to enhance its soft power by leveraging its robust economy, growing influence, and new policy directions that prioritize resolving regional issues. While this vision may seem promising on the surface, its viability lies in its practical application. It is worth noting that a country that once pursued a policy of “zero problems” (Turkey) later found itself with “zero friends.”

The summit has positioned the Kingdom as the biggest winner, achieving what other countries, such as Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq, could not due to their limited size and influence. This success resulted from Saudi Arabia’s persistence at the time.

The idea of Saudi leadership within the Arab official system began to materialize with the Arab-Chinese summit held in the Kingdom last year, symbolizing the shift of the Arab decision-making center from Egypt to Saudi Arabia. Favorable regional and international conditions, along with internal aspirations to increase the Saudi role, particularly following the war in Ukraine and the U.S. withdrawal from the region, have contributed to this trend.

Additionally, through its agreement with Iran, Saudi Arabia has managed to reduce tensions in the region, reversing the policy of polarization and axes. The “Arab Spring” caused economic devastation in countries where it unfolded, diminishing their role and political effectiveness.

On the other hand, Gulf policies have undergone a change, with a shift toward a merchant-like approach focused on self-interest and profit rather than providing assistance to other Arab countries. Investments and economic assets have become key determinants in shaping political decisions in some countries.

Although the Jeddah summit aimed to foster Arab unity, differences were evident. Algeria was not invited to the preparatory meetings, despite previously chairing the Arab summit. The Algerian President also did not personally attend the summit, possibly due to the absence of the Saudi Crown Prince at the Algiers summit.

The summit further highlighted diverging views within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Although the Emir of Qatar attended, he did not deliver his country’s speech and left before President Bashar al-Assad’s address. The same was true for the United Arab Emirates, which experiences rivalry and conflicting interests with Saudi Arabia, resulting in Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed’s absence from the summit.

The Arab summit in Jeddah signifies the end of the “Arab Spring” and the transition of Arab policies toward a new phase characterized by political realism, including respect for each state’s sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.

President Assad’s presence at the summit was the most significant event, accompanied by a warm welcome from the Kingdom. This gives the impression that Prince Mohammed bin Salman seeks to dissociate himself from previous Saudi policies toward Syria, particularly.

The key question remains the extent of Saudi Arabia’s role in the reconstruction of Syria, as reconstruction represents the pathway for refugee returns. Syrian-Saudi relations are experiencing unexpectedly positive developments, making it challenging to interpret the rapidly evolving landscape.

The American position remains the decisive factor in Arab countries’ openness towards Damascus, with some ambiguity and differences between the administration and Congress. Congress has recently introduced a bill imposing severe sanctions on any country providing assistance to Syria.

Arab countries’ openness towards Syria does not imply their readiness to defy international resolutions or withstand U.S. sanctions. Any Arab or international efforts to assist Syria will only succeed if they can convince the United States.