Europe’s ongoing rearmament has exposed a structural contradiction that exists at the very heart of its defense industrial strategy. Despite the surge of demand for weapons, ammunition, and maintenance capacity following the war in Ukraine, access to the European defense market remains structurally limited due to deeply entrenched industrial fragmentation and regulations that favor EU-based production.
This is creating a comprehensive strategic dilemma. As the European Union seeks to strengthen strategic autonomy—often suggested in the context of reducing dependence on the United States and China—it must face an immediate reality at the same time: its current defense industrial base lacks the production capacity, coordination, and speed required for high-intensity rearmament. Thus the challenge is not only one of capability, but also of magnitude and tempo.
The recent policy discussions illustrate that such a dilemma cannot be solved by EU-centric integration alone. As the recent European Policy Centre article pointed out, the European Union should include external players—for example, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Ukraine beyond the EU27—in order to achieve the scale necessary to compete globally. This emerging perception raises an important question among policymakers: whether the pursuit of Europe’s strategic autonomy should be inward-looking, or whether it should evolve into a more flexible model that selectively incorporates credible external partners.
In this context, South Korea offers a persuasive—yet not sufficiently explored—option. Rather than approaching South Korea as a mere external arms supplier, European countries could leverage it as a partner capable of complementing key existing gaps in the realm of the EU’s industrial capacity, supply chain resilience, and production tempo.
Poland’s case is a concrete illustration of how such cooperation could function. The K9 howitzer program transformed from a simple procurement process into one involving technology transfer and localized production through industrial cooperation; this is evidenced by the K9PL variant, which incorporates Polish subsystems and is being transitioned toward local production in Poland. Such an approach aligns external supply with Europe’s industrial policy priority while directly enabling a weapons system—that is developed outside the EU—to directly contribute to domestic production capacity. Similar arrangements surrounding the K2 tanks also showcase how localized assembly and joint production could mitigate the constraints that are imposed by the “Made in Europe” procurement preferences.
This model could be extended across Central and Eastern Europe, where defense demand is both urgent and politically supported. Countries like Poland and Romania are already emerging as crucial nodes in Europe’s rearmament effort, not only as end-users but also as producers and maintenance hubs. Incorporating external partners into the regional-based industrial ecosystem through component manufacturing, facilities maintenance, and joint production offers a realistic path that could expand Europe’s industrial basis without undermining its strategic priorities.
At the same time, Europe is already benefiting from an indirect form of cooperation. The war in Ukraine accelerated the development of a de facto “indirect pipeline” model in which external suppliers contribute to European defense through allied states in an indirect manner. A structure—in which South Korea provides advanced military hardware to Poland, which in turn transfers legacy Soviet-era equipment like T-72 tanks to Ukraine—has created a form of circular reinforcement. As a result, Ukraine can secure immediately needed capabilities while European countries can modernize their militaries. What began as an improvised response to a wartime situation is increasingly showing the characteristics of an institutionalized supply mechanism. If officially institutionalized, Europe could continue both the support for Ukraine and modernization of its respective militaries over the long term.
This trend points towards a deepened institutional opportunity. There is growing recognition that incorporating external production capacity into NATO’s broader supply chain could enhance alliance-wide resilience. For example, institutions like the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) could offer a framework that could incorporate trustworthy partners into procurement, maintenance, and logistics networks. While such integration would require political consensus, it could become the foundation for Europe to move beyond ad hoc cooperation toward a more coordinated industrial strategy.
Similar questions are raised within the EU framework. Although instruments like the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) fund are originally designed to reinforce the defense industrial basis of Europe, their focus on EU-based entities raises the issue of how to include outside contributions. Yet in reality, such tension may be less restrictive than it appears. Partnerships established through EU-based subsidiaries or joint ventures enable external firms to help European production while preserving alignment with the priorities of EU regulation. This would indicate the expansion of practical production capacity under the aegis of Europe’s control, instead of the weakening of its industrial sovereignty.
Importantly, Europe’s choice is not confined to direct cooperation with EU member states. Cooperation with non-EU states including the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Norway offers additional flexibility. These countries are deeply interconnected with Europe’s defense ecosystem and can serve as intermediaries for broader industrial cooperation. Joint production, joint development, and shared maintenance networks involving these actors offer pathways that could integrate external capabilities without directly challenging the EU’s institutional boundaries.
This harks back to the most fundamental policy question: should Europe prioritize developing its defense industry by thoroughly sticking to an internal approach, even if it risks prolonging existing bottlenecks, or should it take a more flexible approach by incorporating external partners as part of its broader strategy for industrial reinforcement?
The answer does not necessarily have to be binary. If strategic flexibility is interpreted as the “capability to act independently and effectively,” selective partnership with external players would become an instrument of enhancing—rather than undermining—Europe’s capacity. In this context, cooperation with countries including South Korea would be a potential means of achieving Europe’s objectives more quickly and sustainably.
Ultimately, the issue is not whether Europe would open up its defense market to external players, but how to structure such cooperation and align it with long-term interests. Through the expansion of local production, supply chain integration, and the institutionalization of cooperative mechanisms, Europe can enhance its defense industrial capacity without compromising its strategic autonomy.
In this evolving landscape, partners like South Korea should not simply be seen as an external arms supplier that seeks to enter the European market. Instead, they are potential elements for expansion that could complement what Europe itself currently lacks—assets that, if adequately incorporated, could play a meaningful role in sustaining Europe’s ongoing military transformation.
