Defending Forward, Respecting Sovereignty
The U.S. military carried out 51 airstrikes in Somalia from January through mid-July 2025. This strike activity—averaging just over two strikes per week since February—reflects not only a sustained counterterrorism campaign but also a broader commitment to maritime and regional stability in the Horn of Africa. As reported in defenceWeb, these strikes were carried out in coordination with the national government in Somalia and are framed within the broader objective of mutual security. But what do these operations signify when examined more closely, particularly as they relate to actor-specific targeting and evolving patterns of cooperation?
This analysis moves beyond the count of strikes and into the heart of what they reveal. The strikes show a deliberate and evolving U.S. strategy in Somalia that prioritizes threat containment, sovereign coordination, and forward defense in alignment with stated U.S. national security goals.
I. Strategic Priorities in the Horn of Africa
Somalia sits at a crucial intersection of U.S. global security concerns. It is both a site of persistent violent extremism and a gateway to strategic maritime corridors, including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The U.S. recognizes the region as critical to counterterrorism, counterpiracy, and stability operations. In the 2022 National Defense Strategy, Africa was identified not as a secondary theater but as a region where strategic competitors may seek influence and where violent non-state actors pose real risks to U.S. forces and interests.
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)’s actions, the combatant command tasked with leading U.S. military operations on the continent, indicate defending forward in partnership with the host country. In the context of Somalia, this has translated into kinetic action targeting two primary non-state armed groups: al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia. Public statements from AFRICOM repeatedly highlight the threats these groups pose not only to regional governments but also to U.S. personnel abroad and the American homeland.
Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in East Africa, has demonstrated operational reach beyond Somalia’s borders, including plotting attacks in Kenya and elsewhere. More recently, U.S. officials flagged ISIS-Somalia as increasingly emboldened actor with transnational ambitions. Although al-Shabaab is still a lethal actor in East Africa, ISIS-Somalia’s operational evolution needs close attention.
This changing threat landscape is evident in the 2025 strike data.
II. Evolving Targeting Priorities and Partner Coordination
According to data collected and analyzed from AFRICOM press releases between January and July 14 2025, the majority of U.S. airstrikes have targeted ISIS-Somalia, not al-Shabaab, see Figure 1 below. Of the 51 total strikes, 32 were aimed at ISIS-Somalia, while 19 targeted al-Shabaab.
Figure 1: U.S. Airstrikes in Somalia Against al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia January 20 – July 14, 2025 | Verified via AFRICOM disclosures, senior defense official insights, and public declarations by U.S. leadership. Source: Pearl Matibe, original U.S. Airstrike Tracking Dataset, 2025, updated July 15, 2025.
Figure 2: U.S. Airstrikes in Somalia Against al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia by Stated Strategic Rationales January 20 – July 14, 2025 | Verified via AFRICOM disclosures, senior defense official insights, and public declarations by U.S. leadership. Source: Pearl Matibe, original U.S. Airstrike Tracking Dataset, 2025, updated July 15, 2025.
A closer examination of the U.S. Airstrike Tracking Dataset, 2025, updated July 15, 2025 provides a more nuanced view of how coordination, sovereignty, and justification intersect with targeting priorities:
Three important insights emerge from this data:
- High Coordination with Somali Government: The majority of ISIS-Somalia strikes were conducted in coordination with the ruling Somali government. This illustrates the extent to which these operations are not unilateral but involve deliberate joint planning. It is a tangible indicator of sovereign partnership.
- ISIS-Somalia Now Primary Target: Despite al-Shabaab’s longstanding role as the dominant insurgent threat, ISIS-Somalia has become the more frequent target. This shift suggests an updated U.S. threat prioritization, likely driven by recent ISIS-linked operational activities in Puntland and the northeast.
- Respect for Sovereignty: Several strikes—notably 5 against ISIS and 4 against al-Shabaab—were conducted specifically “at the request of the Somali government,” with AFRICOM explicitly referring to Somali sovereignty. This language is not diplomatic filler; it reflects a communications strategy and operational posture aligned with U.S. and Somali political goals.
III. The Operational and Geographic Pivot
The location of the strikes reveals additional shifts. While earlier U.S. airstrikes were concentrated in southern Somalia, the U.S. Airstrike Tracking Dataset, 2025 data originated by Pearl Matibe shows increased operations in Puntland—a semi-autonomous region in the northeast. This geographic pivot aligns with the concentration of ISIS-Somalia’s activities in the Bari region, where U.S. officials believe the group has established logistical nodes.
AFRICOM press releases from April and June 2025 specifically cite collective self-defense strikes southeast of Bossaso. The July 13 airstrike, for instance, was a response to active threat intelligence and carried out in coordination with the Somali government, reinforcing the joint nature of these operations.
This approach reflects more than just tactical adaptation; it reveals a sustained shift in U.S. posture toward preemptive, intelligence-driven strikes against a geographically adaptive adversary.
IV. Partner Engagement and Sovereign Legitimacy
Across multiple official releases and briefings, AFRICOM and the U.S. Department of Defense have highlighted high-level U.S.-Somali engagement. General Michael Langley, Commander of AFRICOM, has held strategic meetings with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and senior defense officials in Mogadishu. These engagements have served to reaffirm the U.S. position that Somalia retains primary responsibility for its own security, and that U.S. military assistance is provided in full respect of Somali sovereignty.
Rather than bypassing Somali command structures, U.S. operations are increasingly tied to Somali-requested or Somali-approved actions. This distinguishes the current campaign from past eras of counterterrorism operations in other regions.
Moreover, these engagements are not symbolic. They form the foundation for expanded military-to-military cooperation, improved intelligence sharing, and operational legitimacy. When the Somali Ministry of Defense issues statements praising U.S. support as “timely and essential,” it not only affirms mutual alignment but also bolsters public legitimacy for ongoing operations in a complex domestic environment.
Defending Forward in Practice
The 51 U.S. airstrikes conducted in Somalia in these past five months 2025 are more than statistics on a chart. They are a window into a counterterrorism strategy that is evolving in form, target, and justification. With ISIS-Somalia now drawing more kinetic attention than al-Shabaab, and with most operations explicitly conducted in coordination with the Somali government, the United States is engaging in a model of “defending forward” that seeks to balance strategic imperatives with principled sovereignty.
This approach does not diminish the serious and ongoing challenges Somalia faces from violent extremist organizations. Nor does it eliminate the need for continued scrutiny and policy debate around long-term U.S. military involvement on the continent. However, it does reflect a mode of engagement increasingly shaped by mutual agreement, transparency, and a shared vision of regional security.
As such, the U.S. posture in Somalia may offer a glimpse into the future of partnered counterterrorism operations—where defending forward is not just about projection of power, but about embedding that power within frameworks of partnership and sovereign legitimacy.
