In the years after the Cold War, global politics was centered around a western-led order dominated especially by the United States and Europe. Developing countries were often expected to align themselves politically, economically, and strategically with the west in return for aid, security guarantees and market access. But that era is steadily fading and countries across Africa, Latin America, the Gulf, and Southeast Asia are increasingly rejecting rigid bloc politics in favour of engaging simultaneously with big powers such as China, Russia and U.S depending on their national interests.
This development signals the emergence of a phenomenon that could be termed as “Global South 2.0”, which represents a more confident, pragmatic, and strategically autonomous Global South navigating itself through a multipolar world using platforms such as BRICS. The change has its root in changing geopolitical and economic conditions where western supremacy, while still significant, no longer appears absolute. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan undermined the moral high ground of western interventionism, while sanctions-heavy diplomacy has negatively impacted many developing economies. Simultaneously, China’s economic rise has provided an alternative source of trade, investment and infrastructure financing but at the same time also raised some concerns over the intentions of these investments.
The transition of growing economies from rigid blocs to more flexible platforms is visible through the numbers also. According to the estimates, BRICS countries now account for nearly 40% of global GDP in purchasing power parity terms and in 2024, BRICS collectively reached 4% GDP growth, while worldwide growth stood at 3.3%. Additionally, BRIC also accounts for more than 40% of the world’s population. The transformation of BRICS into BRICS+ in 2024 after the inclusion of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE further reinforced the perception that the centre of global economic gravity is gradually shifting away from the Atlantic world.
Unlike the Non-Aligned Movement of the Cold War, this new phase is not ideological. The states are not moving away from the West, rather they are engaging in adopting a more flexible approach, aiming at ensuring their maximizing their strategic and economic benefits. Multi-alignment is motivated less by ideology and more by issues related to energy security, infrastructure development, technology, food security, and geopolitical leverage.
The Gulf states perhaps best exemplify this new world order. The U.S still considers Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as its traditional security partners, yet both countries simultaneously strengthen their economic ties with China, while participating in the BRICS mechanism. In recent years, China has become one of the top destinations for the export of Gulf energy resources, as Saudi Arabia provided up to 14% of China’s total oil consumption in 2025. Gulf states are also considering ways to engage in oil trade deals that do not involve the use of the US dollar, in addition to forming new partnerships outside the realm of Western financial institutions. Even amid western pressure following the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gulf resisted the idea of fully isolating Moscow, preferring strategic flexibility over bloc loyalty.
In the meantime, Africa’s trajectory also reflects this recalibration. China is still the largest trade partner of Africa for a continuous 16 years now on a bilateral basis and is funding infrastructure development in areas of roads, ports, railways and energy. Meanwhile, Russia has established itself as a significant player in the field of security cooperation in African countries of the Sahel region such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Many African governments today criticise the West over its policies of conditional lending and aid based on good governance because they feel that they constrain policy sovereignty. The African Union’s inclusion in the G20 in 2023 further symbolised the growing demand for greater representation of the Global South within global governance institutions.
Latin America is also seeing a rebirth of the desire for strategic autonomy. Brazil has been at the forefront in promoting discussions on alternative payment mechanisms and transactions in their respective currencies during their presidency of BRICS in 2025. Several other Latin American countries are simultaneously increasing their trade with China while still remaining friendly with the United States. It is worth noting that China has long since surpassed the United States as the main trading partner of some South American nations. Rather than embracing ideological alignment, governments across the region increasingly prioritise economic diversification and policy independence.
Southeast Asia offers perhaps the clearest example of transactional geopolitics. Southeast nations continue to maintain defence partnerships with the United States while maintaining strong trade ties with China. Instead of joining rigid anti-China alliances, most Southeast Asian countries prefer strategic balancing. Their approach is guided by economic pragmatism and balancing ties so that they can be benefited from Chinese investment while preserving security ties with Washington. The Southeast nation’s diplomatic culture of “friend to all, enemy to none” further reflects the broader mindset of the Global South.
The geopolitics scenario is evolving towards a non-western and multi-polar world. Indicative of this is the expansion of the BRICS group, discussions about de-dollarization, and regional trade blocs. These new powers are not attempting to usurp the western order; rather, they wish to lessen their reliance on these western-centric systems. The U.S., with its overwhelming military, technological, and economic power, still holds significant sway; however, developing countries do not automatically align themselves with western interests. The Global South has changed from being a passive setting to being a geopolitically active entity.
