A major change is underway in Europe. Germany, which for seventy years took a passive and cautious approach to military matters due to the trauma of World War II, is now at the forefront of efforts to re-strengthen the continent’s armed forces. In early 2025, the Berlin government approved a €1 trillion defense and infrastructure investment plan, including the creation of a special Sondervermögen that allows defense spending not to be tied to the constitutional debt limit. This is not just a large amount. This is an indication that Europe is undergoing a fundamental transformation. The background of this change is inseparable from two major pressures that occur simultaneously. First, Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, which has now entered its fourth year, presents a real threat on the eastern border of the European Union (EU). Second, perhaps more surprising, is Donald Trump’s return to the presidency in late 2024 with a more skeptical view of the United States’ commitment to the transatlantic alliance. In the midst of these two pressures, emerged ReArm Europe, an ambitious plan that aims to deploy up to €800 billion over four years to rebuild Europe’s military power from the ground up.
The main question that arises is: can Europe really become independent in terms of its defence? Meijer and Brooks remind us of something important to think about: Europe’s efforts to achieve independence in the field of defense will be significantly hampered by two interconnected obstacles, “strategic chaos” which means deep differences among member states on issues of threats and priorities, as well as major shortcomings in military capabilities that require enormous time and expense to overcome. This review was written before the launch of ReArm Europe, but its relevance is even more pronounced: large spending alone is not enough without an underlying strategic unity. Ironically, the push to achieve European defense autonomy is nothing new.
This has been on the agenda for a long time, especially by France, but it has always been faced with indifference from its counterparts including Germany. Aggestam and Hyde-Price reveal that the pressures of Trump’s first term have been the main catalyst accelerating the demand for Europe’s strategic autonomy, as Trump’s euroscepticism and uncertainty in his foreign policy reflect how vulnerable Europe can be if it is completely dependent on. Now, with Trump back in power and more assertive than ever, the argument seems to be a seemingly real prophecy.
Germany is the most interesting example in this context. No other country has undergone a more striking transformation. For decades, Germany has been known as a country that has been very reluctant to discuss the issue of military power. Its post-war political culture (Friedenspolitik) made defense spending not just a fiscal decision, but already integrated with the nation’s identity. When Chancellor Olaf Scholz referred to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as the Zeitenwende, a turning point in 2022, the world watched with doubt. When his successor, Friedrich Merz, finally dismantled the constitutional debt limit to finance defense by 2025, it was clear that these changes were not mere words. However, the changes taking place in Germany would be meaningless without a profound overhaul in the foundations of the European defense industry as a whole.
Fiott assesses that Russia’s conflict with Ukraine not only shows weaknesses in the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), but also questions whether the initiatives taken by the EU, such as joint arms purchases and collaborative planning are enough to trigger significant changes in European defence industry collaboration. The separation of the defense industry in Europe, where individual countries are more likely to protect their own “national champions” remains the biggest hurdle. Germany produced tanks, France designed fighter planes, Italy built warships. All countries do overlapping work, instead of focusing on specialization. As a result, high costs and inefficiencies arise.
Here, the EU’s role as an institution becomes very important. The ReArm Europe, SAFE, and EDIP programs are not only about financial issues, they are an effort to encourage member countries to collaborate on procurement, planning, and ultimately production together. Ewers-Peters argues that Europe’s strategic autonomy has acted as a driver for strengthening security cooperation in Europe as it opens up opportunities for a more balanced partnership between the EU and NATO based on a more equitable sharing of responsibilities. Thus, the ESA is not a threat to NATO, but if managed properly it can strengthen the alliance by making Europe a more substantial contributor, not just a free passenger. However, this is the most difficult point for Germany, in particular. While Berlin took a leading role in strengthening Europe’s defenses, countries in Central and Eastern Europe such as Poland and the Baltic states viewed it with mixed feelings of optimism and skepticism. They fear that a “stand-alone Europe” could have an impact on weakening U.S. relations with NATO at a time when the Russian threat is very real. Germany must therefore operate on two sides: leading the rejuvenation of Europe’s armaments, while at the same time convincing its counterparts in the east that this is not a plan to replace NATO, but to increase its power.
Posen emphasizes that the core of the entire European defense autonomy initiative is not on how much funds are spent, but rather on the priorities that Europe must take first to build a truly self-sufficient deterrence and defense capability, especially in terms of intelligence, ground combat integration, and command systems that have been completely dependent on the US military structure. Without building the base of those capabilities first, the billions of euros spent will simply accumulate into weapons stockpiles without producing an integrated combat capability. This is the most important contradiction of this historic moment. Europe eventually found the political will and financial support to become an independent defensive power. Germany, which was previously the most hesitant, now leads with the largest budget. However, money and intention alone are not enough.
Europe still has to solve a much more complex challenge: unify different views on threats among the 27 member states, build an integrated defense industry, and clearly define where the dividing line between “strategic autonomy” and “dependence on the US” should lie. We are in a crucial and decisive phase. If the ReArm Europe project succeeds, Europe can truly sustain itself without being heavily dependent on Washington, then this will be the biggest geopolitical shift since the Cold Confrontation. However, if this project fails, if funds run out without producing any real capability, and if “strategic chaos” again defeats unity, then Europe will come out of this phase weaker than ever, with more debt, but minimal security. Germany is aware of its heavy burden in history. And this time, the world was witnessing whether the Zeitenwende was real, or just empty words.
