Largely unknown in the outside world, Iran is generally regarded by China’s foreign policy experts and strategic affairs community as a “twin brother” of India. Why India? Because in diplomacy and in foreign policy, most Chinese people see both Iran and India as “opportunistic” and “arrogant.” Zhao Han, a well-known current affairs commentator on China’s WeChat, recently posted: “Iran is too opportunistic, with a mindset very much like India’s. As a result, it acts arrogantly most of the time but crumbles when things get serious.”
Zhao Han was reacting generally to the way Iran landed itself in the current turmoil and more specifically to the “cry for appeal” the Iranian ambassador to China, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, made to the Chinese leadership at a press conference in the Chinese capital a couple of days after the US action in Venezuela. It seemed Fazli went public, and that too in Beijing, asking China, “a powerful southern nation,” to play a proactive role in addressing the world’s challenges and, if necessary, “take greater action in defense and military matters.”
China and Iran are friends, not ‘alliance partners.’
Early on in the US-Iran conflict, China made it clear to both Iran and to all those questioning China’s “muted response” despite the belief that Iran held significance in China’s economic strategy in the Middle East. Ruling out the possibility of China’s military intervention, Professor Hu Chunchun, director of the Institute of European Studies at Shanghai International Studies University, said in an interview with European media on March 3: “China rarely participates in overseas conflicts through military means, nor does it tend to influence regional situations in this manner.” Moreover, China does not adopt a traditional alliance system; “a comprehensive strategic partnership (with Iran) is not equivalent to a military alliance, nor does it include obligations such as collective defense,” Hu added.
Reiterating China’s official stance on the unfolding crisis in the Middle East, Zhai Jun, special Chinese envoy to the region, speaking in Beijing after returning from an extensive visit to the war-stricken Persian Gulf, said, “This war should never have happened. The United States and Israel attacked Iran without authorization from the UN Security Council, blatantly violating international law. China firmly opposes and condemns this.” Referring to China’s past policies, Zhai Jun emphasized that the spread and escalation of the conflict must be resolutely prevented.
‘Iran needs China, but China does not need Iran.’
There has been no ambiguity in the Chinese government’s extremely cautious and restrained approach regarding the US-Israeli offensive against Iran. It only issued criticism after the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a phone call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, cautiously stated: “The blatant killing of a leader of a sovereign nation and the incitement of regime change are unacceptable.” In stark contrast, China reacted very differently to the US military action against Venezuelan President Maduro. In fact, Beijing consistently and relentlessly expressed “deep shock at the blatant use of violence,” condemning for days the US hegemonic behavior.
Beijing’s response, however, was limited to condemnation and expressions of deep concern. At the Chinese Foreign Minister’s regular press conference on March 2, a reporter asked whether China and Russia would consider providing military support to Iran should it request it. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning declined to comment. China has long been considered a crucial strategic partner of Iran. Against the backdrop of prolonged international sanctions against Iran, China has become a major buyer of the country’s crude oil. As widely reported in the world press, approximately 90% of Iran’s oil exports go to China. Iranian crude oil accounts for about 13% of China’s seaborne oil imports, although it remains a viable alternative overall.
Indeed, it is true that Beijing and Tehran have maintained military cooperation for decades, and China, Russia, and Iran continue to hold regular joint military exercises. Indeed, it is also true that notwithstanding both Beijing and Moscow formally denying being part of the Iran-China-Russia “axis of authoritarian states,” all three nations’ common geopolitical interests drive them to come together and work in tandem in order to resist the US hegemony. Yet Beijing’s approach is pragmatic in looking after its interests in the Gulf region beyond Iran. “That’s why China wants to protect its economic and strategic interests in the region. The survival of the Iranian regime is not so important to Beijing,” a scholar was cited in the Mandarin version of an online analysis published in Germany.
Iran needs China, but China does not need Iran.
Echoing the above view, Zhao Han, a Chinese commentator cited above, has argued that in the international cooperation system, each country’s strategic resources are finite and precious, and their investment therefore must adhere to a prudent cost-benefit and strategic value assessment. In past collaborations, China has fully demonstrated its value. For example, in the face of the US trade war, technology war, and geopolitical maneuvering, Iran cannot provide any assistance to China,” Zhao points out. However, conversely, without China’s purchase of Iranian oil and a series of economic collaborations, Iran would have long been unable to withstand the US pressure and blockade, he further stated.
Besides, Zhao, like most international relations scholars in China, vehemently denied China has been inactive in the conflict. In fact, faced with the United States’ global strategic layout, Zhao argued that China has been playing an active and pragmatic role within the international framework. Many experts and analysts, such as Hu Chunchun and Zhao Han, dismissed claims of Western observers that China is a mere spectator and asked who in multilateral forums such as the United Nations has consistently promoted unity among developing countries and provided effective checks and balances at the political and diplomatic levels. And who, globally, has adhered to the principle of common development and engaged in mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries (including those pressured by the United States), thus offering an option different from the logic of hegemony?
It is an obvious fact, these scholars contend, that if China had not withstood the pressure and maintained normal economic and trade relations with Iran (especially oil trade), the survival pressure faced by the Iranian regime would have been drastically different. Irrespective of China and Iran signing a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” agreement in 2016, Iran’s performance in several key areas has failed to effectively meet or satisfy China’s reasonable expectations as a strategic partner.
Iran has been a disappointment and has failed to win China’s confidence.
First, China-Iran bilateral relations have encountered a series of bottlenecks in substantive upgrading over the past decade. China has continuously promoted the deepening of relations, such as supporting Iran’s accession to platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, aiming to provide institutional guarantees for cooperation. Second, China is not lacking in willingness or action; the crux lies more in the execution and openness of cooperation. A prime example is a comprehensive 25-year cooperation plan signed in March 2021; the implementation of specific projects (such as the development and operation of Qeshm Island in the Persian Gulf) has been long delayed.
Third, in spite of the Comprehensive Partnership Agreement the two countries inked a decade ago, China believes there have been a series of actions by Iran that have not only damaged the interests and security of Chinese enterprises but have also eroded mutual trust between the two “partners.” A key example often cited in the Chinese writings is the unreasonable detention of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou a few years ago. The incident demonstrates that, faced with maximum pressure from the US, Iran failed to fully fulfill its obligation to protect the trade secrets and security of its partners, and there is even suspicion that it sacrificed the interests of Chinese companies in exchange for its own de-escalation.
In sum, referring to the Iranian ambassador Fazli’s appeal in Beijing to the Chinese leadership to assume Iran’s core security responsibilities, China’s scholars say it was hugely misplaced and unrealistic. At the same time, however, analysts and experts in China say China will neither stop supporting Iran nor intervene on behalf of Iran in the Middle East conflict. Undeniably, Iran is in turmoil again. But this once again proves that if Iran were to assert itself aggressively, its internal conflicts would be relatively easier to resolve, and it would be more likely to gain the support of major powers. Citing China’s own example, the advice to Iran by scholars in China is: God [aka, China] helps those who help themselves.
