China and Russia are adopting a strategy of indirectly benefiting from the ongoing conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran, starting in April 2026. Both China and Russia see this conflict as an opportunity to drain American resources, but they are avoiding direct military intervention to protect their own interests. The geopolitical and economic benefits for Beijing and Moscow from a war against Iran include the depletion of Western and American resources. For example, Moscow views a war against Iran as a strategic debt to be repaid to the West and Washington. Both Russia and China aim to transform Iran into a Ukraine for the United States, forcing Washington to deplete its stockpiles of interceptor missiles and ammunition from the European front. In addition to Russia reaping several economic gains from the Iran-Iraq War, it has also experienced a surge in energy revenues due to soaring oil prices resulting from the crisis. Estimates suggest that Russia could see additional revenues for its budget ranging from $45 billion to $97 billion by 2026 as a result of the protracted conflict. Furthermore, Russia and China have adopted a strategy of behind-the-scenes support in the Iran-Iraq War. Instead of deploying military forces, Russia and China provide Iran with intelligence and satellite imagery of US ship and aircraft positions, enabling Tehran to improve the accuracy of its strikes without overt Russian-Chinese involvement in the fighting.
Russia and China On the other hand, China’s position is one of cautious balancing regarding a potential Iranian war, aiming to distract the United States from Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Indo-Pacific region, and areas of direct Chinese influence. Beijing benefits from the shift in American military focus towards the Middle East, which reduces military pressure in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and provides it with room to maneuver on the Taiwan issue. China also seeks to secure access to Iranian energy supplies via the Strait of Hormuz even after a potential Iranian war. As Iran’s largest trading partner, China’s primary concern is ensuring the flow of oil. Therefore, Beijing has stockpiled petroleum reserves sufficient for more than 120 days in anticipation of a possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz, despite the guaranteed arrival of Iranian oil supplies to China via the strait, given the strength of the strategic relationship between China and Iran.
The essence of China’s current strategy toward a potential US-Israeli war against Iran can be summarized in several points, most notably attempts to deplete resources and nerves. Beijing believes that Washington’s involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts (whether with Iran or in Gaza and Lebanon) forces it to redeploy aircraft carriers and defense systems, such as the THAAD American defense system, from the Pacific Ocean, near China’s direct sphere of influence, to the Mediterranean and the Gulf. This weakens Washington’s pivot to Asia strategy.
Here, Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles are playing on the scenario of Taiwan as a deferred prize. Every day America is preoccupied with the Middle East is considered by China as a valuable time-out to bolster its military capabilities around the Taiwan Strait and establish a new reality on the ground without significant international media attention. While China is keen to play the role of a clean mediator, maintaining a neutral stance, it supports Iran economically (through oil purchases) and politically but avoids military involvement. This allows it to present itself to the world as a force for peace and a sensible counterweight to what it perceives as American chaos. As China seeks to secure its energy supply, its strategic balancing act also stems from a concern about a full-scale war that could close the Strait of Hormuz, as this would stifle the Chinese economy, which is heavily reliant on the region’s oil. In other words, China wants the tension to remain sufficiently simmering to keep the United States preoccupied, but not so explosive as to destroy Beijing’s commercial interests. China wants the tension to remain simmering enough to keep the United States busy, but not so explosive as to destroy Beijing’s commercial interests.
Here, Russia and China provide Iran with the necessary diplomatic and logistical support in the face of the intransigent US policy. Both China and Russia not only condemned the US-Israeli attacks but also considered them a violation of Iranian sovereignty (especially after the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in February 2016). They condemned these attacks in the UN Security Council, the United Nations, and all international forums. However, at the same time, they refused to make formal defense commitments to Tehran. The Russian and Chinese stance toward Iran is characterized by intensive political and diplomatic support, but it remains governed by calculations of each country’s national interests, which explains their reluctance to enter into binding military alliances. We can analyze this dynamic in the context of current events through the Chinese and Russian eagerness to provide diplomatic support and uphold Iranian sovereignty. Moscow and Beijing believe that targeting Iranian leaders constitutes a dangerous precedent that threatens the international security system and opens the door to a policy of regime change by force, which both parties strongly oppose. Therefore, their condemnation in the Security Council comes as a defense of the principle of state sovereignty and a prevention of American unilateralism in international decision-making. This is coupled with avoiding defense commitments, as both countries refuse to transform their partnership with Iran into a military alliance (like an Eastern NATO) for several reasons. First, they want to avoid direct confrontation. Neither Russia (preoccupied with the war on the Ukrainian front) nor China (which prioritizes economic power) wants to be drawn into a major regional war against the United States and Israel. Furthermore, there are their ties and interests with the Gulf states. China and Russia have significant economic and energy relations with the Gulf states and Israel, and committing to defending Iran could disrupt these balances. Both China and Russia prefer a gray zone policy regarding the Iranian war, favoring providing Iran with logistical, intelligence, and technological support that enables it to withstand the conflict without direct military involvement. In short, Russia and China provide Iran with an international safety net that prevents its complete isolation, but they leave Tehran to face direct security challenges on its own by guiding, planning, and managing them without engaging in a full-scale war or confrontation with the United States.
Regarding the Russian and Chinese roles in stopping the ongoing war against Iran, from my research and analytical perspective, there are persistent Chinese efforts in this regard. China is calling for urgent diplomacy and a Security Council meeting, but its influence in pressuring Israel or Washington remains limited compared to its ability to pressure Tehran. Perhaps, given the lack of an interest in a swift end to the war, as long as the conflict remains within the bounds of a war of attrition without leading to total destruction of the global economy, Moscow and Beijing may not find a strong incentive to intervene decisively to end a war that weakens their primary rival, the United States. While China and Russia simultaneously attempt to reach an understanding with the US administration, both are trying to gauge the Trump administration’s willingness to engage in major deals, such as the (Ukrainian issue for Russia, or trade and the lifting of tariffs and customs restrictions for China) in exchange for a greater role in de-escalating tensions with Iran. The Russian and Chinese approach to the military escalation against Iran is characterized by a focus on diplomatic and political channels, avoiding direct military involvement. Both countries aim to prevent the conflict from escalating into a full-blown regional war that could harm their strategic and economic interests.
On the Russian side, in its efforts to halt the ongoing conflict with Iran, Russia is acting as a player seeking to maintain a delicate balance in the region. Through its mediation efforts, Moscow has offered to act as an intermediary between the conflicting parties to reach political solutions that would end the escalation. This comes alongside Russia’s continued calls to reject escalation and stop targeting infrastructure and civilians and its criticism of US policies, which Moscow believes exploit the tension to advance its own agenda. Russia is keen on maintaining strategic balance by ensuring it doesn’t lose its relationships with other regional powers while preserving its strategic partnership with Tehran on other issues, such as Syria and Ukraine.
Meanwhile, China relies on a strategy of soft power and diplomatic pressure through its diplomatic initiatives. Beijing, in cooperation with Pakistan, launched a five-point initiative aimed at de-escalation and a cessation of hostilities. China also seeks to protect its economic interests and investments by securing its extensive trade interests in Iran, its largest trading partner, and working to resume the flow of vital resources, such as energy. China typically limits its response to political condemnation, often simply denouncing armed conflicts and calling for restraint, preferring to avoid direct confrontation with Washington to prevent impacting other sensitive issues, such as (Taiwan).
Accordingly, we understand that China and Russia will not fight on behalf of Iran but will continue to supply it with what it needs to prevent its rapid collapse in order to prolong the attrition of the United States while maintaining open channels of communication to avoid a full-blown global conflict. From this, we understand the limits of Russian and Chinese involvement in the Iranian war. Despite existing alliances, there is a ceiling to this role, with the absence of direct military support for Tehran. There are no current indications of direct military intervention by either country to repel attacks on Iran; support is limited to political and logistical aspects. Both countries are using their influence in the Security Council to obstruct resolutions that might grant international legitimacy to the use of excessive force, while simultaneously demanding the protection of international navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
