Strategic readings and intelligence, military, defense, and security reports concerning China in 2026 indicate that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s visit to the UAE and his meeting with UAE Ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in March 2026, coinciding with the repercussions of a potential Iranian war, represent a golden opportunity, according to the Chinese vision, to reshape the geopolitics of global trade away from traditional, vulnerable routes like the Strait of Hormuz. Chinese intelligence agencies and strategic circles see the emerging axis between Addis Ababa and the UAE in the aftermath of a potential Iranian war in February 2026 as a vital opportunity to reshape their influence in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf region, considering it an alternative pillar of stability amidst the turmoil that has afflicted their traditional partners in the region. The Chinese intelligence perspective on this axis can be analyzed through the lens of securing trade and energy routes beyond Hormuz, thereby circumventing bottlenecks in oil traffic and global and Chinese supply chains.
Beijing believes that the threats to the Strait of Hormuz during the Iran-Iraq War made the ports supported by the UAE in the Horn of Africa (via Ethiopia) crucial alternative routes for securing the flow of Chinese energy and goods. This aligns with China’s support for Ethiopia’s maritime logistics policy. China renewed its support for Ethiopia in January 2026 in its efforts to access the sea and develop maritime logistics, which intersects with Emirati investments in the region’s ports, creating a safety net for Chinese interests. China is relying on its strategic partnership with Ethiopia to find alternative trade routes and corridors, having elevated its relationship with Ethiopia to an all-weather strategic cooperative partnership in January 2026, the highest diplomatic status for China. This reflects Chinese intelligence’s confidence in the Ethiopian regime’s resilience as a regional ally through coordination with the UAE. Beijing views the UAE as its largest trading partner in the region (with a trade volume of approximately $90 billion) and considers Emirati-Ethiopian coordination a means to promote China’s vision of peace and development in the Horn of Africa. Chinese intelligence and military think tanks and circles analyzed the connection between the timing of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s visit to the UAE and his meeting with Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in light of the Iranian war and Washington’s preoccupation with it. China is attempting to exploit the security vacuum in the Horn of Africa, a region particularly sensitive to Chinese interests, by pushing its ally Abiy Ahmed to visit the UAE to establish post-Hormuz arrangements, given the ongoing tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, which is controlled by Iran. Beijing believes that Washington’s involvement in the repercussions of the Iranian war has weakened its focus on the Horn of Africa, thus presenting China with an opportunity to strengthen its influence as an alternative security and economic partner to secure Chinese supply chains, especially with the increased risks in the Strait of Hormuz due to the conflict. Consequently, China is seriously considering strengthening alternative routes through the Horn of Africa and bolstering Ethiopia’s relations with the UAE under Chinese supervision and support to ensure the flow of both Chinese and global energy and trade.
Here, Beijing’s intelligence, strategic, and intellectual circles have developed a new strategy called post-Hormuz and alternative routes, which China has tried to make successful behind the scenes and perhaps indirectly by strengthening and supporting the Addis Ababa-Abu Dhabi axis. Here, China analyzes Abiy Ahmed’s visit to the UAE as a step to activate a new trade corridor linking the ports managed by the UAE in the Horn of Africa, such as the port of Berbera, with the Ethiopian interior, reaching global markets, to reduce dependence on threatened straits such as the Iranian Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, from a Chinese intelligence perspective, this Ethiopian-Emirati axis can bolster China’s vision of peace and development in the Horn of Africa. China promotes its Horn of Africa strategy (initially proposed in 2022) as an alternative to Western and American interventions. This strategy focuses on security through development and connecting railways, such as the Addis Ababa-Djibouti line, to strategic ports in the region. This ensures the continuity of Chinese supply chains to the region and protects China’s interests and investments through its Belt and Road Initiative.
China also views Abiy Ahmed’s visit to the UAE as an effective tool, from a Chinese military, intelligence, and security perspective, to counter American and Western influence. Therefore, Beijing seeks to present itself as a peace broker in the Horn of Africa through its China Peaceful Development Initiative in the Horn of Africa, leveraging Emirati and Ethiopian investments to establish a South-South cooperation model that avoids Western and American political conditions. To ensure its success, China is striving to make this (undeclared tripartite alliance between Ethiopia, the UAE, and China) a success. Therefore, by supporting the UAE-Ethiopia rapprochement, China aims to build an economic bloc at the entrance to the Red Sea, thus thwarting Washington’s attempts to isolate the region or control its maritime routes through projects like the IMEC Corridor, which means the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. This project has been negatively impacted by the US-Israeli war against Iran.
Therefore, Beijing seeks to counter Western influence through its relationship with Ethiopia and the UAE, aiming to establish an alternative power bloc. Chinese agencies view the Ethiopian-Emirati rapprochement as a tool to reduce dependence on Western and American systems. China supports Ethiopia in advanced technology projects such as the sovereign artificial intelligence model and the shift towards using the Chinese yuan in debt settlement. Chinese intelligence and military agencies also encourage the policies of diplomatic independence adopted by both Ethiopia and the UAE. China values ​​Addis Ababa and Abu Dhabi’s commitment to the One China principle and their rejection of foreign interference. This aligns with the UAE’s policy, in particular, of diversifying alliances away from traditional American pressure following the US-Israeli war on Iran.
On the other hand, China faces a number of security and investment challenges, including concerns about instability. Despite optimism, Chinese reports warn of miscalculations in the Middle East that could affect its massive investments there under the Belt and Road Initiative. China has invested more than $13 billion in trade and infrastructure in Ethiopia alone. Therefore, China seeks to bridge the gap with Washington. Chinese intelligence agencies and strategic circles are attempting to exploit Washington’s preoccupation with the repercussions of the Iran war to deepen military and technological ties with this particular Ethiopian-Emirati axis, including assisting them in fully transitioning to the Chinese BeiDou satellite navigation system as an alternative to the Western and American GPS navigation system, which experienced widespread jamming during the US-Israeli war against Iran.
From the preceding analysis, we can understand the future of the Chinese presence in the Horn of Africa in 2026, especially given China’s welcoming of Abiy Ahmed’s visit to the UAE to find alternative routes and corridors for global trade and shipping to address the current challenges, complexities, and pressures facing China. This is particularly significant as Abiy Ahmed’s visit to the UAE coincided with the launch of the 2026 Year of People-to-People Exchange between China and Africa, which enhances China’s soft power. Therefore, China is betting that stability in Ethiopia, bolstered by Emirati support, will protect its massive investments in continental infrastructure, especially in the Horn of Africa, a region crucial to Chinese interests.
