Iraq is once again at a crossroads. Elections were held late last year, and the ballots have been counted. Yet Iraq remains without a government because the most disruptive elements of the political elite are clinging to power — enriching themselves while reigniting a manufactured war of “us versus them,” in which the so-called “benevolent” faction suppresses its former “oppressors” from returning to power.
Iraq’s post-2003 trajectory has been shaped by a narrative that became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Throughout my conversations with Iraqi Americans over the years, I’ve heard the same narrative repeated: during Saddam Hussein’s brutal rule, some Shiites chillingly — not jokingly — cautioned their Sunni neighbors, friends, and coworkers that if Saddam ever fell and Shiites took power, they would exact revenge on Sunnis for enabling the Baath Party’s marginalization and oppression of Shiites. Following the American invasion in 2003 and the subsequent rise of Shiite exiles to power in Baghdad, the new elite did exactly what critics feared — punishing Sunnis for supposedly facilitating the Baath Party’s brutal policies.
This narrative, however, could not be further from the truth. Saddam, a secular authoritarian, spared no potential adversary — whether it was an ordinary citizen accused of smearing the regime or members of his own extended family. What followed 2003 was not historical reckoning. It was political opportunism cloaked in sectarian grievance.
When the Iraqi Coordination Framework — the bloc that claimed the largest share of votes in the most recent elections — announced that it would nominate Nouri al-Maliki as its choice for the next prime minister, it became clear that Iraq, like virtually every country in the world, is poisoned by fringe ultranationalists who continue to blame “the other” for their own failures. Immediately after al-Maliki’s bid for the premiership became public, the Trump administration warned that because al-Maliki is a close ally of Iran, the United States would not support his candidacy or continue aid if he became prime minister.
Al-Maliki continues to garner support among segments of Iraqis not for his so-called “pro-Iran” credentials, but for the vast patronage network he constructed and his demonization of the “other.” In this context, the “other” refers to Iraqis — across ethnic and sectarian lines — who seek to dismantle his polarizing nativist rhetoric and corrupt spoils system in favor of a more inclusive model aimed at addressing Iraq’s long-standing problems: graft, nepotism, and systemic corruption.
The Iraqi opposition, led by former electricity minister Ayham al-Samarrae and former prime minister Iyad Allawi, has formed a broad multi-confessional and multiethnic coalition of Iraqis inside and outside the country driven by one principal objective: faithfully applying the 2005 Constitution and transforming Iraq into a nation where the rule of law prevails.
For years, figures like Allawi and al-Samarrae have pleaded with Iraqis — and with the United States — to fulfill the aspirations of the Iraqi people by dismantling the sectarian quota system, reforming the unjust de-Baathification laws that excluded tens of thousands of Sunnis uninvolved in violence from public life, and faithfully implementing the federal model clearly outlined in the Constitution. Rather than hold accountable those who obstruct reform, successive U.S. administrations backed al-Maliki, his successor Haider al-Abadi, and most recently Mohammed Shia al-Sudani — leaders who have failed to address core public demands: disbanding non-state armed factions, launching comprehensive political reforms, and preventing entrenched elites from obstructing the political process. In 2010, despite Iyad Allawi’s bloc winning the largest number of parliamentary seats, Washington ultimately supported al-Maliki’s return to power — a leader whom former President George W. Bush had previously described as “the right guy for Iraq” — a decision widely viewed as entrenching sectarian fragmentation rather than correcting it.
The opposition is not calling for kinetic American intervention or sanctions. Instead, it proposes what might be called a “Syrian scenario” — U.S. military disengagement combined with sustained political and diplomatic engagement to support unity, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. On the ground, this means working with a fledgling government and its allies to promote stability and legitimacy.
Months ago, I predicted that post-Assad Syria would spiral into violence, and within weeks of regime collapse, sectarian clashes intensified and Israeli airstrikes and incursions multiplied. Despite spoiler forces, the United States stayed engaged diplomatically, sidelined disruptive actors, and used its regional influence to give Syria a chance to stabilize. In effect, that approach bore fruit because Washington deviated from the informal policy inherited from European powers: divide, conquer, and sustain fragmentation. Instead, Washington worked with credible regional partners — including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey — to ensure that disruptive actors could not derail stabilization efforts. Iraq, like Syria’s new government, has regional allies who have demonstrated that, when conditions permit, they are willing to invest tangibly in Iraq’s stability and long-term recovery. The UAE’s recent role in restoring the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul is only one small example of what Iraq and regional partners can accomplish if spoilers are effectively sidelined.
On the other hand, Iraq’s so-called “transition to democracy” has not produced the desired results because successive American administrations continued supporting factions that perpetuate sectarianism and fragmentation. The Iraqi opposition is asking the United States to give this diplomatic model a chance in Iraq — to use its political, economic, and diplomatic leverage to compel entrenched elites to abandon targeted violence against legitimate political opponents, stop inciting hatred from official platforms, and allow the justice system to transparently investigate corruption and hold perpetrators accountable.
To those in Washington who claim that al-Maliki and his allies are foremost loyal to Iran, I offer a reminder: al-Maliki rose to power with American backing, sheltered behind the U.S. Embassy after losing power, and has in part evaded accountability under the umbrella of American protection.
If al-Maliki or any of his proxies are allowed to return to power, Iraq risks plunging once again into an era of “us versus them” politics — spoils, exclusion, hate-mongering, and the systematic “othering” of those who refuse to submit to a corrupt political order. Figures such as Iyad Allawi and Ayham al-Samarrae represent a national and constitutional alternative to a prevailing model that prioritizes patronage over transparency, exclusion over coexistence, and chaos over stability. Their platform calls for restoring federal balance, protecting the rights of all citizens, and insulating Iraq — and the broader region — from another cycle of sectarian conflict. Whether that alternative is given a real chance may depend as much on Washington’s choices as on Baghdad’s.
