How Myanmar upholds Military Democracy

In Myanmar, in cities and the countryside alike, military campaign posters promise a return to democracy, an election that many analysts dismiss as a sham.

In Myanmar, in cities and the countryside alike, military campaign posters promise a return to democracy, an election that many analysts dismiss as a sham. The generals who overthrew the civilian government in 2021 insist that a three-phase vote will restore civilian rule, but few outside Naypyidaw buy it. In fact, only two of the past four national ballots have ever led to a civilian government. The 1990 and 2020 mandates were discarded by the army. State media openly admit that the goal is merely to cement the military’s control and gain some international legitimacy for the vote. Critics at home and abroad have accordingly dismissed this election as a sham, neither free nor fair, and designed to entrench military rule under a civilian facade. In practice, votes are tightly constrained. Ballots are only open in roughly 265 of Myanmar’s 330 townships (those still under army control).

Lethal intimidation has accompanied this electoral theater. Junta openly frets that any mass boycott would strip the vote of credibility. It has rewritten election laws and jailed dissidents. A draconian election obstruction act now prescribes years in prison for criticizing the polls, and more than 200 people have already been arrested under these provisions. The shadow national unity government has responded by urging for a boycott. Its foreign minister Zin Mar Aung declared that the overwhelming majority will refuse to give the junta any legitimacy by voting in the so-called sham election. International rights monitors have issued warnings. UN High Commissioner Volker Turk pleaded that Myanmar’s army must stop using brutal violence to compel people to vote. Describing how pervasive traits and intimidation distort the electoral atmosphere, the UK’s UN envoy likewise noted that unless the violence ends and genuine dialogue begins, no indications exist that these polls will be accepted as free and fair.

Even after ballots are cast, the army’s creep will remain ironclad. Myanmar’s 2008 charter reserves 25% of all parliamentary seats for uniformed officers, and three key ministries—defense, home affairs, and border affairs—remain under direct military appointment. In practice, the generals have eliminated any real opposition. Last year alone, a junta-controlled commission dissolved 40 parties, including Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, on legal technicalities. Only six minor parties are allowed to contest nationwide, and the military’s own Union Solidarity and Development Party fields about 1/5 of all hopefuls. State media already touts the USDP as likely to sweep the vote, handing a compliant parliament to the generals. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of opponents remain behind bars; monitors count 22,668 political prisoners in the junta jail. This includes journalists, trade unionists, and former MPs who dare to speak up for democracy.

Behind the ballot box fanfare, the civil war rages on in full force. Armed conflict monitors tally well over 13,700 combat-related deaths in 2025 alone, as military pressure offends across Kachin, Shan, Sagaing, and other regions. Air and drone strikes have spiked by approximately 30% compared to the previous year. They smash villages, schools, and clinics with near impunity. This month, junta fighter bombers struck a Rakhine state hospital, killing dozens of patients and staff. Despite revealing its depleted rank, the army is also abducting civilians. Kidnappings rose by roughly 26% over the last year, driving more young people into hiring. Nearly one-third of Myanmar’s population now depends on aid. The UN estimates that approximately 16 million people will need life-saving assistance by 2026.

Mass displacement and grassroots rebellion have followed. Hundreds of thousands of villagers have fled the frontline townships, swelling the refugee camps. Simultaneously, ordinary citizens have taken up arms and become a mess. Grassroots People’s Defense Forces have sprung up nationwide after the coup, joining longstanding ethnic armies to fight the junta. Together, they have retaken swaths of northern and eastern Myanmar, inflicting the country’s worst territorial losses in decades. Even Beijing’s one-time allies have been shaken, fearing a full collapse of the junta. China quietly brokered a truce with major border insurgents, such as the TNLA and MNDAA. But for most civilian military democracy men, only missiles and martial law, fear, and displacement have become the norm, and well over 22,600 political opponents still sit in jail.

Currently, few governments take this vote seriously. The EU’s foreign policy chief bluntly stated that the fundamental conditions for any free and fair elections were absent, calling these polls a clinical ploy to bolster the general’s legitimacy. Britain’s UN envoy echoed this statement: in the absence of a genuine ceasefire and inclusive dialogue, there are no indications that the planned election will be credible. Even neighboring Asian countries, which once offered a diplomatic lifeline, have stepped back amid widespread conflict and no real dialogue; no official observers monitored the vote. By contrast, China, Myanmar’s most important external backer, has dropped talk of sanctions and quietly endorsed the timeline, stressing that its ally must ensure stability. The United States and other Western countries likewise will not recognize any outcome as legitimate unless the junta meets the basic conditions to halt the violence, free Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, and allow genuine political competition.

Virtually no one expects this vote to end the violence. Instead, the elections appear to be designed to freeze the status quo. Observers note that even during the campaign, the Tatmadaw has been pounding rival-held areas, clawing back lost territories with artillery and airstrikes to improve its hand on voting day. Crisis Group’s Richards Horsey bluntly observes that this is not about a civilian government shifting to a softer approach but about maximizing junta gains before any new parliament meets. Right-wing groups have been more direct: FIDH warns this election is a recipe for disaster that will inevitably stoke conflict and abuse. In short, the military offers no peace dividend. It wants votes, but the people are giving it a vote of no confidence.

In sum, Myanmar’s so-called military democracy is democracy in name only. The December 2025 vote held under martial law and amid bombardment was a sham from start to finish, meant to legitimize a regime without a popular mandate. Observers warn it will only deepen the grievances and conflicts the military itself has sown.

Shahriar Nehal
Shahriar Nehal
Undergraduate student of international relations at the University of Chittagong.