During the late summer and autumn of 2025, the Russian Federation has intensified its provocations towards European countries, which could escalate into armed confrontations. Poland, Romania, Estonia, Norway, Germany, and Denmark, all NATO members, have recorded either drone or fixed-wing provocations with direct or indirect Russian involvement and hallmarks.
Attempting to cause friction among NATO defenses and sow discontent, the Kremlin seeks to slowly fracture not only the mutual defense alliance but also test its resolve. However, for now, European officials have been slow and reluctant to respond.
Despite Russia’s growing military production, Europe likewise has also grown its national security capabilities and increased defense spending, so where lies the conundrum? European countries have the capabilities to deter Russia and militarily support Ukraine’s defense, but the continent lacks the political will to do so.
Europe’s Defense Apparatus Disaster
Amidst a tactical failure in their major summer offensive, the Kremlin escalated open provocations against various NATO members in September 2025, for both domestic and international consumption. The first provocation came with a mass drone swarm over Poland on the night of September 9th into the morning of the 10th.
During the drone incursion, 19 Gerbera reconnaissance drones flew freely over Polish airspace in tandem with a mass drone and missile bombing of Ukraine. A NATO quick reaction force, led by the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and others, took down 4 of the 19 drones, with others landing in Poland.
The Polish government confirmed the Russian incursion was done on purpose, and Warsaw recently signed a deal allowing foreign militaries in Europe to enable base access to help deter Moscow.
Three days later, a Russian-made Geran drone, a variant of Iran’s notorious Shaheds, flew over Romanian airspace. Despite the Romanian Air Force intercepting the drone’s flight path, the pilots allowed the deadly drone to return into Ukraine, where it could have caused civilian casualties or damage to infrastructure.
Six days later, the most brazen action took place when three Russian MiG-31s flew several kilometers into Estonian airspace around the vicinity of Vindaloo Island and turned off their transponders to Tallinn’s air traffic controllers. Finland, Sweden, and Italy all sent aircraft to intercept and escort the MiGs out of Estonia.
Simultaneously, Denmark suffered a wave of drone provocations near critical infrastructure such as airports and military bases with ‘undisclosed locations,’ which are the hallmarks of the Kremlin, especially as Copenhagen is the highest per capita GDP-wise backer of Kyiv’s defense against Moscow.
Other European NATO members, such as Germany and Norway, reported aircraft and drone provocations around the Baltic Sea, where Russia’s Baltic Fleet remains intact and active compared to the more decimated Black Sea Fleet during the invasion of Ukraine.
The Assets Are There, but Bureaucracy and Politics Hinder Response
Russian aerial, drone, information, and hybrid warfare activities are an existential threat to Europe that can be mitigated and deterred. European countries have begun remilitarizing, with Northern and Eastern Europe leading the way. However, what hinders a European deterrence is bureaucracy and backdoor politics.
Against the backdrop of the failure of perpetual wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the blowback from interventions in Libya and Mali, anti-war sentiments were exacerbated. Although Russia became a sufficient existential threat for countries such as Sweden and Finland to abandon their state of neutrality, fear of backlash from constituents holds back the traditional parties.
Some of the current populist movements have received direct funding from the Kremlin (AfD in Germany, Lega in Italy, FPO in Austria, and National Rally in France). Other pro-Russian European parties have been intertwined with interference or links to Moscow, as seen with Fidesz in Hungary, Smer in Slovakia, and the recent ties of a prominent Reform MEP, Nathan Gill, who took bribes to promote statements at the behest of Russia and their interests.
What drives the surge of pro-Russian parties is not just Russian interference but also the ability to adapt to global changes that some traditional parties have failed to do. The populists run on ‘anti-war’ stances that constituents see as favorable, even when Russia is exacerbating existential security threats on the continent.
Furthermore, Russia’s intelligence apparatus actively plays a role in mass migration to Europe, which has exacerbated the rise of the pro-Russian populists who run on strict policies of migration, which traditional parties have failed to mitigate. Current German Chancellor Frederick Merz is making an effort to distance himself from his CDU party predecessor Angela Merkel, who didn’t acknowledge the migrant crisis.
Utilizing human trafficking, Russian intelligence has sent tens of thousands of migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Africa to the borders of Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, and Finland in an effort to destabilize their borders and overwhelm Europe’s social services via hybrid warfare. The failure of the European Union and NATO to reinforce the Eastern and Northern flanks arguably emboldened Russian hybrid warfare activities as seen today.
Pushing Past the Pinnacle of Complacency and Fear
Amidst changes in the U.S. national defense strategy, with a more disengaged approach from the NATO administration compared to past American presidents, Europe can and should immediately set the tone on both helping Ukraine win the war and simultaneously enacting deterrence contingencies against Russia.
First, European politicians should be more transparent and open to their constituents about the fact that they are in a state of hybrid and informational warfare. If aerial provocations continue without a response, the odds of armed conflict increase even further.
Second, in a state of recruiting shortages, some European countries will likely need to reintroduce limited to full conscription. Instilling professional values, national pride, and the importance of civil service, as exemplified by the Finnish conscription model, should be the standard for all European nations.
Third, strategic autonomy and the ability to act collectively are crucial for European NATO members. As stated by Ret. Colonel Robert Hamilton in his recent War on the Rocks publication, NATO Article 5 does not guarantee all member states will consider an attack on any country’s territory as an attack on all, unless American intervention comes, which Russia could take advantage of. Putting aside all differences and openly making doctrines that an attack on one is an act of war on all needs to become a true doctrinal clause on the continent.
Lastly, armed confrontation may be inevitable as Putin historically escalates at the sight of fear and complacency but backs down if shown strength akin to the Battle of Khasham and the Turkish SU-24 shootdown.
The winds of change have approached Europe, for which the continent now needs a unified and autonomous approach to threats from Russia, as its major backer, the United States, now has its own interests to consider. Nevertheless, if Europe continues bolstering Ukraine towards a favorable outcome, along with strengthening its critical flanks, it can create enough deterrence to make the Kremlin think twice.
Europe has the Capabilities but Lacks Political Will to Deter Russia
During the late summer and autumn of 2025, the Russian Federation has intensified its provocations towards European countries, which could escalate into armed confrontations.
