The current phase of thaw in India-China relations can be traced back to 23 October 2024, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. This was their first meeting in five years, a period marked by military standoff along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which was ‘resolved’ just days ahead of the summit by finalizing a new arrangement for border patrols. Thus, the groundwork for a leaders’ meeting was laid before the two sides sought to bury the hatchet. A similar pattern is unfolding ahead of the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) leaders’ summit, scheduled for later this year in Tianjin, China.
Finding common ground
India and China happen to find common ground in the Global South through a number of multilateral platforms such as BRICS, the SCO, and the G20, which are positioned as counterweights to the largely Western-led international order. Following the Kazan reset, India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval travelled to Beijing in December 2024 to take part in the India-China Special Representatives’ (SR) talks with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. Come 2025, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri traveled to Beijing in January, and both sides agreed on the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage, the sharing of hydrological data, people-to-people exchanges, and direct air services ‘in principle.’ As a reciprocal gesture, China’s Vice Foreign Minister and former Ambassador to India Sun Weidong visited India in June and reaffirmed earlier understandings.
Notably, both countries observed the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties on April 1, 2025, and exchanged congratulatory messages. President Xi used the emblematic metaphor “Dragon-Elephant tango” to symbolize the improving relations, stating that the two sides should find ways to coexist peacefully, and expressed his willingness to deepen communication and coordination. A month before, in March, while speaking at a press conference in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke of a ‘cooperative pas de deux’ as the only right choice for both sides. In the same month, a PLA spokesperson indicated the implementation of a ‘fair and just solution’ on the border issue.
Meanwhile, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was asked about China on a podcast show in March, earlier this year, he said, “… occasional disagreements are bound to happen. But our focus is to ensure that these differences don’t turn into disputes … Only through dialogue can we build a stable cooperative relationship that serves the best interests of both nations. Since the 21st century is Asia’s century, we want India and China to compete in a healthy and natural way. Competition is not a bad thing, but it should never turn into conflict…” This statement was soon appreciated by the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson during a press briefing.
A third-party spoiler
Following these positive developments, India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh travelled to Qingdao, China, in June for SCO ministerial meetings, during which the Indian side proposed a four-point plan to prevent further tensions: honoring the 2024 disengagement agreement, pursuing de-escalation, fast-tracking boundary demarcation, and bridging the trust deficit.
However, the Indian Defense Minister refused to sign the SCO joint declaration because it omitted any reference to the April terrorist attack in India’s Pahalgam while choosing to include a mention of Pakistan’s Baluchistan, which New Delhi interpreted as a veiled accusation echoing Islamabad’s line. One of the key objectives of the SCO is to promote cooperation among member states in tackling terrorism. Yet under China’s current presidency, given its ‘all-weather’ partnership with Pakistan, India’s concerns appear to have been deliberately sidelined. The SCO foreign ministers are now expected to meet in July, before the leaders’ summit in late August.
In another instance, during the four-day India-Pakistan conflict in May this year, the Chinese side made it clear that it will continue to stand by Pakistan in upholding its sovereignty, a stance reiterated again and again, although it is not surprising for New Delhi. Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif confirmed that it’s normal for Beijing to share intelligence on India with Islamabad. There were also unconfirmed reports of Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied jets shooting down India’s aircraft during the conflict. China is already a major supplier of military hardware to Pakistan, including missiles, fighter jets, submarines, and surveillance equipment. A SIPRI report in March 2025 notes that China is the source of nearly 81 percent of Pakistan’s arms imports in the last five years.
Persisting concerns
Despite positive steps in bilateral diplomacy, both India and China continue to maintain troop deployments on their respective sides of the LAC. India also remains part of groupings often viewed as “anti-China,” the Quad in particular, which also includes the U.S., Australia, and Japan. In fact, India is set to host the Quad leaders’ summit later this year and is strengthening ties with the U.S. and the West on both economic and defense fronts.
There is also a persistent concern in India over China-led multi-billion-dollar projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which is now set to be extended to Afghanistan. Meanwhile, China’s hosting of the first-ever trilateral meeting with Pakistan and Bangladesh in June signals its clear intent to institutionalize regional groupings that exclude India, capitalizing on the decade-long vacuum in South Asian economic integration created by India-Pakistan hostility. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to expand its maritime presence by developing port infrastructure across the Indian Ocean region, where China’s allegedly “spy” ships visited more than once under the guise of research.
On the economic front, China remains India’s largest trading partner, yet it is marked by a significant trade deficit for the latter, approaching $100 billion. China continues to be a major source of India’s industrial imports, particularly electronics, machinery, and intermediate goods, while Indian exports face non-tariff barriers that restrict even competitive goods from entering the Chinese market. India’s relaxation of investment rules and the streamlining of short-term visas for Chinese technicians in 2024 reflect a pragmatic attempt to balance security concerns with underlying economic realities.
Way Forward
Minimizing the trust deficit between the two nuclear-armed neighbors requires sustained, multi-level engagement and clear signaling that neither side poses a threat to the other. China views the U.S. and its Pacific allies as its primary strategic challenge, not India. Antagonizing New Delhi risks driving it closer to Washington, which already considers the former as key in its Indo-Pacific strategy, notwithstanding its long-cherished strategic autonomy. Moreover, hostility could harm China economically, given India’s huge market size, and undermine its position in the Global South. Confidence-building measures operationalized since the 1990s and the current diplomatic engagements should be effectively leveraged to keep strategic competition in check, where both countries benefit from mutual cooperation.
