The securitization of cyberspace has become an inescapable feature of contemporary governance. In many states, cybersecurity is no longer confined to specialized technical agencies or intelligence services. It has evolved into a broad concern involving multiple institutional actors operating across sectors and administrative levels. In Indonesia, the escalation of cyber threats—ranging from data breaches and financial fraud to hacktivism and digital disinformation—has prompted both legal and institutional responses aimed at enhancing state capacity in cyberspace.
Against this backdrop, in September 2024, the Indonesian National Police (Polri) inaugurated eight regional Cyber Crime Directorates (Direktorat Siber) of provincial police commands (Polda) in North Sumatra, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java, Bali, Central Sulawesi, and Papua. This institutional innovation represents an attempt to redistribute cybersecurity functions from the national center to the periphery, aligning with broader reforms in decentralized governance.
Yet, despite its potential, the institutionalization of cyber governance at the regional level introduces a range of complex challenges. This article critically assesses these dynamics through an institutional lens, highlighting both the strategic rationales behind decentralization and the structural constraints that may undermine its effectiveness.
The Logic of Decentralizing Cybersecurity Functions
The central government’s decision to delegate cyber policing responsibilities to provincial units reflects an evolving understanding of cyber threats as both globally interconnected and locally rooted. This move signals a shift from a unitary model of cybersecurity governance—centered in Jakarta and managed primarily by elite units at Mabes Polri and BSSN—toward a more distributed model that recognizes the need for region-specific responses.
The establishment of regional cyber directorates is consistent with the theoretical framework of multi-level security governance, which posits that effective security provision in complex systems requires coordination across levels of authority. Within this framework, the regionalization of cyber functions is intended not only to improve institutional responsiveness and local threat detection but also to foster greater ownership of cybersecurity at the subnational level.
However, the institutionalization of such functions at the provincial level cannot be presumed to produce immediate functional capacity. Decentralization, in this case, is not merely a technical matter of administrative restructuring but a deeply political and institutional process that requires sustained investments in organizational learning, personnel development, and infrastructural support.
Institutional Capacity and Structural Asymmetries
The concept of institutional capacity is central to understanding the viability of regional cyber directorates. Institutional capacity refers to the ability of an organization to formulate and implement policy effectively, based on adequate human resources, technological competence, and internal coordination. While the creation of new directorates may reflect institutional ambition, it does not automatically translate into operational effectiveness.
Indonesia’s regional police commands have historically faced limitations in specialized human capital, particularly in fields requiring technical expertise. Cybercrime investigation demands skills in digital forensics, cryptography, malware analysis, and transnational cooperation—capacities that are not evenly distributed across Indonesia’s provinces. In practice, many Polda units remain dependent on personnel rotation from the center or ad hoc training programs that are insufficient to meet the demands of a dynamic threat environment.
Moreover, institutional performance in the cyber domain is not only a matter of individual skill sets but also of organizational structure and culture. Hierarchical decision-making, rigid standard operating procedures, and siloed communication channels frequently hinder adaptive responses. Without institutional reforms that allow for greater flexibility and inter-unit collaboration, the regional directorates risk becoming nominal entities with limited strategic relevance.
Adaptive Governance and the Limits of Bureaucratic Reform
The proliferation of cyber threats requires what the literature refers to as adaptive governance: the capacity of institutions to respond flexibly to uncertainty, learn from experience, and adjust organizational practices to changing environments. In contrast to rigid bureaucratic models, adaptive governance encourages decentralized decision-making, real-time learning, and multi-stakeholder engagement.
In theory, the regionalization of cybersecurity functions could support adaptive governance by enabling more context-specific responses and shortening the chain of command in crisis situations. However, in the Indonesian context, law enforcement institutions remain heavily centralized in practice, with regional units often operating within narrowly defined mandates and subject to considerable oversight from national authorities. As a result, the potential for adaptive behavior is structurally constrained.
Furthermore, adaptive governance in the cyber domain presupposes a willingness to engage with non-state actors, including the private sector, academia, and civil society. At the regional level, such engagement is often underdeveloped, hindered by a lack of institutional trust, political patronage dynamics, or simple resource scarcity. Without cultivating collaborative networks, the regional cyber directorates are unlikely to generate the kind of anticipatory and preventive capacity that modern cyber governance requires.
Political-Geographical Implications and Strategic Rationales
The selection of regions for the initial rollout of cyber directorates reveals strategic considerations beyond mere institutional logic. Provinces such as Jakarta, West Java, and East Java represent high-density digital economies and are logical targets for cyber infrastructure. The inclusion of Bali reflects the island’s prominence as a global tourist and business hub, where digital crimes—including online fraud, identity theft, and ransomware attacks—are on the rise.
Conversely, the inclusion of Central Sulawesi and Papua indicates a securitization logic that intersects with political and ethnic contestations. These regions have historically been framed as peripheral and security-sensitive, and the extension of cyber governance infrastructure into these areas may serve dual purposes: to enhance cyber resilience and to reinforce state presence through digital surveillance and policing. This reinforces the need to critically assess the power dynamics and political geographies embedded within institutional design.
Conclusion
The institutionalization of regional cyber directorates by Polri marks an important milestone in Indonesia’s effort to construct a resilient and distributed cybersecurity regime. While the move signals a normative commitment to enhancing cyber governance capacity beyond the capital, its success will ultimately depend on the ability of the state to address persistent institutional constraints at the regional level.
To realize the transformative potential of this initiative, several imperatives must be addressed. First, substantial investment in capacity building is required, including long-term professional development programs, partnerships with universities, and improved retention of cyber talent within public institutions. Second, bureaucratic structures must be reformed to allow for greater operational flexibility and decentralization. Third, mechanisms for adaptive and collaborative governance should be institutionalized through formalized channels of engagement with local stakeholders, including civil society and private sector actors.
In the absence of these reforms, the regionalization of cybersecurity risks becoming a performative exercise, reinforcing existing hierarchies rather than redistributing meaningful capacity. A coherent, inclusive, and adaptive institutional architecture is therefore essential to safeguarding Indonesia’s digital sovereignty in an era of proliferating cyber risks.
