The most recent meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors has unfolded at a time of mounting political and psychological pressure on Iran. This pressure coincides with a convergence of several significant developments: the impending expiration of provisions under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which some view as Europe’s final window to trigger the snapback mechanism; mounting domestic economic and political challenges within Iran; and a perceived decline in Iran’s regional deterrence posture. Together, these factors have created conditions that external actors appear poised to exploit in hopes of extracting concessions from Tehran.
Despite shared interest in shaping the outcome of Iran’s nuclear trajectory, the United States, Europe, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are operating with divergent motivations. Washington appears to be pursuing a resolution that maximizes diplomatic leverage, particularly in securing constraints on uranium enrichment. Although U.S. officials likely understand that a demand for zero-percent enrichment lacks both legal legitimacy and practical feasibility under the NPT, the current geopolitical climate offers an opportunity to press for more favorable terms. This effort is also informed by wider strategic considerations, including protracted conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza and growing competition with China. An agreement with Iran, even a limited one, could serve as a meaningful foreign policy achievement amid these other unresolved challenges.
European actors, meanwhile, seem intent on reasserting their relevance after being sidelined following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. For Europe, increasing pressure on Iran is not only a matter of nonproliferation but also a way to reaffirm its diplomatic agency in a field where transatlantic coordination has been uneven. By leveraging the timing of Resolution 2231 and Iran’s current vulnerabilities, European states may hope to influence the negotiating agenda and preserve their role as serious interlocutors in any future nuclear framework.
Complicating this diplomatic picture is the role of the IAEA, which, though formally a technical and impartial body, has become increasingly visible in the political arena. Under the leadership of Director General Rafael Grossi, the agency has received both commendation for its vigilance and criticism for perceived politicization. In particular, Iranian officials and analysts have expressed concern that the agency’s focus on past issues—such as uranium traces found at undeclared locations—has come at the expense of a more forward-looking technical engagement. Although the IAEA is operating within its mandate, the optics of its actions have contributed to a perception among Iranian officials that political calculations may be shaping its assessments.
Part of this perception stems from the agency’s media strategy and public statements. Critics in Tehran argue that Grossi’s frequent media engagements, rather than adhering to the traditionally reserved posture of technical oversight bodies, have contributed to an environment of distrust. They contend that such visibility, particularly in politically sensitive moments, may compromise the perception of neutrality and even risk exposing sensitive information. Iran’s Permanent Mission in Vienna has already lodged objections regarding the content and dissemination of recent IAEA reports, arguing that the agency’s reporting has occasionally omitted acknowledgment of Iran’s cooperation and instead presented a skewed narrative that aligns more closely with political than technical judgments.
Iran, for its part, continues to assert that its nuclear program remains within the bounds of international law, pointing to provisions in the JCPOA, Article IV of the NPT, and customary legal principles as guarantees of its right to peaceful nuclear enrichment. Iranian officials emphasize that the country is currently the most heavily monitored by the IAEA, and yet, in their view, this cooperation is not reflected adequately in the agency’s evaluations. Such sentiments have contributed to a growing sense in Tehran that the nuclear issue is being instrumentalized for political gain.
Against this backdrop, the potential adoption of a new resolution by the Board of Governors becomes a critical variable. A harsh resolution could provoke a spectrum of Iranian responses, ranging from reductions in transparency and IAEA access to more consequential steps such as reconsidering the scope of safeguards commitments or even initiating discussions about continued participation in the NPT. Conversely, a more measured resolution—such as one recommending enhanced cooperation—may serve to preserve diplomatic channels and avoid triggering a cycle of escalation. In this sense, the language and tone of any resolution will significantly shape Tehran’s options and its appetite for continued engagement.
This is particularly relevant in light of the ongoing, albeit indirect, dialogue between Iran and the United States. Despite tensions, the negotiation track has not collapsed, and Iran is currently reviewing proposals from the U.S. as part of a broader diplomatic effort. However, these proposals reportedly contain elements—especially in the area of enrichment—that Tehran views as incompatible with its legal entitlements and strategic interests. While Iran has not formally rejected these proposals, its response may hinge in part on the outcome of the Board of Governors meeting and the broader geopolitical environment, including U.S. domestic uncertainty and heightened tensions with other global actors.
Persistent technical disagreements further complicate the landscape. The IAEA continues to emphasize unresolved issues related to undeclared nuclear activity at sites including Turquzabad, Varamin, and Lavizan. Iran maintains that it has already provided sufficient documentation and facilitated inspections and sees the continued focus on these cases as indicative of the agency’s unwillingness to close files. This disconnect reflects deeper structural challenges: while the IAEA insists on procedural thoroughness, Iranian officials increasingly view the process as politically driven and unresponsive to their explanations.
Additionally, Iran’s gradual reduction of JCPOA commitments in response to the U.S. withdrawal followed a phased and legally articulated strategy. While the initial steps received muted reactions from Europe and the agency, the fifth phase became a flashpoint. From Tehran’s perspective, this escalation was a justified reaction to the failure of other signatories to fulfill their obligations. However, the failure to resolve disputes stemming from this final phase has entrenched mistrust and reinforced the adversarial tone of current exchanges.
In this broader context, any efforts to reopen previously addressed issues, especially at the insistence of states pressing for new concessions, may be interpreted by Tehran as driven more by political than technical imperatives. Whether this is an accurate assessment or not, such perceptions inform Iran’s policy calculus and its willingness to engage with external actors. The likely outcome of the Board of Governors meeting, therefore, is of considerable significance. A narrowly framed, non-escalatory resolution could maintain a fragile diplomatic balance. On the other hand, a more confrontational stance may not only reduce transparency but also further complicate the negotiation track with the United States.
Ultimately, the dynamics surrounding Iran’s nuclear program underscore the difficulty of separating technical oversight from geopolitical considerations. The interplay between strategic interests, domestic political pressures, and institutional behavior continues to define this protracted dossier. A realist perspective would suggest that maintaining diplomatic space and emphasizing verifiable, mutually acceptable arrangements may offer the most viable path forward, not only to avoid escalation but also to reinforce the credibility of international nuclear governance at a time of growing global instability.
