At this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth sent mixed signals. On one hand, he emphasized that China is the biggest threat in the Indo-Pacific region, asserting that the U.S. is a regional power and will not leave. On the other hand, he pledged that the U.S. does not seek to encircle China, change its regime, or act recklessly.
Although China’s defense minister did not attend the dialogue, Hegseth warned China that “any attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion” is “unacceptable.”
The paradox is this: if the US does not seek to encircle China, how can it deal with “the biggest threat in the Indo-Pacific region”?
Hegseth seems to have retained a belligerent posture of mere verbal intimidation, abandoning his operational preparedness. Instead, he urged regional countries to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP to counter military threats in the region—a move unlikely to be welcomed by Indo-Pacific nations.
The reason Indo-Pacific countries value the U.S. presence is, to some extent, the hope that the U.S. military can ensure they do not need to heavily invest in security. If the U.S., at a time when the regional military balance is disrupted, is unwilling to actively contain China on the security front and instead demands that regional nations increase defense spending, does this signal a U.S. intent to withdraw from the region?
Following the MAGA logic on European defense, the U.S. should not over-invest in NATO, and European countries should increase military spending to defend themselves. Indo-Pacific nations are not surprised by Hegseth’s similar remarks in Asia.
The problem is, if the U.S. no longer serves as the engine driving economic growth for these countries, where will they find surplus revenue to invest in security? This is why, to Beijing, U.S. deterrence has become clichéd. The increasingly asymmetric gap between harsh rhetoric and actual actions only pushes Indo-Pacific nations to adapt to the presence of a new regional power.
The goal of a deterrence strategy is to make adversaries recognize the high cost of war, deterring them from initiating conflict. In the Indo-Pacific, far from U.S. soil, the only way to raise the cost of war is to surround the adversary with credible and powerful firepower. The U.S. is no longer capable of doing this—or even willing to invest in it—opting instead to urge China’s neighbors to buy various U.S. weapons to achieve deterrence.
However, in practice, only the Philippines, which follows U.S. directives, faces direct threats from China. Although China’s defense minister skipped the Shangri-La Dialogue, China deployed two long-range strategic bombers (H-6) to Yongxing Island in the South China Sea before the event.
Analyzing the relationship between these weapons and their geographic positioning, the H-6 bombers target the U.S. Typhon mid-range missile system on Luzon Island in the Philippines and U.S. carrier strike groups.
Strategic bombers do not operate alone. Supporting the H-6 are military assets like the KJ-500 early warning aircraft and Type 052D and Type 055 missile destroyers at sea. If Beijing launches a surprise attack on Taiwan, the Typhon missiles on Luzon and U.S. supply ships would be closely monitored by the H-6 strike group, making it difficult for U.S. carrier groups to move from the South China Sea or Philippine Sea to the Taiwan Strait for combat or deterrence.
This means that if the Philippines allows U.S. forces to intervene in a Taiwan conflict from its southern flank, Luzon would face bombardment from Beijing. Unlike the U.S.’s verbal deterrence, China demonstrates credible and powerful firepower for deterrence of the Philippines and the U.S.
Two recent conflicts have drawn widespread attention: first, the U.S. military’s high-intensity operations in the Red Sea, using advanced equipment against Houthi forces, only to face asymmetric counterattacks and withdraw hastily; second, India’s loss of its advanced French Rafale jets to Pakistan’s Chinese-made weapon systems.
These conflicts demonstrate that advanced weapons are not a guaranteed path to victory, that China’s weapon systems are proven effective, and that armies with geographic advantages are difficult to defeat in non-annihilation warfare.
In the Indo-Pacific, the only scenario likely to draw both the U.S. and China into conflict is a Taiwan Strait war. Even if the U.S. is willing to intervene, it is hard to imagine the U.S. aiming to annihilate Chinese forces. Beyond China’s military capabilities, Beijing holds a geographic advantage, and the distant U.S. lacks the conditions to wage an annihilation war.
As the objective situation is unfavorable to the U.S., the U.S. is now eager to build a collective defense in the Indo-Pacific region and intends to use the alliance to call on Australia, Japan, and the Philippines to join the U.S. military to form a defense network aimed at deterrence. However, no collective defense organization on Earth is likely as tight-knit as NATO, and the adversaries faced by Australia, Japan, and the Philippines are far stronger than Russia. Thus, this strategic intent is unlikely to materialize.
For Indo-Pacific nations, MAGA’s non-interventionist stance clashes with the interventionist approach of traditional U.S. hawks, making Hegseth’s rhetoric seem illogical.
According to the U.S. think tank CNAS, in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict, countries beyond the U.S. and China fall into four categories: first, treaty allies and geographic frontline states like Japan and the Philippines; second, close allies like South Korea, Australia, and India; third, Southeast Asian nations excluding the Philippines; and fourth, Europe and developing countries.
Globally, only Japan and the Philippines might participate in a conflict, but only if the U.S. military stands on the front line, with Tokyo and Manila playing logistical and intelligence roles. If Taiwan does not engage in intense fighting and the U.S. does not intervene on a large scale, no country will join a Taiwan Strait war.
The U.S. military’s willingness to be on the front lines against China is predicated on Taiwan’s ability to fight a protracted war of Ukrainian proportions and China’s loss of air and sea control.
U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Paparo has recently issued repeated warnings, noting that the depth and breadth of Chinese military exercises are changing at an alarming pace, suggesting that China is not merely conducting drills but rehearsing, ready to shift to war at any moment.
Paparo assesses that only by disabling China’s radar stations, missile launchers, and command centers can the U.S. or its allies gain the upper hand. Yet, the reality is that the U.S. failed to prevail against Houthi forces in the Red Sea.
In summary, the signals sent by Hegseth are likely to be ignored by Indo-Pacific nations or seen as a ploy to get regional countries to buy U.S. weapons. The real problem may lie in the fact that, just as India bought Rafale fighters without integrating a complete combat system, Indo-Pacific countries buying US weapons may receive incomplete systems, leading to hesitation or demands for price reductions.
Indonesia’s deputy defense minister recently indicated that the country is evaluating the purchase of Chinese J-10 fighters, reflecting the impact of Pakistan’s J-10s downing French Rafale jets, which is shifting the arms procurement market.
Chinese public opinion largely views Indonesia’s move as a tactic to negotiate lower prices with France and the U.S.—Rafale jets cost 2.5 times more than J-10s, and the U.S. F-15EX is nearly twice as expensive—France is persuading Indonesia to buy more Rafales, while the U.S. is negotiating the final price for 24 F-15EX jets.
The Indo-Pakistani conflict has reminded many international buyers that if they buy fighter jets but lack the capability to fight in a systematic way, they will end up like India, where a single failure can seriously damage the country’s dignity.
Under geopolitical considerations, many Asian countries procure weapons from multiple sources. For example, India buys jets from France, radars and early warning systems from Israel, and air defense systems from Russia, resulting in a patchwork combat system that struggles to counter Pakistan’s integrated Chinese systems.
In other words, if Indonesia buys jets from France or the U.S., it must reconsider combat system integration, which requires securing lower jet prices to afford complete systems. The bigger question is whether the U.S., intent on building a deterrence network in the Indo-Pacific, is willing to provide complete combat systems to regional countries.
For a non-aligned country like Indonesia, the U.S. is typically unwilling to provide highly sensitive complete weapon systems. This is why Chinese integrated combat systems, even if less advanced, are gaining popularity in the market.
Thus, the U.S.’s ambition to build a deterrence network in the Indo-Pacific while promoting arms sales faces a key challenge: when Indo-Pacific nations demand complete weapon systems, will Washington sell? If Washington doesn’t, but Beijing does, how can deterrence be achieved?
This underscores the validity of U.S. concerns about China’s rise, as Beijing not only alters global economic and military dynamics but also concretely undermines U.S. arms sales. If Washington relies solely on allies increasing defense budgets for deterrence, the challenge will only grow. No country is willing to stand on the front line to take bullets for the U.S., and even those willing to provide rear support are dwindling.
When deterrence is reduced to rhetoric and paper-based weapon specs, the U.S.’s ability to convince others of its presence in the Indo-Pacific will only decline, along with its arms orders.
Hegseth’s failure to commit to defending Taiwan says it all.
