Formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – the Iran nuclear deal was once hailed as a pillar of international nuclear non-proliferation – but it is currently in a precarious position. A new diplomatic effort is evident in the recent indirect negotiations between the Washington DC and Tehran, which were held in Muscat, Oman. However, even with this cautious diplomatic thaw, the chances of reviving the agreement are still hampered by long-standing mistrust, regional power struggles, and domestic political pressures.
The JCPOA’s Origins and Demise
The European Union acted as a mediator in the July 2015 conclusion of the JCPOA between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers (China, Russia, France, Germany, the UK, the United and the US). In exchange for reducing its nuclear programme and permitting thorough inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the deal offered Iran relief from international sanctions.
Numerous economic sanctions were lifted after the IAEA verified Iran’s compliance in January 2016. The agreement gave international observers previously unheard-of access to Iranian nuclear sites and drastically reduced Iran’s capacity for uranium enrichment.
Nevertheless, the JCPOA’s stability was short-lived. The United States withdrew from the deal in May 2018 due to concerns about Iran’s missile programme, regional activities, and the agreement’s sunset clauses, which were cited by then-President Donald J. Trump. After that, the Trump administration reinstituted broad sanctions against Tehran, focussed especially on its financial and oil export industries. In retaliation, Tehran responded by gradually breaking the terms of the deal by enriching uranium above agreed-upon levels and decreasing its collaboration with the IAEA.
The Precarious Resumption in Muscat
Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi of Oman acted as a mediator when indirect US-Iran talks resumed in Muscat in April 2024 following years of diplomatic silence. Growing regional instability, such as the devastating Israeli bombardment of Gaza and Iran’s increasing involvement with militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, coincided with this diplomatic opening.
The tenacity of these predominantly exploratory talks was to determine whether larger negotiations were feasible – if both sides revealed political will – a renewed agreement was possible, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi emphasised. Nonetheless, the fifth round of talks constructed no concrete outcomes.
The Negative Impact of Local Rivalries
Every effort to revitalise the JCPOA must take into account the altered geo-political landscape. A comprehensive agreement is complicated by Iran’s strategic alliances (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and various Shia militias in Iraq). These ties have strengthened the status of Iran in the region while also further isolating it, especially from the Gulf States and Israel.
Both the Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – who were not parties to the 2015 agreement – have now become more forthright in their calls for a more ample deal that takes into account Tehran’s proxy operations and ballistic missile programme. Israel was tenaciously against the original JCPOA, but the changing stance of Riyadh is especially crucial because it reflects a wider regional agreement that a sturdier and more enforceable agenda is prerequisite.
Domestic Pressures on Tehran and Washington
The condition is further problematic by the internal political dynamics in Iran – because of years of US pressure and the apparent failure of moderate diplomacy – the hardlines establishment was still very suspicious of the US intentions. Although sanctions have had a substantial negative economic impact, the leadership has enticed this destitution as a story of national resistance, making compromises politically costly.
On the other hand, the Biden administration is up against bipartisan domestic opposition despite its rhetorical commitment to reviving the JCPOA. Any interaction with Tehran was politically delicate because of the 2024 presidential elections. Republicans still call the agreement naive, and some Democrats even call for a more aggressive approach to Iran’s regional actions.
A New Deal or an Interim?
It seems implausible that the JCPOA will be fully restored in the near future due to the deeply held positions on both sides. Analysts proposition a more measured strategy instead: a limited deal that might provide Tehran with some sanctions’ relief in return for a halt or reduction in its nuclear programme.
Such a temporary agreement, sometimes known as a ‘less for less’ bargain, perhaps used to boost confidence and set the stage for longer-term talks. The accomplishment of even this modest objective, however, hinges on both parties making a firm commitment to put diplomacy ahead of all-out demands.
Stakeholders in Europe and International Mediation
The European Union continues to endorse diplomatic engagement – having historically played a significant mediating role – particularly, France and Germany have advocated for the revitalisation of the JCPOA agenda while addressing its limitations. The ineffectiveness of the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) to protect Iran from secondary sanctions imposed by the United States confines their influence, despite their unrelenting commitment to thwarting nuclear proliferation.
Despite presumably supporting Tehran, China and Russia have their own strategic concerns – although Iran is seen by both nations as a valuable counterbalance to Western influence – neither is willing to risk wider geopolitical interests for Tehran’s benefit. The Iranian nuclear hold-up has lost international attention as a result of Beijing’s economic priorities and Moscow’s war in Ukraine.
Realities of the Economy and Strategic Patience
The Iranian economy is still in a terrible position, suffering from high unemployment, inflation, and a declining value of the currency. Oil earnings have been choked by sanctions, and access to global financial systems has been restricted. Nonetheless, Tehran has demonstrated strategic patience by strengthening its connections with China and Russia and increasingly using unofficial trade routes.
The leadership of the Islamic Republic is poised to withstand pressure from the West, particularly as the world’s energy markets adjust to the post-Ukraine environment. Despite the acute economic hitch, this sense of resilience makes diplomatic leverage more difficult and makes a breakthrough more challenging.
The Role of Regional Proxy Dynamics
It is impossible to isolate Iran’s nuclear programme from its overall regional strategy. It is still controversial for Tehran to back non-state actors – such as the Houthis in Yemen or Hezbollah in Lebanon – any agreement, according to the United States and its allies, that does not stop Tehran’s regional aspirations is insufficient. But in its geo-political calculations, Iran sees these alliances as strategic imperatives and negotiating chips.
Conclusion: A Difficult Yet Necessary Way Forward
The complicated relationship between domestic politics, regional rivalries, and international diplomacy is embodied in the Iran nuclear dilemma. Although recent talks in Oman have given people new hope – they also highlight the difficult obstacles that still need to be overcome – there is still a long way to go before the JCPOA is revitalised or a new, more inclusive deal is droughted.
The only credible way to stop nuclear proliferation and avoid another Middle East crisis is still through diplomacy. However – realism – respect for one another . . . and a sincere desire to compromise are necessary for diplomacy to be successful. A military conflict or Iran with nuclear weapons would be disastrous for regional and international security although it would balance Israel regional hegemony, and the stakes are too high to fail.
Achieving a long-lasting deal in the current geo-political scenario will necessitate a re-evaluation of expectations, reliable multilateral engagement, and a mutual understanding that ‘peace is valued even though it is brittle’.
