In December 2024, history recorded the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria when Russian support should have been at its peak. Over the past three years, Moscow confidently implemented a new strategy in Syria by replacing regular troops with the Wagner Group and securing influence through economic investment. In fact, this decision backfired and accelerated the destruction of its long-time ally.
As we know, Russia occupies the unique position of having a historically close relationship with Syria dating back to the Cold War era. This relationship has been rooted in military and economic cooperation since the reign of Hafez Al-Assad. One of the strongest symbols of such cooperation is the Russian naval base in Tartus, the only Russian military facility abroad that provides strategic access to the Mediterranean Sea. Russia views Syria as a key ally in the Middle East and an important foothold in maintaining its global influence. Since its formal military intervention in 2015, Russia has played a crucial role in maintaining the survival of the Al-Assad regime. Through air operations, arms support, military training, and logistical assistance, Russia helped government forces retake vital areas such as Aleppo (2016) and control more than 60% of the national territory by 2020.
However, the period 2021-2024 saw a significant transformation in the pattern of Russian intervention. Two important developments characterize this period. First, the implementation of the Caesar Act by the United States in 2020 had a major impact on the Syrian economy. These sanctions drastically cut Syria’s foreign exchange reserves, worsening economic conditions and increasing the regime’s dependence on foreign aid, particularly from Russia and Iran. Second, the 2021 Syrian presidential election, which was widely viewed as non-inclusive and undemocratic by the international community, nevertheless received full support from Russia. This indicates that Russia is not only a military protector of Al-Assad but also a political legitimizer of his continued rule.
The biggest transformation came after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Within months of the invasion, Western intelligence reports recorded the withdrawal of more than 30 percent of Russian troops from Syria, including elite units and advanced weapons systems such as the S-300 that were diverted to Ukraine. This shift changed the character of Russia’s intervention in Syria from direct military dominance to an economic and diplomacy-based approach. Russia began to rely on non-state actors such as the Wagner Group to maintain security stability in strategic areas, as well as strengthen control over vital economic sectors as a form of long-term influence. At the same time, the reduction of military presence does not necessarily reduce Russia’s involvement in determining the direction of policy and the reconstruction process in Syria.
Conflict Intelligence Team data (2023) reveals how drastic this change has been. By the end of 2023, Russia had withdrawn around 60% of its combat troops from Syria, leaving only a small framework to defend the regime. The Wagner Group, relied upon as a replacement, was overwhelmed by the dual mission of securing the oil fields while maintaining political stability. ‘It’s like hiring market thugs to perform the functions of a national army,’ a Western diplomat in Beirut told Middle East Eye. Moreover, the port of Tartus, a symbol of Russia’s Mediterranean ambitions, is a clear example of the failure of this change in strategy. Despite controlling a 49% stake, Russian investment is only able to operate 40% of the port’s capacity (BBC Monitoring, 2024). Infrastructure projects worth billions of dollars are abandoned, while Russian companies prefer to do business in the more profitable Africa. ‘They left Syria like traders fleeing a burning market,’ said Carnegie Endowment analysts.
The crisis reached its peak when the Wagner Group, which lost 70 percent of its personnel as it was diverted to Ukraine and Africa, began abandoning key posts in eastern Syria. Without adequate pay, local militias that had been loyal turned against the regime. Large demonstrations erupted again in Daraa, the same city where the 2011 uprising began, spreading quickly to Damascus and Aleppo. Surprisingly, the Syrian Army’s 4th Division—an elite force led by Bashar Al-Assad’s own younger brother—refused to fire on the protesters. Russia’s half-hearted response was the final nail in the coffin of the Al-Assad regime. Instead of sending major reinforcements, Moscow only brought in 500 special forces to secure the Tartus base. This decision reflects Putin’s dilemma of defending Syria or saving his position in Ukraine. ‘It’s a choice between losing face or losing lives,’ commented a Russian military analyst who declined to be named.
The collapse of the Assad regime left valuable lessons for global politics. First, the ‘shadow war’ strategy of relying on non-state actors has clear limits. Second, economic control cannot replace a solid military presence. Third, authoritarian regimes that rely on foreign patrons will eventually collapse when the patrons experience internal crises. Now, Syria is entering a new phase that is no less bleak. Without a strong central regime, the country may fragment further. Meanwhile, Russia, having lost its last strategic base in the Mediterranean, must face the harsh reality that overreaching geopolitical ambitions with limited resources will eventually lead to failure. For the West, this is proof that strategic patience and well-targeted sanctions can ultimately pay off.
The collapse of the Al-Assad regime mirrored the failure of Russia’s geopolitical strategy in the modern era. Overconfident in its ‘shadow war’ approach through the Wagner Group and economic control, Moscow failed to recognize the fundamental fragility of its own allies. The Syrian case proves that in international politics, there is no effective substitute for direct military presence and sustained political commitment. For the West, this event provides a valuable lesson on the effectiveness of measured sanctions and strategic patience, although this victory is bittersweet given Syria’s current divided state. For Russia, the loss of the Tartus base is not just a tactical setback but a slap in the face to its global ambitions amid protracted engagement in Ukraine. Most worryingly, this collapse may set a precedent for other authoritarian regimes dependent on foreign patronage as a reminder that in international politics, there are no lasting friendships, only lasting interests. Now, the world must brace itself for a volatile new phase in the Middle East, asking, will Russia’s failure in Syria trigger a major shift in the global power map or be the start of a wider and more dangerous conflict?
