On the night of March 31 to April 1, 2025, the Algerian Ministry of Defense announced that it had shot down a Turkish Bayraktar Akıncı drone used by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). According to the communiqué, the aircraft had penetrated two kilometers into Algerian territory, violating national airspace.
The very next day, the Malian authorities reacted by denying this version. They claimed that the drone had been shot down not on Algerian territory, but over Malian soil. In protest, Bamako recalled its ambassador to Algiers for consultation, and the ruling juntas in Burkina Faso and Niger followed suit. These recalls marked the opening of a new phase of tension between Algeria and its Sahelian neighbors.
Algiers, from indispensable intermediary to contested voice
The coups d’état in Mali in 2020 and 2021 have deeply damaged relations between Algiers and Bamako. The arrival in power of the Malian junta, followed by the gradual withdrawal from the 2015 Algiers Agreements process, directly weakened Algeria’s traditional role as mediator in the region. These agreements, which had made it possible to initiate a dialogue between the Malian government and the armed groups in northern Mali, were gradually set aside, marking a clear break with the diplomatic strategy that Algeria supported.
We are witnessing a veritable paradigm shift in the region. Faced with the persistence of the Tuareg rebellion, the Malian authorities are now opting for a security and military approach to the crisis. Where previous governments sought to negotiate political solutions, the new ruling junta has opted for a strategy of force, aiming to regain control of the northern regions and impose stability by force of arms. This shift was reinforced by a military rapprochement with Russia, notably through the Wagner militia, which has de facto marginalized the players in favor of a peaceful resolution to the dispute, including Algeria. Algiers, which considered the Malian issue crucial to its own stability and security, is seeing its influence wane.
At the same time, new players are trying to take advantage of the difficult climate between Algiers and Bamako to strengthen their presence in the region. One of the most notable initiatives is that of Morocco, which at the end of 2023 launched the “Royal Initiative to promote access to the Atlantic for Sahel countries”. This long-term plan aims to strengthen economic and security ties between Sahelian countries and Morocco, by offering them access to the ocean via the future port of Dakhla located in Western Sahara (an occupied territory claimed by the Polisario Front supported by Algeria). Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, but also Chad, who see this as an opportunity to diversify their partners and gain access to new strategic opportunities, quickly expressed their support.
On the Algerian side, this Moroccan offensive is naturally frowned upon, all the more so as the rivalry between the two countries is also expressed in the field of information. Algeria accuses Rabat of manipulating Malian public opinion to turn against it. In December 2023, Algerian public radio revealed, based on intelligence sources, that Morocco, Israel and the United Arab Emirates were financing media campaigns aimed at distorting current events in the Sahel and tarnishing the image of the Algerian authorities.
Stirring up the outside world to lock up the inside political space
Algeria’s marginalization in the Malian issue can also be explained by the junta’s internal political strategy. To justify the extension of the transition and maintain its legitimacy, the Malian government is seeking to designate both external and internal enemies. Rebel groups in the North are naturally designated as a threat to national unity. But this logic also extends to those calling for dialogue, perceived as indirect supporters of these movements. In this context, Algeria, because of its historic role as mediator, is gradually being portrayed as a hostile external power, whose diplomatic stances are allegedly contrary to Mali’s interests.
At the same time, the junta tightened its control over domestic political life. On April 10, 2024, it suspended the activities of political parties and associations, citing “sterile discussions” and risks to public order. Although this suspension was lifted in July 2024, tensions persist. More than 80 political parties and organizations called for a presidential election and an end to the transition, pointing out that its duration legally ended on March 26, 2024. Demonstrations took place in Bamako in April 2025 to denounce the methods of Colonel Assimi Goita, illustrating the mistrust that reigns between the junta and traditional political forces.
A similar dynamic is at work in neighboring Niger, where the junta that emerged from the July 2023 coup d’état recently dissolved all political parties, thus confirming the prolonged suspension of democratic life. Niger, also a member of the AES, has followed Mali’s lead in its hostility towards Algiers. Algerian diplomats have expressed regret that Niamey has “blindly” joined forces with Bamako, even though several strategic joint projects have yet to be finalized. These include the Algiers-Lagos trans-Saharan road and the Algeria-Nigeria trans-Saharan gas pipeline, both of which are due to cross Niger territory. The Algerian company Sonatrach is also planning to build a power plant in the country, where access to electricity remains very uneven. Like Burkina Faso, Niger’s diplomatic choices are nevertheless made within the framework of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This organization was set up in response to ECOWAS sanctions, and is keen to assert political solidarity between military regimes.
At a time when transnational challenges are worsening, the creation of a lasting climate of mistrust between Algeria and the Sahelian regimes can only weaken the region as a whole. In this respect, Russia seems best placed to play a useful intermediary role, provided that a more open channel of discussion opens up between Algiers and Moscow on the future of the Sahel.
