In 2025, Brazil will host two of the most consequential global gatherings in the fight against climate change: the 30th Conference of the Parties (COP30) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 17th BRICS Summit. While the significance of COP30 is self-evident, the importance of the BRICS meeting should not be underestimated. The bloc is undergoing a notable “greening” process, marked by increasing strategic alignment on climate issues. This convergence is expected to shape — and potentially influence — the dynamics of the November negotiations at COP30. Expectations are high that the BRICS meetings in Brazil will deliver substantive outcomes and that COP30 will stand firm amid growing turbulence driven by intensifying unilateral foreign policies.
The aim of this article is to examine the recent trend toward the “greening” of the BRICS bloc, particularly in light of the latest joint declaration issued by the environment ministers of its member states. This emerging environmental agenda signals a potential pivot in the group’s identity—from an economic and geopolitical counterweight to a more proactive actor in global sustainability governance. In this context, the essay explores the bloc’s capacity to confront pressing environmental and climate-related challenges while also scrutinizing the internal asymmetries and political frictions that may hinder the consolidation of a coherent and influential BRICS position on global environmental issues.
Active since 2008, the BRICS group traces its origins to cooperation within multilateral financial institutions. Since then—and especially following its recent expansion—the bloc has seen a notable rise in intra-BRICS initiatives focused on sustainability and climate change. In their 2024 joint declaration, the heads of state made clear that climate change has become a central priority for the group. If it is true that BRICS seeks to reshape, rather than replace, the current global order, this ambition necessarily entails aligning both their foreign legal frameworks and domestic public policies with the imperatives of climate action.
In line with Brazil’s natural vocation in the domains of clean energy, environmental stewardship, and the fight against climate change, the BRICS summit of 2025 has adopted an ambitious and telling motto: “Strengthening Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance.” In doing so, it signals a deliberate shift in emphasis from the security-driven agenda that dominated the Kazan Summit in Russia the previous year. Under Brazil’s presidency, the bloc appears poised to redefine its priorities, anchoring them in issues of long-term planetary consequence rather than immediate geopolitical tensions.
The message is twofold and unmistakable. First, enhanced cooperation among countries of the Global South is no longer optional—it is imperative. Second, and perhaps more significantly, the outcomes of this cooperation must be rooted in sustainability, not only in environmental terms but also in the broader sense of inclusive global governance. By placing these principles at the heart of its diplomatic agenda, Brazil invites a reimagining of the BRICS as a platform not just for multipolar balance, but for constructive, future-facing solutions to challenges shared across hemispheres.
By adopting the language of the “Global South” as part of its official discourse, BRICS appears to claim for itself the responsibility of representing—and safeguarding—the interests of this broad and often ill-defined constituency. Yet representation becomes problematic when one considers the composition of the current BRICS+ constellation: eleven full members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia) alongside nine officially recognized partners (Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Nigeria). This grouping of 20 states (and there are other candidates to join the bloc) encompasses vast differences in political systems, foreign policy orientations, and internal tensions.
On climate issues, particularly greenhouse gas emissions, many BRICS countries rank among the world’s largest emitters. Any meaningful solution to the climate crisis—whether within or outside a BRICS-led architecture—must inevitably involve them. The question, then, is whether BRICS+ can genuinely claim to represent the interests of the broader Global South, a concept tied to developmental status, colonial legacies, and stages of industrialization.
It is indeed the case that within the field of technological cooperation, certain BRICS members stand as global leaders in the development of clean energy and green technologies—electric vehicles being a prime example. This intra-BRICS leadership and collaboration represent not merely a strategic alignment of technical capabilities but a significant opportunity for technological diffusion across the bloc, with potentially far-reaching consequences.
Such diffusion directly addresses the economic pillar of sustainable development, as outlined in the landmark 1992 Rio Declaration, which called for a balanced integration of economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental stewardship. By leveraging internal strengths and sharing innovations, the BRICS countries are uniquely positioned to translate their technological prowess into a developmental model that aligns prosperity with planetary responsibility.
However, BRICS is, by its very nature, asymmetrical. Its “greening” is therefore equally uneven. Still, this does not preclude the emergence of shared priorities or strategic legal alignments within the international climate regime.
The Kazan Declaration—the most ambitious document yet produced by the BRICS—placed climate change squarely at the center of the bloc’s agenda. The international climate regime, including the Paris Agreement, featured prominently as a focal point for joint intentions and commitments. Notably, the declaration rejected the use of climate arguments as justification for unilateral state actions—a pointed critique of certain trade policies pursued by countries and economic blocs in the Global North.
Kazan marks the high point of a crescendo of climate and sustainability references within BRICS declarations and action plans, signaling a more assertive and coordinated environmental discourse from the group.
In an effort to shield themselves from criticism for belonging to the club of major emitters, BRICS countries have embraced a legal strategy firmly grounded in the current architecture of international environmental and climate law. By emphasizing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), the bloc draws directly from Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration and its enduring influence on global legal norms.
The principle is straightforward in wording but far-reaching in implication: “In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, states have common but differentiated responsibilities.” The Declaration further notes that “the developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.”
This foundational principle has informed the very design of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement—and has featured prominently in recent BRICS declarations, serving both as a legal shield and a normative compass.
In the advisory proceedings before the International Court of Justice—the United Nations’ highest judicial body—concerning states’ obligations on climate change, a legal battlefield has emerged. Most BRICS countries have forcefully underscored the deep inequalities in historical emissions and the imperative of upholding the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) (see China‘s and Brazil‘s submissions, for instance). In contrast, some Northern states have vigorously denied both the legal standing and normative implications of such a principle.
Underlying this clash is a deeper geopolitical logic: developed countries are increasingly wary that emerging economies—some of which already rival them in key sectors—might gain further competitive ground if international climate obligations are tailored to reflect historical responsibility and developmental asymmetries.
As the legal battle over climate responsibilities continues to gallop forward in negotiations between developed and developing nations, the BRICS bloc has been quietly building new internal structures to enhance cooperation, dialogue, and coordination on climate-related matters. This trend was particularly evident during the 2024 meetings held in Russia. Sustainability is also gaining prominence in the bloc’s trade agenda. The BRICS, it seems, are steadily—and strategically—going green.
It is no coincidence that climate change ranks among the six priority areas of Brazil’s BRICS presidency in 2025. In this context, beyond the traditional joint leaders’ declaration advancing common positions on environmental and climate issues, there is explicit ambition to adopt a BRICS Climate Leadership Agenda and a Leaders’ Framework Declaration on Climate Finance—aimed at promoting structural shifts within the financial sector.
On 4 March 2025, the BRICS environment ministers adopted a joint statement entitled “Advancing Environmental Cooperation amongst BRICS towards Sustainable Development and a Just Transition for All.” It is expected that elements of the language adopted in this communiqué will be echoed in the final declaration of the 2025 BRICS summit. By outlining a series of intra-bloc cooperative initiatives, the document reaffirms a set of shared positions—most notably the assertion that “cooperation within and through BRICS has the potential to contribute to the global path towards a sustainable future and an equitable and just transition for all.”
Equally significant is the statement’s firm defense of the global multilateral architecture. The ministers underscore that all environmental protection measures “must not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.” This language reflects a long-standing concern among BRICS members that climate-related regulations in global trade frameworks may serve protectionist ends. The statement thus balances a growing rhetorical embrace of sustainability with a clear insistence on safeguarding development space and resisting environmentally motivated trade barriers.
While not legally binding, such an agenda and declarations could exert meaningful influence both within and beyond the bloc. They have the potential to shape expectations, set soft standards, and signal best practices to states aspiring to become BRICS partners or full members. If adopted, these instruments may serve as strategic tools to align priorities, guide policy direction, and lay the groundwork for the high-stakes negotiations at COP30 later this year.
The message is clear: while others hesitate, BRICS nations are signaling their intent to take the lead in addressing the climate crisis, promoting a sustainable energy transition—and, without illusion, pursuing the economic gains that such transformation entails. Even the bloc’s agenda on artificial intelligence has been increasingly infused with notions of sustainability, suggesting a broader shift toward climate-conscious policymaking across sectors.
Naturally, questions persist as to how effectively BRICS can contribute to tackling climate change, given the vast differences among its members in terms of industrial structures, energy matrices, and climate ambitions. A cursory glance at the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and environmental strategies of countries like China and Russia reveals divergent levels of commitment and capacity.
Scholars have long critiqued what some perceive as a degree of taking advantage of the bloc’s environmental posture. Yet such criticism should not obscure the tangible progress that has emerged. The New Development Bank, for instance, has prioritized sustainable financing, embedding environmental considerations into its internal regulatory framework and funding criteria.
That there are identifiable points of convergence in BRICS legal diplomacy on climate change makes the bloc an unavoidable actor—not only at COP negotiations but in the broader quest for viable solutions to the climate crisis. The BRICS are going green. By the close of Brazil’s presidency and COP30, the world will be better positioned to assess just how deep—and how durable—that greening truly is.
