Iran and the Accumulation of Historical Concerns about Survival

In the realist school, the main desires of countries are considered to be survival and security. Iran, as one of the oldest civilizations in the region, has been facing this issue for many years.

In the realist school, the main desires of countries are considered to be survival and security. Iran, as one of the oldest civilizations in the region, has been facing this issue for many years. Due to its geographical location and other interests, such as connecting the East and West of the world and energy, Iran has always been attacked by foreign powers such as Alexander, the Mongols in ancient times, the Ottomans, and its eastern neighbors in the Middle Ages, and in contemporary times, Britain and Russia. Only during the last 100 years was Iran occupied once, in 1941 and in World War II, by the Allied forces despite declaring neutrality. In 1953, in response to Iran’s attempts to nationalize its oil, the legitimate government was overthrown, and Western governments in Iran staged a coup. Finally, just a few months after the revolution, Saddam Hussein’s regime imposed an all-out war on Iran that lasted eight years.

The accumulation of experience and life in this region has made the continuation of the threat experience a priority for Iran and every ruler in Iran that has tried to make arrangements for it. Over the past hundred years, the Iranians have pursued at least three security strategies. The first one was a negative and positive balance with the Soviet Union and Britain. It meant not giving concessions to these two or giving concessions to both of them. The policies of this strategy manifested themselves in the form of granting different foreign concessions to Britain and Russia/Soviet. The changes in the international order in World War II and perhaps the lack of appropriate action by Iran’s decision-makers during those years, as well as the effectiveness of this strategy for ensuring Iran’s security, led to the invasion due to the presence of Allied forces in Iran. It also caused the change of the Shah of Iran.

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi said in an interview: “During the Second World War, based on the optimism that international law would be preserved, we were resting in the golden cage of our so-called neutrality until the powerful states attacked us. If we had not been optimistic in those days and had been defensively prepared to confront the occupation of our country, those events would not have happened.”

Another strategy that emerged after Britain left the region in the 70s and the opportunity for more regional actors to be active was Iran accepting the task of ensuring regional security with the support and backing of the United States. This policy, which can be called “Regional Gendarmerie”, made Iran emerge as a military power in the region. This was reflected in the CENTO agreements, which were a kind of West Asian NATO without the presence of the United States itself. Iran under the Shah was America’s number one arms customer, accounting for $18.1 billion or 25 percent of the $71 billion in military orders placed by foreign governments under the Foreign Military Sales program between FY 1950 and FY 1977. According to Asadollah Alam memories, a key Iranian politician who was prime minister during the Shah’s regime, The Shah told the American ambassador: “I will provide for my country’s defense budget even if it means starving the people.”

A revolution in Iran occurred, one of the main demands of which was independence. This word has been emphasized 15 times in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, indicating the position of this desire in the mentality of the Iranian people. Independence had made Iran’s security dependent on the will of the great power, namely the United States. Therefore, for example Iran supplied fuel to the US fleet in the Indian Ocean and sent F5 Phantom aircraft to support South Vietnam beyond its national will.

This lack of independence in security, along with the significant experience of the imposed war with the Baath regime and Saddam Hussein, the limited capabilities due to sanctions, and external pressure after the revolution, led to the new design of a type of security strategy for Iran. This new strategy should be both efficient in contrast to the negative/positive balance and independent in contrast to the role of the regional gendarmerie. This strategy was the strategy of “Asymmetric Deterrence”. According to its capabilities, Iran’s strategy has focused on developing a type of asymmetric deterrence. This asymmetry means that the country’s level of capability is not similar and not aligned with its enemy. Still, by acquiring a certain capability, it has the possibility of meaningfully imposing costs on the enemy. This asymmetric deterrence strategy has resulted in the development of tools such as drones, missiles and fast boats.

In the minds of Iranian decision-makers, survival has always been a threat accumulated throughout history.  So, it deals with solving it as a number one priority. The capacity for asymmetric deterrence has ensured Iran’s national security until recent years. But in recent weeks, some threats and actions have been made against Iran that seem to have once again prioritized the threat of survival over their own. For example, Senator Lindsay Graham, a notable hawk in foreign policy, has called for bombing Iranian refineries.  There are also numerous claims that the US or Israel should target Iran’s nuclear facilities. If this mindset is backed up with enough real evidence, it seems that Iran will not hesitate to increase its security level and change its strategy. This is a lesson from history for them. This is why Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, in response to the recent Israeli attack on Iran, stated, “The miscalculations of the Zionist regime must be disrupted.”

There are lists of different options that Iran may respond to these threats. This concern of survival will make Iran accept costs for the sake of its security. Iran’s enemy could push decision-makers in Tehran to address “the Accumulated and Historical Concerns of this land”. FM Araghchi on X posted that: “Maximum Pressure 1.0 “ compelled ‘Maximum Resistance’. There could be Max Resistance 2.0 with significant development in deterrence and addressing Historical Concerns about Survival.

In the latest developments, Trump has sent a letter to Iran offering a deal or choosing a military option. Iran can be handled: militarily, or you can make a deal,” Trump told Fox Business. “I would prefer to make a deal, because I’m not looking to hurt Iran.” To understand the mindset of decision-makers in Tehran, it is important to understand that Iranians view developments with a “Present History.” This means that they see Trump as someone who withdrew from the JCPOA and took military action against Iran by assassinating General Soleimani. Of course, neither side wants a large-scale war now, but it remains to be seen whether the various pressures on Iran, in the event of military action against it, will bring it to “Day Zero” decision making, or whether diplomacy can address the Iranians’ historical concern for survival, along with the ongoing distrust of the United States from the 1953 coup against Mossadegh to the hostile actions of the first Trump administration.’ . Max pressure 1.0 leads to the “No war, No negotiation” policy of Iran, Max pressure 2.0 could lead to “Both War or/and Negotiation” policy.

Ali Salehian
Ali Salehian
Ali Salehian, PhD candidate of International relations at Tarbiat Modares University, Senior Reseacher at Governance and Policy Think Tank, Tehran.