The Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan in 2021 was heralded as a decisive victory for the militant group, yet four years into their rule, the regime teeters on the precipice of implosion. Beneath the facade of unity lies a labyrinth of factionalism, economic paralysis, and governance failures that have eroded its foundations. As internal schisms deepen and external pressures mount, the Taliban’s grip on power grows increasingly tenuous.
The Taliban’s internal cohesion, once fortified by a shared objective to expel foreign forces, has unravelled in the absence of a common enemy. The regime’s leadership, ostensibly centralized under the reclusive Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, is fractured along regional, tribal, and ideological lines. While the power struggle between Kabul’s bureaucratic elite and Kandahar’s religious hardliners is often cited as the primary rift, the reality is more nuanced. Factionalism permeates every tier of the Taliban hierarchy, with Pashtun tribal loyalties—particularly Akhundzada’s Noorzai tribe—alienating Ghilzai, Durrani, and non-Pashtun factions. This tribal favouritism has stoked resentment among commanders who feel marginalized, mirroring the ethnic divisions that have historically plagued Afghan governance.
Unlike the Taliban’s founding leader, Mullah Omar, whose charismatic authority bridged tribal divides, Akhundzada’s insular leadership has exacerbated fragmentation. His reliance on a narrow circle of loyalists and refusal to decentralize power have transformed the regime into a patronage network rather than a functional government. Compounding this is the resurgence of regional warlordism, with provincial Taliban leaders exploiting their autonomy to control resources and enforce rival agendas. Such discord undermines the regime’s capacity to project strength, revealing a movement ill-equipped to transition from insurgency to statecraft.
The Taliban’s economic policies have accelerated Afghanistan’s descent into humanitarian catastrophe. Rather than stabilizing the economy, the regime has weaponized resource control to consolidate power. Figures like Haji Bashir Noorzai, a key Akhundzada ally, dominate the lucrative mining sector, diverting revenues to elite circles while ordinary Afghans face crippling taxes and inflation. The agricultural and banking sectors, already weakened by decades of conflict, have collapsed under the weight of sanctions and the regime’s incompetence.
Afghanistan’s economy, artificially sustained by billions in frozen U.S. aid during the occupation, now faces irreversible collapse as international donors withdraw. Inflation exceeds 30%, unemployment hovers near 40%, and over 90% of the population lives in poverty. The Taliban’s response—a combination of denial and repression—has only deepened public disillusionment. By prioritizing ideological purity over pragmatic governance, the regime has forfeited any semblance of economic legitimacy, fuelling grassroots dissent and emboldening resistance movements.
The Taliban’s inability to govern is perhaps its most glaring vulnerability. Having mastered the art of guerrilla warfare, the group lacks the administrative acumen to manage a nation. Ministries remain understaffed, infrastructure projects stalled, and public services non-existent. The regime’s draconian social policies—notably its gender apartheid, banning women from education and employment—have drawn global condemnation, isolating Afghanistan diplomatically.
This isolation is self-inflicted. Despite initial diplomatic overtures, the Taliban have rejected every opportunity for international normalization. Their refusal to form an inclusive government, sever ties with transnational terrorists, or moderate extremist policies has cost them critical recognition. Even regional allies like Pakistan and China, initially pragmatic in their engagement, now distance themselves as the regime’s instability threatens regional security. The Taliban’s squandering of the Doha Agreement’s diplomatic goodwill underscores a fatal inflexibility: they remain insurgents, not statesmen.
Global actors are increasingly leveraging legal and economic tools to compound the Taliban’s crises. The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrants for Taliban leaders—a response to crimes against humanity, including gender persecution—have intensified internal discord. Hardliners view the warrants as a badge of honour, while pragmatic factions see them as liabilities, further fracturing cohesion.
Meanwhile, the U.S. and EU have shifted aid strategies to bypass the regime, channelling funds through NGOs and UN agencies. This approach starves the Taliban of resources while addressing humanitarian needs, exposing their governance failures. Concurrently, regional powers are cautiously engaging Afghan resistance groups, such as the National Resistance Front (NRF), hedging against the regime’s potential collapse.
The Taliban’s survival hinges on suppressing dissent and maintaining a veneer of control. Yet, as inflation soars, ethnic tensions flare, and defections multiply, the regime’s collapse appears inevitable. The question is not if, but when—and how violently—the implosion will occur. History offers a stark lesson: regimes built on repression and exclusion rarely endure. For the Taliban, their refusal to adapt may seal their fate.
Recommendations for the International Community
- Leverage ICC warrants and sanctions to delegitimize the Taliban, targeting regime elites while protecting vulnerable populations.
- Direct funding through independent agencies to bypass Taliban intermediaries, ensuring aid reaches civilians without bolstering the regime.
- Support dialogue between the NRF, civil society groups, and disaffected Taliban factions to forge a post-collapse roadmap.
- Collaborate with regional actors to disrupt Taliban revenue streams, particularly mining and narcotics trafficking.
- Encourage neighbouring states to mitigate refugee crises and terrorism risks through multilateral frameworks.
“A house divided against itself cannot stand.”— Abraham Lincoln
