US-India Relations in a Multipolar World: The Impact of China and BRICS on US Grand Strategy

The relationship is predicated on the major assumption of the Indo-US purchase resting on India helping counteract China's influence in the region.

The US has been viewing the Indian behemoth as a check against the Chinese rise in the Asia-Pacific region, but the agreement by these two countries on China-India border patrol for 2024 has put question marks on this posture. The normalization attempts between China and India regarding border matters are ongoing despite both sides’ determination to cooperate in pursuing joint interests in bilateral trade and multilateral channels like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) blocs. It is not uncommon for India to walk both sides of the street. India is an active member of BRICS as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), but it is also taking the lead in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), India, Israel and the United States, UAE (I2U2) and the United States Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). This is similar to the so-called strategic autonomy of India’s Cold War-era non-alignment policy. But it has caused serious alarm in Washington about India’s usefulness in the context of the US grand strategy for the Asia-Pacific region. The relationship is predicated on the major assumption of the Indo-US purchase resting on India helping counteract China’s influence in the region.

The Indian External Affairs Ministry unveiled a significant disengagement agreement between India and China at the latest 2024 BRICS summit in Russia. Both nations also agreed to withdraw the number of soldiers at the two unresolved areas of dispute at the India-China boundary. That deal resumed routine patrolling in the area that looked like it had functioned before their 2020 border clash. Chinese investment is needed for India to accelerate its economic growth, said Sushant Singh, a fellow in the Foreign Policy Programme at Yale University. India’s business community cherishes India’s business links with China, something that may have influenced the Modi-Xi détente. This patchup between China and India is deeply worrying for the US, because the primary US interest toward South Asia focuses on India’s action to oppose the rise of China.

No, India is not Western; it is not anti-Western either: at any point in great power competition, it takes the middle path. BRICS & Quad with safe hand hedging signifies India’s monumental relevance for her nay traditional method of international politics. In fact, it becomes even more jarring to observe the way the US has misread India’s approach and gambled on it to offset the rise of China. That is a long way from being part of the US’s “hub and spoke” model. As the largest democracy and one of the fastest-growing economies, Delhi has long seen the BRICS platform as an opportunity to project soft power in the Global South. It has significant interests in the region, with an expanding presence in African, Latin American, and Southeast Asian markets. This Indian ambition stands in competition with the American vision of India.

The BRICS platform is a natural space for India to exercise its economic and political power. The bilateral trade reached $200 billion between the US and India in 2024, showing strengthening economic relations. But India would face both a challenge and an opportunity as BRICS would inevitably clash with Trump’s agenda—and his tariff threats could complicate the picture. India may be finding it harder to make that choice if other BRICS member countries continue to encourage the use of local currencies in trade. It might move closer to the BRICS bloc, offering a channel to project its influence in the Global South and perhaps further estranging Washington by remaining a BRICS member. Secondly, the concept of BRICS has been conceived from India with an aspiration to become a leader of the Global South.

Despite Trump’s tough rhetoric, India’s commitments in BRICS and growing economic relations with other BRICS members may draw Delhi closer to those nations and away from the US. While India is unlikely to stop doing business in dollars any time soon, it may increasingly help BRICS in its more ambitious goal of lessening dependency on the US currency. India has so far not warmed towards the de-dollarization strategy espoused by BRICS, but the momentum to move to local currencies by other member states may soon push India to take a stand. With changes in the geopolitical landscape, India will have to adjust its position between responding to the economic and strategic leverage of the US-led bloc and the BRICS bloc’s growing influence.

At BRICS, India’s firm commitments and Modi-Xi rapprochement do assure that India doesn’t feel threatened from China. At the same time, it calls into question India’s role as a regional power balancer against China for the US. But how Washington would manage its relations with India in the future was not entirely clear. The US has no other option but to rely on India in the context of the containment policy for China in the region. Given the consensus of both countries over China, the only shot Washington can fire is through Delhi. India-China détente is a watershed of sorts that may induce the US to rethink India as a strategic partner in the Asia-Pacific region. Worse, not only must Washington also now contend with the new dynamics in BRICS produced by Trump’s hardline approach, but the wider geopolitical shifts may send India into the arms of the BRICS construct further than what it might have attempted as it tried to keep its bet in Washington. India’s time-tested foreign policy of strategic autonomy will be under severe strain over how the country responds to these pressures in the years to come.

Hamad Ullah Gulzaar
Hamad Ullah Gulzaar
I graduated from Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan with a degree in Political Science.