For many Americans, technology seems to provide the solution to winning the nation’s next major war. Fearsome shows of force from Russia and China combined with worries of falling behind enemy capabilities have propelled the US towards a technology-first Offset Strategy, believing that this can increase chances at victory and deter conflict. Unfortunately, this thinking has only resulted in funding projects without purpose. It neglects the fundamental truth of what wins wars – doctrine and doctrinal evolution. The claim that technology alone drives changes in the nature and character of war cannot stand under scrutiny. On the contrary, technology serves as a force multiplier and executor of doctrine – it is effective only to the extent that doctrine enables it. Should America forget this fact and prioritize technology-driven doctrine instead of doctrinally-driven technology, it risks losing the next major war, even if faced with technologically inferior opponents. America must prioritize doctrine, not technology, in preparation for the future fight.
Planning Like It’s 1989
In its quest to secure a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to counter developments from Russia and China, the United States military has prioritized creating specific capabilities under the Third Offset Strategy, including weapons such as hypersonic missiles, drones, and AI. This approach refers to the third time that the US, at least in the eyes of Offset Strategy proponents, has systematically used technology to overmatch an adversary’s perceived advantages. However, while America has achieved offsets against past enemies, such offsets emerged from the skillful employment of technology as a force multiplier within a greater doctrinal scheme. Technology, no matter the type, is always measured in effectiveness by its ability to implement the strategy and doctrine it serves under. Effective implementation of doctrine based on technologies developed to execute it can serve as a more significant deterrent than nuclear weapons, convincing the enemy that they cannot employ their strategies.
Perhaps the most remarkable historical example of this comes from the Cold War, when NATO, faced with overwhelming numbers and capable military technology from the Soviet Union, had to evolve its plans to win a conventional war in Europe. In the 1970s, NATO, observing Israel’s successful use of maneuver warfare doctrine combined with technology during the Yom Kippur War, introduced the AirLand Battle doctrine, which emphasized early offensive action through rapid retaliatory strikes and breakthrough tactics. AirLand Battle replaced the Active Defense doctrine, which saw conflict in Europe as inherently defensive and de-emphasized offensive maneuver actions. AirLand Battle’s requirements directly led to the development of the F-117 Nighthawk, AH-64 Apache, M1 Abrams, and many other weapons – including precision-guided munitions – that dominated conflicts through the 1990s and beyond. These weapons made no sense under the alliance’s previous doctrine – only within AirLand Battle did the need for such technology emerge. Because of doctrinal-technological fusion, NATO achieved a force-multiplication advantage over the Soviet Union.
Lessons from the Past
Conversely, pursuing a technology-driven offset strategy without regard for doctrine’s implications can prove disastrous for a nation’s military. Imperial Japan’s embrace of this mindset in World War II offers a stark lesson on the dangers of pairing superior technology with the wrong doctrinal formula. At the outset of WWII, Japan’s six fleet aircraft carriers formed the core of its naval power. Developed as a way to offset America’s superior battleship force, Japan planned to use its highly advanced carrier fleet to dominate the Pacific. However, despite their ships’ advanced capabilities, Japan’s naval strategy remained rooted in outdated concepts emphasizing decisive battles over flexibility. This approach met with disaster at Midway in 1942. Hesitating to launch an immediate strike on newly spotted US Navy carriers, Japanese leadership insisted on rearming half their available carrier aircraft for a massive, unified attack according to Japanese naval doctrine. This delay allowed American forces, operating under adapted and innovative carrier strike tactics, to attack first, resulting in the loss of four Japanese carriers and ending Japan’s initiative in the Pacific War.
Avoiding America’s Midway
The US cannot afford a Midway moment in the next great power war. To ensure a chance at victory, America needs to take a critical look at its current doctrine and refine it, analyzing what future battlespaces will look like and developing its requirements based on that analysis. Merely emphasizing the multi-domain nature of future conflict falls short of adequately addressing what a war might look like and how the US will need to fight it. Offset technologies may prove helpful, but only under an appropriate framework with a place and novel use.
Embracing new and evolved warfighting concepts integrated with cross-domain ideas such as the Air Littoral are perhaps the most critical aspects of any future military doctrine. Past developments have dictated the realities of future war: weapon ranges have increased, defensive capabilities have proliferated, and the likely flashpoints for potential American engagements with Russia or China have been well-solidified. Both Eastern Europe and the South China Sea pose unique challenges. In Europe, the rise of irregular warfare with drones has blurred the line that separates the air and land domains – drone-accessible airspace, known as the Air Littoral, dominates conflict now, challenging traditional concepts of air superiority and demanding enhanced electronic warfare and aerial denial tactics. In Asia, vast expanses of ocean and land alike demand missiles of great range and aircraft of great striking power. China has already recognized this and has developed a strategy of area denial that it executes with some of the most advanced anti-air and anti-ship weaponry developed to date – an example of force multiplication. America must mirror this through long-range, distributed force employment plans. Only after America establishes a new doctrine based on these operating environments can the development of Third Offset technologies, which alone will not win the next war, be justified. A modern RMA achieved through the correct fusion of technology and doctrine provides the winning answer, increasing the odds of victory in a future great power war.
